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Introduction
Regarding the mediatization of the secular state
In Poland, a secular state remains the “pious wish” of opponents of religion in the 
public sphere. November 13, 2015, was the day after the swearing-in ceremony 
which opened the new term of the Polish parliament. On the largest Polish news 
portal, Onet.pl, a text with a significant title appeared: Sejm of the 8th term. How 
many deputies swore “without God” (2015). The author of the article named 27 
deputies who took an oath without ending “so help me God.” Here, the author 
allowed the readers to interpret who was “righteous” or “wicked.” This figure 
shows that the Church-state relationship in Poland really does matter.
June 1, 2018, was the day after the Corpus Christi processions on the streets. 
The YouTube channel called Wolność24 – Wolność i już! [Freedom 24 – Freedom 
Now!] showed a new film with the Butterfly-man, a disguised performer who 
used to disrupt one of the big Corpus Christi processions every year. This time, 
the Butterfly-man chose the main procession in Warsaw. A report about his per-
formance dressed as Jesus, in a dozen or so hours, was viewed by over 60,000 
YouTube users. Here we can see that the controversy of the meeting point of the 
Church in public space has a significant reception and this is happening even 
faster than ever before.
Comparing these images, we perceive a certain scheme. Religion in Poland’s 
public space is doing very well. Those who do not enter into its framework are 
subject to controversy. It does not matter if their agency takes on a civilized form 
or breaks religious feelings and blasphemy. Today, this is happening at a faster 
pace thanks to digital media, while in the past, this was happening at a slower 
pace through traditional media. What essentially is this process? What are its 
dynamics?
Context: Secularization, desecularization
In this book, we deal with this issue by associating the fields of media, religion, 
and politics. This attempt leads to articulate the thesis on the mediatization 
of the secular state. In particular, this matter gets to the roots of the general 
problem of religion in society. Two essentially permitted empirical approaches 
can be pointed out in this case: secularization and desecularization.
When we think of a secular state, it becomes clear that the context of sec-
ularization reveals the most natural ambience for its implementation in systemic 
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practice. However, secularization does not quite suit the Polish case. To begin 
with, let’s recall José Casanova’s (2006) statement made over a decade ago:
“Let Poland itself prove the secularization thesis wrong. Let Polonia Semper Fidelis keep 
faith with its Catholic identity and tradition while succeeding in its integration into 
Europe, thus becoming a ‘normal’ European country. Such an outcome, if feasible, could 
suggest that the decline of religion in Europe might not be a teleological process neces-
sarily linked with modernization, but rather a historical choice Europeans have made. 
A modern religious Poland could perhaps force secular Europeans to rethink their sec-
ularist assumptions and realize that it is not so much Poland that is out of sync with 
modern trends, but rather a secular Europe that is out of sync with the rest of the world.”
In his short text, Casanova establishes two mechanisms. The first indicates that 
modernization does not have to involve a decline in religiosity. The second 
assumes a missionary perspective according to which Poland has the potential 
to convince Europe to abandon the path of secularization. This rhetorical matter 
indicates that when thinking about secularization, we have in mind the decline 
in religiosity associated with modernization. Second, secularization cannot be 
reduced in this way in Poland. In a country with such a strictly homogeneous 
religious structure (Borowik, Dyczewska, & Litak, 2012), this would be an abuse. 
Let’s, therefore, ask two basic questions. What is secularization? To what extent 
can we create an analytical context for contemporary Poland?
Secularization derives from the Latin saeculum [world] (Vorgrimler, 
2005:  333), which suggests secularizing, or the late Latin saecularis [secular] 
(Grabowska, 2002: 21). It appeared in relation to the Church authorities’ pro-
gress since the Reformation when lay rulers robbed Church property. In 
European languages, the term became popular at the Peace of Westphalia in 1648 
where it expressed the transfer of Church-controlled areas to the state (Wilson, 
2005: 8214). In Poland, it appeared in this sense only in 1773 in connection with 
the dissolution of the Jesuit Order (Grabowska, 2002). Sometime later, the term 
secularization meant a priest being dispensed from his vows and his transfer to 
the secular state (Wilson, 2005).
The classics of social thought began to perceive secularization as a process of 
particular areas of social life (culture, politics, economy, etc.) becoming inde-
pendent from the influence of religion in Western Europe. Karl Marx, Sigmund 
Freud, and Émile Durkheim postulated a decline in religiosity along with social 
modernization. Present in Max Weber’s (1946) slight reflection on rationaliza-
tion, Entzauberung der Welt [disenchantment of the world] has become the basic 
term for describing these processes.
In modern approaches to secularism, attention has been drawn to the fact that 
in the sacred space of meaning, religion is losing control over other spheres of 
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life that are gaining autonomy. On the other hand, individuals are constructing 
their own privatized version of the world. As a result, their religion (1) loses the 
transcendent element and enters into the worldly and (2) penetrates the world 
in such a way that it begins to be invisible religion (Luckmann, 1967). According 
to Peter L. Berger’s (1967) view, secularization proceeds along with the rational-
ization of the world and industry. Society is then freed from the control of reli-
gion. Religions themselves begin to compete with each other for followers. Bryan 
R. Wilson (2016) claims that, during the course of social differentiation, ratio-
nalization brings secularization, whose basic feature refers to autonomy. The 
independence of social institutions causes institutional religions, practices, and 
ways of thinking related to religion to lose their importance. Many theoreticians 
popularize the view of Franz-Xaver Kaufmann (1979) that the process of sec-
ularization is not a linear departure from religion. There is also a consensus 
that, depending on the variant, secularization occurs at the social, institutional, 
and individual levels (Dobbelaere, 2002; Giddens, 2009; Kaufmann, 1979; 
Wilson, 2016).
In recent decades, there have basically been two approaches that compre-
hensively relate to the progress of secularization. Casanova’s (1994) sociological 
concept understands secularization in three dimensions. The first is the pro-
gressive loss of beliefs and the decline of religious practices in modern socie-
ties. The second refers to the privatization of religion. The third assumes the 
emancipation of secular social spheres, meaning their differentiation from reli-
gious institutions. Charles Taylor in his Secular Age (2007) presented another 
approach to secularization a decade ago. The author based this on a largely phil-
osophical analysis of the progress of secularization in the North Atlantic world 
on several typologies, which, according to Robert N.  Bellah (2007) and later 
researchers (Künkler, Madeley, & Shankar, 2018), three dimensions come to 
the fore: Secularity I, II, and III. Bellah interprets Taylor’s Secularity I by differ-
entiating domains such as the state, economics, bureaucracy, law, and politics 
from religious norms and the authority of institutional religions. Using Taylor’s 
Secularity II, Bellah appealed to the decline of religious practices at the indi-
vidual level. However, at the Secularity III level, he was concerned about the 
phenomenon that religious practices and faith became an individual option in 
society. Consequently, an individual must justify his faith more than disbelief. 
Both the secular and sacred find a place in society “by virtue of the conditions of 
the experience of and search for the spiritual” (Taylor, 2007: 4).
Taylor’s Secularity I and II concepts seem to be based on Casanova’s project. 
However, Taylor’s full concept is shaped by omitting emancipation and privat-
ization, which are very important for Casanova’s model (Gorski, 2018). Thus, 
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Taylor’s approach has a broader character than Casanova’s and, as recently 
shown by editors Mirjam Künkler, John Madeley, and Shylashri Shankar (2018) 
in their work, after its adaptation to the empirical project, it quite well describes 
the non-Western context. It is necessary to mention that in this adaptation, the 
authors narrowed down the analysis time in comparison to Taylor’s concept. 
They focused equally on every kind of secularization, trying to identify and 
explain the patterns and dynamics of change. They did this clearly differently 
than Taylor, who especially emphasized Secularity III based on understanding 
the changes in the conditions of practicing the faith. Eleven non-Western cases 
served as the basis for their empirical analysis: China, Japan, Indonesia, India, 
Pakistan, Iran, Israel, Turkey, Russia, Egypt, and Morocco.
The results of the analysis showed two general regularities regarding secular-
ization in non-Western countries. First of all, the Western version of the scheme 
cannot be easily translated into a general model. The globalization and moderni-
zation that are progressing worldwide do not apply just one characteristic model 
of secularization. The second conclusion proposed by Künkler et al. states that 
religions differ in their dependence on state regulations. In the case of Islam, 
Hinduism, and Judaism, the dependence of religion on government authorities 
is greater than in Christianity, Buddhism, or Chinese religions.
When we translate secularization presented as such in the case of Poland, 
we can see the implementation of Secularity I  and partial implementation of 
Secularity II (Zielińska, 2009). Despite a few Church-state links in the system, 
a clear differentiation among the spheres of state, law, politics, bureaucracy, and 
economics from the nation’s religious space occurs. It cannot be forgotten, how-
ever, that this process was unique in post-communist countries. In the period 
of the Polish People’s Republic, the state functioned according to the model of 
hostile separation. In accord with Soviet standards, the authorities promoted 
atheism. After the systemic changes in 1989, a period of shaping public secular 
institutions and marked tensions between the secular authority began, which 
was exercised mostly by Catholics and the hierarchy of the Catholic Church just 
recently admitted into the public sphere.
Regarding Secularity II, there is a drop in institutionalized religious practices 
at the individual level. Religiosity in the country is slowly being privatized and 
the incomplete consensus regarding faith is increasing (Borowik, 2010). Such a 
case, however, goes beyond Taylor’s (2007) conceptualization. The relationship 
between Poland and Secularity III is even weaker. The dominating narrative 
proves that Catholic identity is still intertwined with Polish identity. Schemes 
from the periods of partitions and the communist regime, such as “a Pole = a 
Catholic,” are not as clear-cut when we consider the division of religiosity in the 
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countryside and in the city. However, in many regions of Poland, it is impossible 
to talk about religious practices and faith only as an option (CBOS, 1994b). At 
the same time, the percentage of religious practices in large cities has decreased 
(CBOS, 2014; Urzykowski, 2014).
The theory of secularization assumed the disappearance of religion. Berger 
(1999, 2011), its chief propagator, surprised many by pointing out in the last 
decade of his life that modernity is marked by an increase in religious pluralism, 
brought about by counter-secularization. He called this the desecularization pro-
cess. In order to precisely outline the context of our reflection on the media’s idea 
of a secular state, we cannot overlook the specifics of this phenomenon.
Desecularization should be placed on the continuum of the reflection on reli-
gion at the turn of the millennium. According to sociologists, it is impossible to 
only speak about the erosion of whatever is religious, meaning secularization. 
Instead, one sees the complexity and diversity of religion, the development of new 
forms of spirituality and the breakup of secularization tendencies (Mariański, 
2013). This kind of religious revival is taking place all over the world (Berger, 
Davie, & Fokas, 2008; Joas, 2014). This is accompanied by the conviction that 
non-religious projects for Europe have not worked. Modernity, therefore, does 
not give a clear-cut choice concerning the secular side. Actually, modernity allows 
people to choose a lifestyle of both a secular and religious character (Berger & 
Zijderveld, 2009). Modernization does not, therefore, lead to the disappearance of 
religion but its change. This should be understood in the following way. Religion 
is not returning to the public sphere because religion has never disappeared from 
it (Beckford, 2012). Religion, however, has gained new visibility. This property 
shows how religion changes along with society’s changes (Woodhead, 2012).
It turns out that when we try to capture the essence of secularization, we can 
treat it in two ways:  (1) as religion returning to various spheres of social life, 
and (2) as a revival of traditional faith and practices and the emergence of new 
forms of spirituality that are not affiliated with institutional religions (Mariański, 
2013). In the first approach, we see desecularization as standing in opposition 
to secularization. Desecularization provides a space for connecting the religious 
with public issues. In this sense, we get closer to the deprivatization of religion 
(Casanova, 1994). On the other hand, secularization, recognized as social differ-
entiation, emancipates individual spheres of social life from the power of insti-
tutional religions. The second meaning of desecularization presupposes a return 
to traditional piety and the development of spirituality, which can be defined as 
non-denominational (Mercadante, 2014) and the widening of popular religion 
(Knoblauch, 2008). In this sense, secularization means precisely the process of 
pluralizing the religious space.
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In the context of Central European Countries (CEE), including Poland, 
Christopher Marsh’s (2011) proposed way of understanding desecularization 
seems significant. Its essence boils down to the domination of religious 
institutions and symbols over specific spheres of culture and society. In the case 
of post-communist countries, grassroots and spontaneous desecularization 
were to replace the earlier secularization imposed by communist authorities. In 
Poland, this type of approach can be combined after 1989 with the aspirations 
of the authorities stemming from the Solidarity opposition camp in order to 
secure the free functioning of the Catholic Church in the country. Thus, when 
we talk about bottom-up activities, the main point is that voters have chosen the 
majority on behalf of liberties for the Church and thus compensate for the losses 
suffered during the communist period.
Desecularization, however, has strong opponents. The articulation of 
objections towards the approach points to its problematic side. At the same 
time, it confirms several significant intuitions that result from combining this 
perspective with the secularization that was previously expounded. The funda-
mental problem that Titus Hjelm (2015) points to relates to the descriptiveness 
of desecularization. The phenomenon bravely summarizes the current reli-
gious status of the world rather than providing a theory of social and religious 
change. The author here refers to Casanova’s (1994) argument that the persis-
tent return of religiousness into public life, which is noticeable in individual 
regions of the world, does not immediately mean the falsification of the theory 
of secularization.
The second argument against desecularization applies to the term itself. 
The prefix “de-” indicates that secularization has already fully occurred. 
Desecularization would, therefore, mean the return of religious faith. In the light 
of what was written earlier, this claim is empirically unverifiable. A unique ap-
proach is proposed by Hjelm (2014), who treats desecularization as a useful term 
for clarifying the visibility of religion. His proposal, however, turns out to be 
insufficiently competitive for republicization (Herbert, 2015). The latter term 
does not suggest that religion has previously been secularized, but simply that it 
has expanded its public visibility.
When we look at desecularization as an element that specifies the context 
of our considerations, we are able to take advantage of its inevitable relation-
ship with secularization. Modernity tells us that previously adopted seculariza-
tion requires correction in the form of religious changes, which also takes into 
account desecularization. In practice, in the context of the secularizing world, 
there is a place for the phenomena and processes of desecularization, which con-
firm the increased visibility of religion.
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Media and religion
In the context of Poland, this relationship ought to be more clearly studied. 
During the last few decades, religion has not disappeared from the public space, 
including its media coverage. On the contrary, numerous religious events, 
including the funeral of Pope John Paul II and his beatification and canonization, 
or Pope Benedict XVI’s resignation from office, showed a significant participa-
tion of religion in media agendas (Brzoza, 2015; Dyczewski, Lewek, & Olędzki, 
2008; Guzek, Szostok, & Głuszek-Szafraniec, 2015; Olędzki & Sasińska-Klas, 
2016; Sarna, 2014) as well as group and community practices (e.g., schools were 
closed for the funeral of Pope Wojtyla). At the same time, the whole is accom-
panied by the ongoing and unabated privatization of religiosity (Borowik, 2010; 
Mariański, 2013).
In recent studies, little space has been devoted to media relations and the idea 
of a secular state. In the report on the media’s image of the Church in the public 
sphere, Sławomir Sowiński et al. (2013) point to four models of the description 
of the Church-state relationship in Poland: separation, presence and natural ten-
sion, equal status and testimony, and the religious public sphere. Their proposal, 
however, is based only on the analysis of the media contents in the area of several 
social debates. The question remains to what extent representations of this type 
correspond with the legal status, political practice, and knowledge of recipients 
about the secular state.
In general, studies on religious content in the media indicate the func-
tioning of the so-called secular sacred (Knott, Poole, & Taira, 2013b: 176). The 
secular sphere is, however, a derivative of the analysis of religious categories in 
the media rather than the object of Church-state relations. Also, in the litera-
ture about media, religion, and politics, there is a lack of empirical studies that 
would indicate the role of the media in understanding state secularism by the 
citizens. Native studies focus on establishing media representations of selected 
religious issues, such as the activities of Pope John Paul II (Dyczewski et al., 2008; 
Hodalska, 2011) or the presence of specific contents in the media (Krzemiński, 
2017). The question concerning the intersection between media, secular state, 
and Church-state relationship remains open to be answered.
Mediatization instead of mediation
In his analysis, Stig Hjarvard (2008a) views the relationship between media and 
religion in a way that does not touch upon the problem of what the media do 
with religion, but how social and cultural changes give the media an opportunity 
to play a more important role in it. Similarly, Hubert Knoblauch (2013) does not 
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ask about mediation and media coverage, but how certain sociocultural forms 
transform in relation to the media. This clearly indicates a different phenomenon 
than mediation, which refers to communication.
The term mediatization turns out to be the keyword, but at the same time, 
it causes double trouble. First of all, mediatization, which appeared in studies 
from Western Europe, in the so-called high modernity societies, functioned in 
the literature on the subject as a competitive term for mediation. Second, the 
term mediatization in English does not sound good (Livingstone, 2009). Indeed, 
it was accepted among the representatives of social sciences, but it clearly has 
German and Scandinavian roots. The matter is complicated by the fact that these 
languages do not lack similar-sounding terms. For example, the German term 
Medialisierung [medialization] expresses the status of society as a media society, 
while Mediatisierung [mediatization] concerns social changes caused by media 
changes (Imhof, 2006).
Individual works treat mediatization and mediation interchangeably, ascribing 
both terms the key character of changes taking place under the influence of the 
media (Chouliaraki, 2013; Couldry, 2008; Silverstone, 2007). However, the pre-
vailing view is that mediatization and mediation are names of separate processes 
that, although linked, focus on different goals (Hjarvard, 2008b; Strömbäck & 
Dimitrova, 2011; Strömbäck & Esser, 2009; Thumim, 2008). In this book, it is 
assumed the distinction, according to which “ ‘mediation’ refers to the process 
of communication in general – that is, how communication has to be under-
stood as involving the ongoing mediation of its meaning construction, thus 
‘mediatization’ is a category designed to describe these changes” (Couldry & 
Hepp, 2013: 196). When it comes to determining which term remains broader, we 
follow Sonia Livingstone’s (2009) alternative among other approaches, according 
to which mediatization represents a broader concept. We emphasize the present 
division in the current literature that mediation assumes a neutral act of trans-
mitting messages (Mazzoleni, 2008b), while mediatization represents a process-
oriented concept affecting all aspects of society (Strömbäck & Esser, 2009).
The word mediatization appeared in the English language in the context of 
Napoleon’s activity to describe “the subsumption of one monarchy into another 
in such a way that the ruler of the annexed state keeps his title and maybe some 
power” (Lundby, 2009a: 11). In the social sciences, the term mediatization was 
used for the first time by Kent Asp (1990) in a study on the importance of the 
media in political processes. In the initial phase of development, the concept 
functioned rather metaphorically. However, in the mid-nineties, the theoriza-
tion of the concept began, along with its clear distinction from the metaphorical 
approach to mediation (Krotz, 2001; Mazzoleni & Schulz, 1999; Schulz, 2004). 
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The metaphor and the strict research concept were then easily identified among 
representatives of various fields of the humanities and social sciences.
In L’échange symboligue et la mort [Symbolic Exchange and Death], Jean 
Baudrillard (1993: 63) used the term l’information médiatisée [mediatized infor-
mation] to present the way photography, film, and television make presentations. 
John B. Thomas in his The Media and Modernity: A Social Theory of the Media 
(1995: 46) used the term mediazation of culture to point to a clear process of social 
change under the influence of Johannes Gutenberg’s invention of movable type.
Theoretical and empirical studies in the second decade of the twenty-first 
century indicate that the concept of mediatization has clearly matured (Hepp, 
Hjarvard, & Lundby, 2015). However, scientific literature on mediatization in 
Poland calls for an update. In a recent diagnosis, Małgorzata Molęda-Zdziech 
(2013) remarked that the term did not meet with in-depth analysis in Poland 
and was accepted intuitively or journalistically. The publications that referred to 
mediatization in the title rather concerned media coverage (Bsoul, 2009). On the 
other hand, in the case of conceptualization attempts, the mediatization process 
was considered mainly in relation to the political field (Dobek-Ostrowska, 2006; 
Fras, 2009; Kolczyński, Mazur, & Michalczyk, 2009; Oniszczuk, 2011; Piontek, 
2011). Newer publications include definitions by Winfried Schulz (Głuszek-
Szafraniec, 2017; Hess, 2013; Sasińska-Klas, 2014), Stig Hjarvard (Guzek, 2015a) 
or André Jansson (Kopecka-Piech, 2015). However, existing positions treat the 
keyword mediatization in an intuitive sense. The few monographs based on the 
theoretical perspective related to mediatization (Łach, 2015; Molęda-Zdziech, 
2013) indicate the need for more complete studies that would include applying 
the theory to the specificity of Central European countries. This study of the 
mediatization of the idea of a secular state provides a modest attempt to respond 
to this demand. We are primarily asking about the dynamics of the process. As a 
prerequisite for this goal, we set a framework for understanding mediatization, 
choosing the right analytical approach, and identifying key phenomena that 
accompany the process.
The aim of the book
The aim of this work is to examine the process of the mediatization of the idea 
of Poland as a secular state. The analysis will be delivered on the empirical study 
we have conducted on three nationwide media (the dailies Gazeta Wyborcza and 
Rzeczpospolita, as well as the news channel Wiadomości TVP), supplemented 
by the contents of the election programs of political parties and religious law in 
Poland in 1989–2015. To this end, we used mixed methods of research, which 
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included an analysis of the legal acts and electoral documents of political parties, 
media content analysis, and investigation based on the grounded theory and 
media reception survey.
An argument here is that when analyzing the collected material towards the 
secular state, in the years 1989–2015, we see the progressive accommodation 
of political and religious actors to the logic of the media. This is a peculiar pro-
cess in which the dynamics of changes in political actors leads to articulating 
strong coverage of the postulate to establish separation of religion and the 
state. Meanwhile, religious actors are accommodating to the changing media 
conditions, emphasizing the aspect of the professionalization of the Church’s 
communication. Comprehensively captured mediatization, however, does not 
significantly affect the state of public awareness.
In the following parts of the book, we prove this argument based on the 
answers to five questions. Specifically, the first two questions addressed concern 
the secular state and Church-state relations.
Q1: Does the case of Poland fit the secular state category, and to what extent?
Q2: What do Church-state relations look like in practice?
The following three questions which we ask refer to the process of the 
mediatization of the secular state and its reception among research participants.
Q3: What does the media’s representation of a secular state and Church-state 
relations look like?
Q4: Do the processes of the mediatization of the secular state and Church-state 
relations take place and in what way?
Q5: What does the reception of the mediatization of the secular state look like?
The answer to these questions reveals a series of dependencies that the process 
of mediatization in the religious and political spheres evokes in the context of 
Poland, culturally located in the West, yet for a long time politically belonging to 
the Eastern domain.
This book consists of the theoretical part (Chapters 1–3) and the empirical 
part (Chapters 4–7). Specifically, in its first part, it is analyzed particular aspects 
of the phenomenon of the secular state and the Church-state relationship. Here 
it is also presented the foundations of the growing theory of mediatization. As it 
will be clarify, the institutional approach to mediatization studies which we apply 
is placed in the context of post-communist Poland.
When we want to talk about a secular state, we need to look at the problem in 
a broader context. This concept, in its various forms, is only one of the many pos-
sible options for shaping the relationship between the state and religion. That is 
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exactly why the first chapter tackles different approaches to shaping the Church-
state relationship. When refering to Benjamin Neuberger’s (1999) popular divi-
sion of these accounts, Poland is considered to be in the prism of the endorsed 
Church model.
Since the endorsed Church model is far from the concept of hard secularism, 
we try to clarify what a secular state actually means. To this end, we refer to 
the four features of the secular state by Ryszard Małajny (2013). His perspective 
evolved in the Polish context. Reading subsequent characteristics that Małajny 
illustrates before us, we become convinced that the ideal type of concept differs 
from the realities in Poland. Entering further into the concretization of the con-
cept of a secular state, we differentiate it from similar yet essentially separate 
concepts, such as laïcité, the state’s worldview neutrality, and state impartiality 
towards religion.
In the last part of the contextualization of the secular state, we begin a journey 
through four elements of the secular state theory, which allow to deepen the 
specificity of the Polish case. First of all, we show the openness of the secular 
state towards various approaches to accommodating conscientious exemptions. 
In this way, we provide the reader with a panorama of the complexity of the 
raised issues. Focusing on the issue of the fusion of religious and national iden-
tity, we show how a clear relationship between patriotic values and Catholicism 
in Poland excludes many of the previously presented secular state models. Next, 
we compare the discussed case of Poland with the concept of a civil religion. We 
point to the clear inconsistencies in these formations. Finally, we accommodate 
this case into a public religion and José Casanova’s three levels of public religion 
(state-polity, a political society, and a civil society). We complete this view with 
a look at Polish religiousness in the context of the modernization of society after 
communism.
The second chapter begins the journey through a selected aspect of the 
theory of mediatization. It consists of reading the basic elements of the theory 
of mediatization and re-reading them according to the case discussed in the 
book. We provide the reader with an answer to the question about which trend 
of research on mediatization belongs to this study and which concepts are rele-
vant. Of the three separate approaches to mediatization, we place this study in 
the institutionalized mediatization process and its related definition of the phe-
nomenon. Then the reader is suggested to reflect on the epistemology of the ana-
lyzed process. This allows one to understand better the levels of social life (micro, 
meso, macro) and what kind of mediatization processes take place.
Applying the institutionalized approach to mediatization, we are limited to 
using three terms related to it:  media institutions, media differentiation, and 
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media logic. Therefore, we are opening the reader to reflect on the understanding 
and functioning of these three components of institutional mediatization. First, 
we refer to their current foundations in the scientific literature setting the media 
as social institutions. Next, we point to differentiation as the heterogeneous pro-
cess for the media to obtain more or less autonomy. We apply a few divisions 
related to the specificity of media systems and the role of media autonomy in 
these systems. The highest concept of institutionalized mediatization refers to 
media logic, and we put emphasis on understanding the rules of this logic and 
its basic components.
Within the study on mediatization, the debate on what should be examined 
and how this should be done is still taking place. Here, we try to face this problem 
by answering the question about the subject of mediatization that can be grasped 
in an empirical study. In other words, we are reviewing the scholarly literature 
in terms of what constitutes a characteristic change under the influence of the 
media. Next, we complete these considerations by discussing the relationship 
between the mediatization effect and the media effect.
This book is about interrelationships between the media, religion, and pol-
itics. In the third chapter, we analyze the mediatization of religion and the 
mediatization of politics as two separate branches of research on this phe-
nomenon. Thanks to this, we are able to focus the reader’s attention on the 
most important theoretical issues that shape the mediatization of politics 
and religion. This chapter is begining with a discussion on the subject of the 
mediatization of religion and its specific foundation based on the agency of 
religious actors. Subsequently, we place the research problem of interest to 
us in the space of three forms of the mediatization of religion and various 
spheres of the phenomenon. As it has been shown earlier, the Polish example 
somewhat corresponds to the phenomenon of secularization. Meanwhile, sec-
ularization is essentially connected with the phenomenon of mediatization. 
From this, we once again refer to mediatization as it relates to the process of 
secularization. We also add the perspective of republicization of religion, and 
refer to the consequences that mediatization of religion brings to society and 
institutional religions.
When presenting the problem of political mediatizing, we take three basic 
steps. The first comes down to the conceptualization of mediatization as a mech-
anism of adapting to media logic, which accounts for political logic and the 
incomplete differentiation of media from the world of politics. The second boils 
down to the primacy of media logic over political logic. On the other hand, the 
third step proves that the mediatization of politics is a complex process of mutual 
connections between political decisions and media performances.
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Specifically speaking, the second part of the book, is focused on empirically 
based mediatization of the secular state in Poland in the years 1989–2015. In the 
fourth methodological chapter, it is explained the empirical background of the 
study. First, we introduce the reader to its design. Next, we describe in detail the 
material used in the analysis, which concerns the transfer of selected media, the 
electoral documents of political parties and applicable legal norms. This study is 
based on mixed research methods. The first stage concerns content analysis, the 
second the grounded theory, and the third an audience reception study. These 
methods provide qualitative and quantitative data, which is why in the last part 
of this chapter we perform their triangulation and establish the dominance of the 
qualitative perspective in the analysis.
The fifth chapter of the book presents the results of media coverage on the 
subject of the secular state and the Church-state relationship. It should be treated 
as a reference point for subsequent analyzes according to the grounded theory 
key. It starts with an overview of the percentage distribution of individual cate-
gories present in the media material. Next, it concerns the presence of the sec-
ular state category and related terms in the examined media. The previously 
presented theory proves that mediatization is a process shaped by the agency of 
religious and political actors. With this in mind, in the following sections of this 
chapter, we discuss the coverage of political and religious actors. In addition, we 
refer to the results of the media coverage of individual confession as well as non-
believers. The last point that we touch upon in this analysis concerns the clearly 
dominant religious themes in media coverage.
In the sixth chapter, it is presented the grounded theory of secular state 
mediatization. It starts with a general description of the axial categories that build 
the analyzed research material. After this, we point to incoherence on the sub-
ject of the secular state. The legal analysis indicates that the endorsed Church 
is grounding. Meanwhile, political parties, especially leftist, crystallize their 
radical positions towards state secularity. Next, we head towards analyzing the 
agency of political actors, revealing the evolution of the approach of political ac-
tors towards the dynamic context of the merger of the nation and the state. We 
point to the mechanisms of their operation in this merger and accommodation 
to the progressing logic of the media. When touching upon the agency of reli-
gious actors, we point to mediatization in the context of the professionalization of 
communication among religious institutions and the mediation of the agency of 
individual religious actors only in the second decade of this analysis. We comple-
ment this picture by changing the media coverage of the endorsed Church model 
implemented in Poland. It consists of the existence of clear traces of banal religion 
in the research material in the context of the fusion of religion and the state.
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In the seventh chapter, it is completed the previous investigation of the traces 
of mediatization of the secular state based on the results of the reception study. 
The debate over the mediatization effect in relation to the media effect leads to 
analyze whether the clear signs of mediation in the media coverage’s agency of 
religious and political actors are also accepted by society. First of all, we show 
that social knowledge about the secular state is primarily taken from the media. 
Respondents unanimously identify the media as their basic source of knowledge 
about the secular state. Their insight into the subject of reported Church-state 
events, however, turns out to be negligible.
In three subsequent thematic areas, it is shown no media effect in relation 
to the reported content. Here we ask questions about the reception of reli-
gious symbols, about the banalization of the cross and the visits of world reli-
gious leaders to the Polish parliament. Next, we ask about the attitude of the 
respondents towards the practice of the state’s worldview impartiality. Taking 
into account the critical media approach towards this issue, we check whether 
the media variable really dominates here. Finally, we undertake a re-reading of 
the mediatization effect in the light of the results obtained.
Instead of a conclusion, we confront the grounded theory and reception study 
with the theoretical assumptions presented earlier. Based on the results, we pro-
vide some interesting insights into the current theory, especially in the aspect of 
banal religion and agents within the mediatization process.
Part I   

1  State secularity in context
Analyzing the relationship between religion and politics is no easy task. The 
500th anniversary of the Protestant Reformation in 2017 confirms that recent 
decades have not radically changed the weak ties between the Church and state 
after the turbulent entanglement of these institutions due to Martin Luther’s 
actions up till 1517. Religion, which at that time determined the functioning 
of individuals and entire societies, can now be interpreted as irrational, op-
pressive, and dividing people (Furbey, 2009). In the first chapter of this book, 
we undertake efforts to comprehend subsequent views of what remains of this 
engagement, describe the backbone of Church-state relations, the related ways 
to understand it, and the praxis of the secular state. We do this by explaining 
models of Church and state relations and focusing the attention on the notion of 
a secular state, its further characteristics and associations with other areas of the 
social world. Thanks to this, it is possible to embed the seemingly abstract idea 
of a secular state into the context of reflections on Poland. As a result of these 
considerations, we prepare the ground for the subsequent conceptualization of 
the secular state’s mediatization process.
1.1  Shaping the Church-state relationship according to models
The subtitle of this book, Media, Religion and Politics in Contemporary Poland 
reveals our intention to look at the relationship between the world of religion 
and politics through the prism of the media. Before we examine the mutual 
relationships among these three components, we must first refer to the key 
Church-state relationship. It is the Church that directly determines the area for 
reflecting on the notion of a secular state. When we recall the simplest divisions 
regarding the discussed Church-state relationship, in practice we are talking 
about a religious state and a secular state that remains no more than a religious 
state à rebours (Małajny, 2013). Examples of shaping the relationship between the 
Church and state from different geographical regions prove, however, that mixed 
models can also function successfully (Iversen, 2006; Künkler, 2013).
Keeping in mind the numerous proposals of Church-state relationship models 
(Hirschl, 2010; Marczewska-Rytko, 2010; Riedel, 2008), let’s refer to Benyamin 
Neuberger’s (1999) six classical divisions: secular-absolutist, theocracy, separation 
of Church and state, recognized communities, established Church, and endorsed 
Church. Each of these models comes from a set of peculiar state practices in 
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dealing with institutional religions. To a great extent, these models result from 
specific events and historical processes. Our goal is to assign one of these models 
to Poland. Finally, we also want to determine how the model negotiates its shape 
in practice.
The first secular-absolutist model in the past was characterized by the Soviet 
Union and the countries of the Eastern Bloc associated with it. It assumed an 
oppressive attitude towards institutional religions and religious practices in the 
public sphere. Since it promoted Karl Marx’s (1974: 70) view in the Contribution 
to the Critique of Hegel’s Philosophy of Right, religion became “the opium of the 
people.” The next model, a theocracy, has been known since antiquity as based 
on the intertwining of religious and secular rights. Today, it occurs mainly in 
Muslim countries led by Saudi Arabia. The example of this theo-monarchy 
shows that it is still alive, providing its rulers with enormous power founded on 
well-established religious and cultural rights (Al-Atawneh, 2009).
Neuberger’s model of separation is definitely a softer approach to Church-state 
relations. Naturally, here the secular state does not show interest in the life of 
Churches and religions. The state does not enter into dialogue with religions, 
treating all of them equally. Depending on the version of this separation, we can 
assume that the state excludes the participation of religion and religious symbols 
in the public sphere. This type of hostile separation functions in France as laïcité. 
In a milder version, the so-called open separation occurs, among others, in the 
United States, where the state permits religious rituals to be held in public life. 
However, it prohibits supporting any one of the denominational groups.
We can notice the clear role of religion in the public sphere in the next 
three models: recognized communities, the established Church, and the endorsed 
Church. The oldest of them, the recognized communities, emerged as a result of 
the Reformation in 1517 and the religious division of Germany into the continu-
ation of the older order under the leadership of the papacy on the one hand and 
supporters of denominations led by Martin Luther on the other. The state then 
developed a specific mechanism for the recognition of religious communities. It 
was based on the fulfillment of certain legal conditions. As a result, the recog-
nized Churches obtained certain powers from the state regarding activities in 
the public sphere. Every recognized community, however, obtained equal rights 
and obligations.
The established Church model appeared as a consequence of the Act of 
Supremacy of the English parliament from 1534. It essentially deals with the 
treatment of a particular Church as being official or having a constitutional posi-
tion (Bradney, 2011). This corresponds to the current situation in the Church of 
England, officially headed by the ruler of Great Britain. The last of the endorsed 
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Church models is characterized by ambiguity. On the one hand, the endorsed 
Church model excludes granting any religion status as established. It creates 
laws that equally distribute rights and obligations to all religious institutions. 
On the other hand, it grants one of the Churches the position of a privileged 
religion: slightly preferred, preferred, or supported in a symbolic way. We can 
easily identify these types of cases in Europe. They concern the Roman Catholic 
Church in Italy, Spain, Ireland, and the national Orthodox Churches in Bulgaria 
and Romania.
We can also include Poland in this model due to the cited article of the 
Constitution of Poland: “The relations between the Republic of Poland and the 
Roman Catholic Church shall be determined by an international treaty con-
cluded with the Holy See, and by statute” (“The Constitution of the Republic of 
Poland,” 1997, Art 25 § 2). What is important in the Polish Constitution, besides 
granting freedom of religion, only the Catholic Church was mentioned in the 
formula above. Indeed, we can note the fact that the Holy See is a subject of 
international law and at the same time represents the interests of the institutions 
of the Catholic Church on a global scale. Additional mention of this confirms, 
however, that Polish legislation in a special way treats the issue of the nation’s 
relations with this Church.
This essentially raises two questions. First of all, how is the endorsed Church 
model negotiated in social practice? We must remember at this point that the 
ambiguity of an endorsed Church clearly flows from the separate sources that 
lead to it. In the case of Spain, this model was adopted after the end of General 
Franco’s dictatorship. Roman Catholicism then moved from the position of the 
state Church to the position of a supported Church. The situation in Poland was 
just the opposite. As a result of the transformation from the communist regime 
to a liberal democracy, the endorsed Church model replaced state atheism. 
Another question concerns the relation of the endorsed Church model to the 
titular mediatized secular state. The ambiguity of the endorsed Church model 
which we expressed will have a significant impact on our understanding of a 
secular state.
1.2  Understanding the secular state
The notion of a secular state does not appear in scientific literature as a hard 
concept that can be attributed to a finite set of features. A few attempts to define 
it clearly come from the non-Western context (Małajny, 2013), which has 
both advantages and limitations. Explaining this issue will help us to under-
stand the very term. The starting point is to view the diversity of the European 
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case that raises the question whether a secular state is an option for Poland? 
Ryszard Małajny claims that the European and Anglo-Saxon context has only 
one model of the relationship between the state apparatus and Churches: sep-
aration, meaning the secular state. However, the question concerning a secular 
state with regard to the United Kingdom for a lawyer in this area remains point-
less (Bradney, 2010). Within the legal and social tradition in such a country, it 
is impossible to reconstruct the situation typical for the pre-established Church 
context. This brings up a hypothetical question:  is a secular state worth pur-
suing? The real issue concerns how to shape Church-state relations in the face of 
a high level of secularization and social diversity (Davie, 1990, 2015; Hill, 2015).
We will give a different answer by looking at countries based on the separation 
model (McClay, 2001). In the case of France, the basis of its laïcité flows from the 
legacy of the Enlightenment and the need for efficiently managed state organi-
zations, in which the religious factor has not played a significant social role for 
many generations. In the case of the United States, it is more about a strict sep-
aration of state organization from institutional religions. However, it is accom-
panied by confusion in the ideological sphere visible in a civil religion, meaning 
the national values cultivated in a religious way. We will discuss this civil religion 
phenomenon later on in this chapter.
In the explicitly homogeneous religious and ethnic context of Poland, as 
measured by Neuberger’s (1999) endorsed Church model, Małajny (2013) 
conceptualizes a secular state as a type of state organization that realizes world-
view neutrality and consequently remains separate from institutional religions. 
Our task is not to assess to what extent his proposal results from the reaction to 
the religious sphere saturated with religion in Poland. Małajny’s definition, how-
ever, strikes resentment at the non-religious context. In this sense, the question 
asked earlier about whether the secular state is an option for Poland finds its 
justification.
When the postulate of a secular state appears in the public sphere, it is diffi-
cult to clearly determine what its formation would consist of. It mainly concerns 
the practical implementation of worldview neutrality. Małajny’s four points 
help us create this ideal model. First, he assumes the organizational and func-
tional separation of organizing the Church and state. This means the lack of 
competence of the Church or, more broadly, all institutional religions to act on 
matters specifically relating to the state. Thus, religions lose the state’s ability 
to perform public functions and the need to refer to instruments of state coer-
cion. Małajny indicates that the practical mechanism implementing the func-
tioning of religious institutions be based on private law, not public legislation. 
Such a formula deprives institutional religions of the ability to exercise specific 
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administrative authority. In turn, the state obtains full independence from reli-
gious denominations in the process of exercising power.
From the state’s position, the principle discussed concerns two areas. The first 
reveals the state’s abstention from implementing religious assignments and wor-
ship rituals. The second means that the state guarantees autonomy to religions. 
This does not mean immunity for representatives of religions who are subordi-
nated to state law. Rather, it applies to the state abstaining from interfering in the 
internal affairs of religious associations.
The second feature of the model is connected with the implementation of the 
principle of freedom of conscience and religion. Małajny emphasizes that the 
communist system showed in practice how separating the state apparatus from 
religion does not guarantee religious freedom. His type of ideal religious freedom 
appears as a consequence of state neutrality towards any worldview. Ensuring 
neutrality is possible by creating a state that allows every citizen the free choice 
of a religion or lack of religion (in the individual dimension) and association for 
religious purposes (the collective dimension). From the cradle to the grave, a 
citizen’s religion is not of interest to the state (Pietrzak, 2010). The state does not, 
however, hinder institutional religions from speaking out on public matters. It 
also takes into account their voice when shaping social institutions.
The next point addressed by Małajny concerns laïcité understood as a con-
sequence of the policy of state neutrality towards worldview issues. Because the 
idea of a secular state is often associated with such terms as laïcité, state world-
view neutrality, and the state’s impartial worldview, we will include this topic in a 
later part of the book. Instead, we will immediately address the last characteristic 
of the mentioned ideal type (Małajny, 2013). It concerns the state’s relation to 
religious institutions, which grants them the status of associations. The actual 
status of institutional religions in the state practically takes place in several forms. 
In the most convenient form for the state, institutional religions operate on the 
basis of associations (as in the United States or France). In a less convenient form 
for the state, the position of institutional religions is based on one common law 
or many statutes, and even concordat treaties with the Holy See. The last case 
transfers the Catholic Church and state relations to the level of international law. 
This sets clear limits to the state’s ease in relation to the Catholic Church shaping 
its position on the nation’s territory.
We suggest treating the notion of a secular state in a wider way, which we 
referred to based on the pure type according to Małajny. When we put together 
these types of presented features, it becomes clear that the concept of a secular 
state means a proposal for the optimal shaping of relations between citizens who 
represent religious diversity. We see in this a reflexive modernity (Beck, Giddens, 
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& Lash, 1994), which shows that over time, societies are becoming more and 
more aware of how to shape their future based on real risk (Giddens, 1990). As 
it will be shown in the later analysis of media content, it appears as a reference 
point many times in the current context of the Church-state relationship.
The concept of the secular state perfectly fits into the individualization that is 
entering into society (Mariański, 2010). On the one hand, religion in society is 
losing its monopoly as the binding function (Berger, 1967). In turn, the state now 
maintains the established defragmented order. In its ideal form, however, it lacks 
a different ideology than one which ensures harmony in the face of diversity. In 
practice, civil religion takes on the role of such ideologies. On the other hand, an 
individual’s agency regarding religion confirms the expanding view that religion 
is socially created rather than being a result of the intervention of divine provi-
dence (Giddens & Sutton, 2013).
1.3  Differentiating laïcité, neutrality, and impartiality
As the reference to the ideal type of secular state has shown, the issue we are ana-
lyzing in this book undertakes several terms: laïcité, state ideological neutrality, 
and the state’s impartial worldview. To maintain terminological consistency with 
regard to the notion of a secular state, it is good to show the specificity of each 
of the mentioned concepts and show their relationship to the subject of interest.
The first of the terms that we mentioned is laïcité derived from the Greek word 
laos, which directly means the people. It has a broad political sense referring 
to state regimes that respect an individual’s freedom of conscience (Haarscher, 
2004). In addition, the laicist state does not give privileges to any one religion or 
concept of a good life but grants everyone freedom within set limits.
In the narrow sense of the term, laïcité concerns a separation between the 
state and religion. It was based on the willingness of liberalists to overcome the 
Church’s influence on the state since the Church was considered to be a refuge 
for conservatism (Dufault-Hunter, 2008; Haarscher, 2004; J.  Mazur, 2004). In 
this sense, the laicization process was closely bound to the context of Catholic 
countries. However, the understanding of this division has changed over time, 
as illustrated in the case of France (Willaime, 2008). In 1905, when the law on 
the separation of Church and state came into force, the country ended up with 
a concordat system that radically separated religion from state power. In 1946, 
legislative (statutory) secularity gained a constitutional character. The text also 
confirms the currently binding basic legislation of 1958. The significance of 
“laïque” appears in its original French notation: “La France est une République 
indivisible, laïque, démocratique et sociale” (“Constitution de la République 
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Française,” 1958, Art 1); in English, this word is translated as “secular”: “France 
shall be an indivisible, secular, democratic and social Republic” (“French 
Constitution of October 4th,” 1958, Art 1).
During the course of this historical process, however, there has been a change 
in the structure of the phenomenon. Laïcité, originally based on separation, gave 
way to a new form based on neutrality (Barbier, 1995). The modern version of 
laïcité in France is also perceived as being in confusion with limiting whatever 
is religiously allowed. This particularly concerns protecting women and the free 
provision of the right to choose a religion or lack thereof (Barras, 2017).
Neutrality as the main category of a laicist state pursues an attitude of not 
promoting and not discriminating views related to an individual’s faith and 
convictions. Neutrality distances people from the messages of specific religions 
and philosophies. In this sense, it is also ungradable, it either is or is not pre-
sent. The practice in many European countries shows, however, that a neutral 
view towards institutional religions implies indifference towards the contents 
of these religions, and not just ignoring their actual significance in society 
(Małajny, 2009).
Therefore, how can a neutral state be created in practice? The first element 
is to keep away from any argumentation referring to God’s law present, among 
others, in the legislation of many Churches, for example, the Catholic Church 
(Code of Canons of the Eastern Churches, 2001; The Code of Canon Law, 1983). 
A neutral worldview state functions when political power does not determine the 
law based on internal denominational laws, religious or materialistic contents 
(Małajny, 2013). Attacks concerning symbolism also lack religious references, 
such as invocatio Dei in the Preamble to the Constitution. In practice, therefore, 
the endorsed Church model is excluded. The second element concerns restraint 
in using religious symbols by public authorities, such as a cross hanging in offices. 
The third element denotes the state refusing to provide material support to both 
institutional religions and atheistic organizations. The fourth element assumes 
equality of citizens in exercising their political and civil rights regardless of their 
worldview or religion (Pietrzak, 2010). The fifth element, however, boils down 
to the recognition of religion and worldview as a private matter. It also gives the 
citizen the right to remain silent about his religion and beliefs.
Against the background of neutrality understood in this way, the last of the 
concepts arises, meaning an unbiased worldview. It appears in the Constitution 
of Poland in Art 25 § 2 instead of neutrality and it bases our general reflection 
on the legal category of impartiality on the decisions made regarding the case in 
Poland. Some specialists in the field of Polish constitutional law claim that impar-
tiality and neutrality are different things (Szymanek, 2006). There are, however, 
State secularity in context38
lawyers who find these identical (Garlicki, 2004). Józef Krukowski (2000) treats 
the neutrality in a closed way. To distinguish it from unbiased impartiality, he 
understands it as being a type of open neutrality. This is supposed to eliminate 
the threats caused by a radical understanding of neutrality, which, as the commu-
nist period has shown, can be used by the state to fight religion (Borecki, 2008).
According to the interpretation of the Polish Constitutional Tribunal from 
ruling No. K55/07 on December 14, 2009, the provisions of the Constitution 
confirm that unbiased impartiality allows for the possibility of state involve-
ment in order to ensure the widest freedom of conscience and religion for all 
people. Therefore, if neutrality is about not interfering in the internal affairs of 
religion, in this respect, impartiality presupposes the active attitude of the state 
in resolving worldview disputes.
The situation of hypothetical interference by the state is linked with the 
postulate that all religious, worldview, and philosophical beliefs should be 
treated equally by public authorities. This point of view, according to Wojciech 
Brzozowski (2011), is misbegotten. Another provision of the Polish Constitution 
mentions the fact that the nation of Poland remains the common good of all citi-
zens, regardless of their religion, religious beliefs, and worldview. Meanwhile, the 
state’s concern for the good understood in such a way means that the government 
has no position on matters of belief and religious convictions (Małajny, 2013).
In addition, an unbiased worldview gives the impression of a tailor-made 
endorsed Church model. In order to clarify this, let’s again recall art.  25, §  2 
of the Polish Constitution, which confirms the symbolic privileged place of the 
Catholic Church in its relations with the state. Its contents show that, conse-
quently, impartiality brings about a transition from rewarding the Church in 
a symbolic way to it actually being privileged. In Poland, the matter looks as 
follows (Małajny, 2013: 21):
“The constitutional practice in this matter indeed corresponds not to the neutral but 
impartial approach of public authorities towards the issue of citizens’ convictions. It 
looks as if the authorities have in fact initially examined the statements of supporters 
of theism and atheism, and after giving rights to the first, they then preferred to favor 
Catholicism, constantly muttering the slogan of Christianity.”
Comparing the three discussed concepts with the idea of a secular state, we per-
ceive several significant dependencies. First, the concepts operate on two onto-
logical levels. The secular state and laicist state represent general notions, thanks 
to which we can characterize the state model presented from the position of its 
relations with religious institutions. At this level of our analysis, the secular state 
is identified as a more general formation in which the issue of religion remains 
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indifferent to state authorities. In a laicist state, on the other hand, we see a more 
concrete form, oriented towards the separation of state institutions from reli-
gious institutions and restricting the role of religion to the private sphere.
When to speak of a neutral or impartial worldview, in fact, we touch upon the 
characteristics specific to a secular state. When to disregard impartiality, we can 
assume that we also refer to the specific characteristics of a laicist state. At this 
level of the analysis, therefore, we point to the basic characteristics of the state 
in its activity in relation to the phenomenon of religiosity:  refraining or even 
impartial interference in matters of religion, ideology, and philosophy.
1.4  The secular state’s ways of accommodating 
conscientious exemptions
The models of the Church and state relations and the concepts of laïcité, neu-
trality, and impartiality towards worldview by the state presented so far must 
be supplemented with arguments on the subject of conscientious exemptions, 
which today constitute the basic way for the secular state to accommodate reli-
gion or religious demands. We do so in the face of the growing expectations of 
individuals and collectivities to include conscientious exemptions at least when 
it comes to compulsory military service. The reasons for these expectations can 
be expressed in different ways.
Social sensitivity increases when it comes to discourses related to human 
rights. Many countries are strengthening their diversity policy. The modern state 
regulates the sphere of one’s private life in a way incomparable to the past. When 
pointing to the ways liberal democracies in their broad mechanism of incor-
porating the religious element grant conscientious exemptions, we will focus 
on five groups of possible approaches according to Yossi Nehushtan (2015). He 
accepts the following traits concerning this matter: neutral, equal regard, liberal 
value-based, pro-religion, and anti-religion. Next, we will refer to the previous 
conception of the secular state.
In the case of neutral approaches, the issue of religiosity is not a prerequi-
site for granting or not granting conscientious exemptions. A person’s autonomy 
determines whether such exemptions should be granted depending on the situa-
tion. Within these approaches, the first option assumes that the individual has or 
should have a choice regarding conscientious exemptions. The task of the state is 
to watch over those conscientious exemptions so that they will not result in real 
harm to others (Kugler, 1997) or be engaged in burden-shifting (Leiter, 2013). 
In the second variant, the state assumes a utilitarian position against harming 
an individual. This means a situation in which a higher public interest justifies 
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harming an individual. Neutral approaches have one burning element when we 
compare them with the demands of religion. Here we are talking about the case 
of a strong individual for whom religion is a basic element for organizing their 
life. The more religion in people’s lives, the more frequently it contrasts with the 
demands of the law towards which they remain neutral (Nehushtan, 2015).
The principle of equal regard approaches denotes that the conscientious 
exemptions granted to X belong to all who are similar to X. Granting exemptions 
to a non-religious subject, therefore, requires an analogy in relation to the religious 
subject. This multi-faceted approach assumes maintaining a balance. According 
to some researchers, it allows counteracting demands put forward by religion, 
aimed at favoring or discriminating against non-religious people (Bradney, 
1993). It concerns granting priority to religious people for their conscientious 
exemptions over the non-religious. This group of approaches also includes the 
controversial view that religion in the public sphere should have as many rights 
as, for example, the General Motors Company (Kramnick & Moore, 1997).
Such equating of institutional religion with an ordinary enterprise points out 
that a balance requires the state to apply the same importance to religious values 
as to the respectable values of the laity. When we shift the center of gravity from 
the contents of religious values to their equality, we can talk about the equal 
regard approach. It assumes that the state cares about the religious values of 
minorities with a commitment equal to that which it exhibits in relation to the 
whole (Eisgruber & Sager, 2007). In this approach, various values and central 
beliefs in the lives of individuals will be equally protected by the state.
The next group of liberal value-based approaches assumes (1) a hierarchy of 
values, rights, and interests and (2) the inability to tolerate certain contents that 
refer to conscience. Its development reflects several autonomous approaches 
based on the primacy of liberal principles and the liberal perception of the law 
over any conscience dilemma. The foundation of the first rests on the prin-
ciple that in a liberal democracy, there is no agreement on illiberalism violating 
human rights, for example, women’s rights (Raday, 2003). The second assumes a 
balancing test between religious freedom and other human rights. The state can 
limit this freedom when it comes to protecting its citizens’ greatest opportunities 
(Nussbaum, 1999). Another approach assumes that freedom of conscious bal-
ances on the intensity of values protected by special laws. Restricting someone’s 
conscience can, therefore, occur when the matter concerns violating special laws 
(Gans, 2002).
When considering pro-religion approaches, we mean all the positions for 
which religious reasons justify granting conscientious exemptions (Nehushtan, 
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2015). Religious reasons can be the basis for distinguishing religion itself or 
deprecating non-religious people. Religion is treated in a special way for social, 
cultural, and psychological functions. According to this approach, it is also 
impossible to find equivalents for distinguished religious values among non-
religious values.
The last in the group of anti-religion approaches stands in opposition to the 
liberal constitutional theory towards religion, which grants religion a place in 
the public sphere. These people oppose the equal treatment of various religious 
consciences. They do this by emphasizing that many religions sustain or spread 
intolerance. By seeing a broad perspective in the meaning of life among non-
religious people, they also stand in opposition to religion as providing people 
with sense in life. They suggest, therefore, focusing on two questions that do not 
take into account religion: how should one behave properly and how should one 
behave among others. Nehushtan summarizes this approach in a precise way: the 
limit of liberal tolerance ends with illiberal intolerance, which has strong links 
to certain religions. In cases where religion engages intolerant and anti-liberal 
values or practices, he suggests sharp opposition to accommodating conscien-
tious exemptions.
The presented approaches to conscientious exemptions display the traits of 
a secular state that have not quite strongly resounded so far. We are thinking 
of openness to various ways of accommodating religious demands in the area of 
conscience, characterized by several elements. First of all, in the majority of 
cases, it takes into account the primacy of freedom and individual choice. In 
a fewer number of cases, it shows the positive values of religion. Second, it 
treats religion mainly in a functional way, assuming that the vector of religion 
is directed towards community-building functions or towards discrimination. 
The essential aspect of religion arises when it can be characterized in pejora-
tive terms as the basis for limiting individual rights. Therefore, we should look 
at the secular state as a concept whose specific contours result from the atti-
tude towards individual freedom. In this sense, therefore, the concept reflects a 
clearly liberal nature.
The presented variants of accommodating conscientious exemptions in a sec-
ular state have some limitations. Both a secular state and secularism represent 
Western perspectives. Their transfer onto the specific context of CEE possesses no 
problem. In non-Western and non-European countries, models of religion-state 
relations imply different principles (Calhoun, Juergensmeyer, & Van Antwerpen, 
2011). It is not possible, therefore, to transfer this clearly Eurocentric perspective 
onto a more general level.
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1.5  The secular state on the fusion of national  
and religious identity
We tried to clarify what the notion of the secular state is all about and referred 
to the pure type of secular state to do this by pointing to synonymous concepts. 
We also pointed to the liberal foundations of a nation’s secularity in the context 
of conscientious exemptions. Now let’s contextualize the notion of a secular state 
with reference to Poland. The current tendency in post-communist countries to 
combine religiosity with being a good citizen can serve as a starting point for this 
task (Pew Research Centre, 2017). In the past, this partially coincided with the 
mechanism recognized in many contexts, which Anna Grzymała-Busse (2015) 
described as the fusion of national and religious identity. In the previous section, 
it was shown how the secular state sets limits on religion based on the primacy 
of freedom and the right of the individual to decide. Here, we will change the 
perspective to show that the secular state also faces the challenge of pressure 
from religion, which to a certain extent builds the national identity of its citizens.
Roger Brubaker (2012) recognizes that religion and national identity consist 
of separate worlds and signs. They represent different ontologies and justification 
structures. In practice, however, we see that some of these differences blur. This 
long-term process comes from the historical interpretation of the popular place 
of religion in a nation (Grzymała-Busse, 2015: 23):
“The fusion of religious and national identities is a culmination of a process of historical 
interpretation: the careful tending of national and religious identity at home, in schools, 
and if possible, in public conversation. It is a product of favorably homogenous demo-
graphics and historical political opportunities. Fusion relies on the notion that a religion 
stands on the same side as the nation, that when oppression threatened the nation in 
the past, religion protected national representatives and safeguarded national identity.”
Thus, the common origin of religion and a nation denies that they walk together 
holding hands. Instead, we speak of religion as a protector of national interests 
when the nation itself is under repression. This conception perfectly reflects 
the situation of Poland during the partitions and communist era. Especially in 
the latter case, the Catholic Church headed by the charismatic Stefan Cardinal 
Wyszyński managed to convince the nation to side with him. As a result of 
this merger, whoever held on to the Church also sided with the Polish nation. 
Religious symbols, like the icon of the Black Madonna of Częstochowa, set the 
basis for national legitimacy (Kubik, 1994). The Church buildings provided 
physical space and the freedom to act as a democratic opposition. As a conse-
quence, national identity was maintained and renewed in the Church environ-
ment (Hervieu-Legér, 2000).
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Apart from the discussed case of Poland, one can find a fusion of religious 
and national identity in countries such as Croatia, Ireland, Malta, Lithuania, 
the Philippines, and even the United States. These examples, however, confirm 
the occurrence of degrees of fusions, which results from the real influence of 
institutional religions on politics. According to Grzymała-Busse (2015), we can 
measure the scope of this merger based on three factors. The first concerns the 
number of current supporters of religious fusion and nationalism, checked by 
using public opinion polls. The second raises the problem of the Church’s his-
toric role in relation to the Church-state relationship. The third concerns the 
number of mutual references between religion and the nation in the functioning 
of national symbolism.
What has been said so far regarding the fusion of religion and nationality intu-
itively seems to coincide with the idea of a secular state. In order to explain these 
assumptions, we will introduce the basic variants of the relationship between 
the two phenomena. Following Grzymała-Busse, we will rely on the criterion 
of source and duration. When we trace the historical formation of the state, we 
can see that it has a secular character by nature. From the beginning, however, 
it is constituted on the basis of clear clashes with religion representing the per-
spective of the sacrum. In the first approach, the state and the Church clash over 
the possibility of establishing and maintaining a hierarchy of control over an 
individual’s behavior. Arguments for the Church may have a revealed nature. On 
the other hand, arguments for the state usually concern effective management by 
a professional bureaucracy. The formation of the nation’s identity as opposed to 
state organization does not require reliance on authority or secular bureaucracy 
(G. M. Thomas, 1989). From the very beginning, a nation quickly incorporates 
religious contents into its identity. In times of threat to the nation’s sovereignty, 
religious contents shape national myths and provide additional strength to fight 
the oppression. A good example of this is present in the veneration of the Icon of 
the Black Madonna at the Jasna Góra Sanctuary in Częstochowa (Kubik, 1994).
As a result of this process, three possible patterns of relations between the 
state, nation, and religion appeared. The first describes the case in which the 
historically recognized Church maintains and defends national identity against 
an enemy state (D. Martin, 1991). The second refers to the situation in which 
the state appeared first. Only later did religions find a place for themselves in 
the framework of the state and supported its construction. In this way, religions 
became a keystone of the emerging identity of the state. They also allowed for the 
creation of a civil religion in the state (Atran, 2002). The third pattern concerns 
a specific situation in which the Church opposes the binding of the state and the 
nation, while the state takes action to unite the nation. An example was the clash 
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of the papacy with the united kingdom of Italy emerging in the nineteenth cen-
tury (Zieliński, 2007).
The discussed relationship between the state government, a nation’s people, 
and religion can also be undertaken from the position of duration. This pre-
cisely concerns the mechanisms that allow the discussed fusion to overcome 
changes in the social context, including the process of the succession of gener-
ations. Grzymała-Busse (2015) points to education, comparisons with the past, 
and national rhetoric in a seemingly religious context. In the case of education, 
she primarily refers to catechism classes. In communist Poland, the Church used 
to treat them as a conveyer belt for teaching the truths of the faith and the trans-
mission of national identity, and these remained outside of state supervision. 
Another mechanism depends on comparisons to actors from the past or cur-
rent opponents. In Poland, when the Church assumed the role of the nation’s 
defender, it could refer to its actual role in communism.
At that time, the Church allowed the entire anti-communist opposition to 
hide in its space. The last mechanism consisted in applying national rhetoric in 
a seemingly religious context. In practice, however, this was about the appear-
ance of religious symbols that took on the role of national symbols. This case in 
Poland concerned the national shrine of Wawel Cathedral at the royal castle in 
Cracow, as well as the annual Catholic pilgrimages to Jasna Góra Sanctuary in 
Częstochowa. But it also takes into account the liturgy for the Polish Army’s cere-
monies falling on August 15 which collide with the Solemnity of the Assumption 
of the Blessed Virgin Mary.
Previous literature shows that the seemingly secular identity, in practice, may 
have significant religious components (C. Mitchell, 2006). This is clear in the 
cited cases of religious and national fusion. As a result, we can correct our pre-
vious understanding of the secular state by adding to what was previously an ele-
ment of negotiation between the secular and sacred. The fusion of national and 
religious identity primarily demonstrates that the religious and social context 
fosters specific system solutions. In the case of Poland, this leads to the endorsed 
Church discussed earlier.
1.6  Understanding civil religion
When we look at the three mentioned types of relations between the state, na-
tion, and religion in the context of the secular state, there are several significant 
issues regarding civil religion. However, their discussion requires prior charac-
terization of the very term. In order to stress its significance, let’s present the 
circumstances of its beginnings, a specific feature for the consequences of civil 
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religion. As a result, we will provide the reader with materials that will refer them 
to the frequently mentioned endorsed Church.
This issue begins quite provocatively with Reinhold Niebuhr’s (1952) 
centuries-old comparison of the United States and the Soviet Union. The author 
of The Irony of American History finds some surprising similarities between these 
two nations. Both assumed they would create an ideal society thanks to the pro-
gress of knowledge. Both assumed the achievement of this state thanks to their 
economic system. The myth of their own virtues appeared in both nations. The 
fundamental difference in the implementation of their plans resulted from the 
attitude of these nations towards religion. Soviet ideologists made communism 
the basis of their proclaimed transcendence. Americans, on the other hand, used 
their religious background to support the values of humanism and materialism 
in something that is easily expressed by the “American Way of Life” or “The 
American Faith,” (Marsden, 2001) which actually concerns the concept of a civil 
religion we are dealing with.
Let’s take a look at it from a historical perspective. Jean-Jacques Rousseau’s 
discourse on the Republican government in the essay The Social Contract intro-
duced us to modern social thought on this idea. In reference to the Platonic idea 
of civic religion based on state control, he postulated the functioning of purely 
civil faith, which would ensure the social order and at the same time be vol-
untary. Understood in general terms, it would also maintain tolerance for the 
diversity of private faiths. Rousseau’s concept appeared in a contemporary form 
first as religion-in-general (Marty, 1959) and as the religion of the republic (Mead, 
1963). Civil religion itself gained the greatest publicity after Robert N. Bellah’s 
publication of the essay entitled Civil Religion in America (1967). The author 
argued by comparing the inaugural statements of Abraham Lincoln and John 
F. Kennedy that, despite their time difference, both of these discourses confirmed 
the divine purpose of the American nation.
The basis of this religious anointing of the nation should be sought in the 
American Civil War of 1861–1865. During this war in the United States, two 
equal forms of faith expression were sanctioned. The first concerned religious 
groups and individual denominations. The second was about the religion of the 
republic (Mead, 1963) and recorded in the nineteenth century on the basis of the 
non-denominational version of Evangelical Protestantism (Casanova, 2003). 
At that time, it appeared in the America model as being a Christian nation. 
In the twentieth century, along with the weakening of liberal Protestantism, 
the discussed model of a civil religion grew into a Christian-Jewish formula 
(Hollinger, 1997). Currently, it faces the challenge of secularization and 
multiculturalism.
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After taking into account the historical aspect, it is worth referring to the civil 
religion thesis, which reads as follows (Booth Fowler, Hertzke, Olson, & Den 
Dulk, 2004: 301):
“The one important religion in the United States has nothing to do with specific 
denominations or religious traditions. Instead, the important American religious 
dimension is a shared but vague political religion – a religion of America and its culture.”
This concept clearly separates the true religion of the United States from indi-
vidual institutional religions. It reflects Will Herberg’s (1955) division into 
a professed religion associated with one’s declared confession and the oper-
ative religion, which sets the highest values of the citizen incorporated in the 
“American Way of Life.” At the same time, it points to common American reli-
gious dimensions. Following the suggestion of Catherine L. Albanese (2013), we 
see them as a system based on one’s personal theology (creed), ethics (code), and 
a set of rituals and symbols (cult). The creed means the fundamental assumption 
that the United States seems to be the chosen nation. This chosen status can be 
considered in various ways: as God’s decision, by nature, or a historical twist of 
events.
The code is contained in the nation’s creed. Being chosen provides the basis 
for being active and confirms one’s chosenness. This activity goes beyond oper-
ating on the country’s territory. It also defends America’s presence throughout 
the world. However, the cult associated with civil religion results in sacred places 
marked by the activities of the country’s founding fathers, for example, George 
Washington’s house. It applies to relics that testify to the foundations of the 
country, such as the original Declaration of Independence and the Constitution 
(Booth Fowler et  al., 2004). It also includes rituals that connect people, like 
fireworks, during the Fourth of July (Albanese, 2013).
Combining civil religion with the ideal type of secular state presents a poten-
tial collision between religion in the United States and the citizen’s right to choose 
a religion or not. Explaining the complexity of this problem requires taking into 
consideration several elements. First, civil religion operates on the sidelines of 
the paradox enshrined in the Constitution of the United States of America. The 
First Amendment states the separation of state and religion, while at the same 
time confirming the right to exercise freedom of religion. This record reflects 
the specificity that evolved in the American nation: the lack of superiority of one 
of the denominations in the state administration and the simultaneous mutual 
tolerance of religious denominations (Wolfe, 2003). However, we are not talking 
about the statute of yet another natural element for Americans such as “the 
American Faith.” Although civil religion takes the form of a public religion, it 
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clearly needs to be separated from institutional religions that are playing the role 
of public religions.
The civil religion functioning in the United States is, therefore, something 
more than an established or endorsed religion. It represents a superior state cult 
that does not accept compromises just like the cult of Caesar in Ancient Rome. 
This functions not due to an apparatus of legal oppression but to social aware-
ness and the resulting affirmation or stigmatization. Without a doubt, love for 
his or her country fundamentally determines a good American. Second, he must 
be a believer, which results from the conviction that “religion is a precondition 
for morality” (Wolfe, 2003: 246). The quality of this faith does not play a funda-
mental role. While Peter L. Berger (1967) postulates understanding religion as 
a sacred canopy, protecting people from the chaos of the inexplicable, Christian 
Smith (1998) reduces it in the case of Americans to sacred umbrellas. Religion 
should provide portable worlds that already now offer full meaning.
Civil religion cannot be properly translated into contexts outside of the 
United States. Its characteristics, treated in terms of a model, instead indicate 
a cult, codes, and rituals, which in a secular state may constitute a passage or 
wall for the popularization of institutional religions. From the perspective of 
the model of clear separation, the national holidays, relics related to the foun-
dation of the state and the rules of conduct determine the material object of 
patriotism. Examples can be found in Europe on every corner, like Marseillaise 
and celebrating July 14 in France. At the same time, we can see an easy temp-
tation in the endorsed Church model to combine religious rituals with secular 
state celebrations. The aforementioned Polish Army Day celebrated on the most 
important Marian ceremony on August 15 in Poland is a perfect example of this. 
Such a situation, however, does not give grounds for claiming that Poland is 
dealing with a civil religion. Traces of this concept present in Poland’s endorsed 
Church variety show that one can only talk about a religion that has found a 
permanent place in whatever is civil or public rather than a typical civil religion.
1.7  The place of public religion
The narrow issue of civil religion in the United States refers to a broader term, 
public religion, which turns out to be much more useful for the conducted analysis. 
In this section, we will deal with explaining the concept of a public religion and its 
associations with the case in Poland. When asked about the meaning of a public 
religion, José Casanova (2003) simply responds that it is a religion that assumes 
a public character. The difference between such a concept and the meaning of 
civil religion we have put forward indicates that (1) every institutional religion 
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has the potential to become public, and (2) it is impossible to put an equal sign 
between civil religion and public religion. The former captures certain spaces in 
social life, which cannot be equated with institutional religions (Jones, 1988). 
The latter assumes transposing the content of the institutional religion onto the 
level of what is public. Therefore, the key to understanding this term concerns 
the operationalization of what is public.
Casanova, in his influential book Public Religions in the Modern World (1994), 
draws attention in a different way when comparing private and public religion. 
He presents them on three levels. The first is organizational and concerns the 
division into individual and group religiosity. Individual religiosity remains first 
and foremost personal religiosity. Meanwhile, group religiosity comes down to 
a system of practices uniting a group of followers. The next level is interactional 
and takes place within the religious community as a result of the merging of 
individuals in response to a specific message and the community worship which 
they belong to due to birth. The last level referring to societal levels concerns the 
distinction between religion and the world.
In another work, Casanova (2003) argues that the importance of a public 
religion should be considered based on three levels:  state-politics, political 
society, and civil society. The first type refers to the models of states that we have 
already mentioned, which assume the marriage of power and religion, meaning 
established Churches. Public religion at the level of political society concerns 
religions that engage their resources in the political game, cooperating with 
political parties, social movements or lobbyist groups. However, on the level of 
civil society, we can speak of public religions when we notice they have specific 
demands at public squares and streets, as well as leading open debates on public 
topics.
In his study, Casanova (1994) presents Poland as an example of public religion 
along with Spain, Brazil, and the United States. He believes that Poland will stay 
in the public religion model for many years. The last two decades have confirmed 
this prediction. However, it is worth briefly looking closer at the specificity of the 
public religion in Poland. This task must be kept open to a greater degree. Only 
further analysis based on the empirical material will allow us to explain how 
the actions of representatives of the Catholic Church influenced the shape and 
awareness of the idea of the secular state.
When we refer to the state-policy level, we see that the country functions ac-
cording to the endorsed Church model. The starting point for this state concerns 
the fundamental change that affected religion after the fall of communism in 
CEE. Churches that in the past were not granted legal status now gained a sense 
of freedom and support due to free expression (Borowik, 2007). In Poland, 
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Catholicism under the leadership of Józef Cardinal Glemp, however, had to 
change its public discourse. Catholicism entered into a period of transforma-
tion as a kind of winner over the regime (Janowski, 2004). At the same time, 
the progressing democratic changes meant that it ceased to play the role of the 
guarantor of the political scene (Grabowska, 2001). As pointed out by Krzysztof 
Kowalczyk (2012), the Church, as the deposit of proper values, found itself in 
tension with the democratic principles of secularism, deliberation on axiological 
issues, worldview pluralism, and tolerance. As a consequence of the resistance by 
society and silence on the part of the Vatican, the Church in Poland unwillingly 
recognized its formal separation from the state, adjusting to pressure from less 
official channels (Casanova, 1994).
In public speeches, the bishops articulated the need to normalize Church-state 
relations by a concordat treaty with the Holy See. Moreover, in their pastoral let-
ters and the Episcopate’s messages, they suggested that these relations should 
be based on autonomy and cooperation. This was to ensure freedom of con-
science and citizens’ confessions, at the same time not removing the sacred from 
public life (Kowalczyk, 2012). The confusing matter of the concordat signed by 
Prime Minister Hanna Suchocka on July 28, 1993, ended with its ratification on 
February 23, 1998. In the meantime, the provision on the regulation of relations 
with the Catholic Church in the form of a concordat was written as art. 25 of the 
Constitution of April 2, 1997.
This symbolic privilege granted to the Catholic Church in practice sanctioned 
a specific understanding of the earlier general records of respecting Christian 
values in public media under the Radio and Television Act of December 29, 
1992. Christian values were decoded before the Constitution, for example, as 
a “universal and fundamental system enriched with evangelical truths, which 
together with European culture have grown into our being persons” (Glemp, 
1993: 1). After its approval, logic suggested referring to the values presented by 
the endorsed Catholic Church. In addition, this is confirmed by the rules set in 
cooperation with the Church in the field of normalizing abortion legislation and 
religious education in schools.
Public religion at the level which Casanova describes as the political society 
in Poland was characterized by periods of the Catholic Church’s involvement in 
the political game and periods of neutrality (Kowalczyk, 2012). In the period 
of 1989–1995, the bishops represented a heterogeneous position within which 
the idea of supporting the building of a Christian Democratic Party dominated. 
First of all, the bishops declared over-politicalness. In practice, however, they 
undertook attempts to integrate right-wing parties and set the system of values 
that these parties should follow (Gowin, 2002). Second, they presented various 
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approaches. Józef Cardinal Glemp acted for the unification of the right-wing 
camp. Bishops Tadeusz Gocłowski and Józef Michalik supported the Christian 
National Union (Zjednoczenie Chrześcijańsko-Narodowe  – ZChN). Bishops 
Tadeusz Pieronek and Józef Życiński revealed their distance towards parties and 
politics (Kowalczyk, 2012).
The Church’s approach changed after the defeat of the right-wing parties in the 
parliamentary elections of 1993 and Lech Wałęsa in the 1995 presidential election. 
At that time, the Polish Bishops’ Conference reached a unified stance on matters 
of political involvement. It claimed that lay Catholics themselves bear moral 
responsibility for their party activity, and the Church remains non-partisan. At 
the same time, they indirectly suggested who not to vote for in the 1997 and 2001 
elections, depreciating the left wing. In 2005, in the face of the survey advantage 
of the right-wing Civic Platform (Platforma Obywatelska  – PO) and Law and 
Justice (Prawo i Sprawiedliwość – PiS), the demonization of left-wing parties by 
the Church decreased. After PiS (27 % of votes) and PO (24.14 % of votes) won, 
the Church engaged in mediation between both formations. In the residence of 
Gdańsk’s Archbishop Tadeusz Gocłowski, unsuccessful talks between PiS leader 
Jarosław Kaczyński and PO leader Donald Tusk took place. In the following years, 
the Church’s approach returned to the non-partisan formula that clearly distin-
guished Catholic values and their protection (Leśniczak, 2016).
On the last level of civil society, we can speak of Catholicism in Poland as 
a public religion in reference to two different areas:  (1) the changing Church 
discourse on social issues, and (2)  the great manifestations affiliated with the 
Church. The first area connects with the assumption that being Polish means 
being a Catholic (Grzymała-Busse, 2015). In 1989, the number of Catholics in 
the country came out to 94 %. For the bishops, this was a sufficient reason to 
identify the nation of Poland and society with Catholics, thus implying that the 
people would vote for Catholic candidates. The Bishop’s Conference erroneously 
assumed that Catholics would be politically united (Borowik, 2000). This fusion 
of state and religion created the Church’s authoritative discourse, which fell with 
successive elections.
Subsequent years showed the Church functioning in two discursive models 
characteristic of the post-conciliar era (Borg, 2009). The first, the incarnation 
model, assumed an open formula in the debate based on using non-Church 
arguments. It was mainly represented by the so-called open Church and the 
opinion-forming Catholic environments of the weekly Tygodnik Powszechny, 
Znak, and Więź magazines. The second, the intra-Ecclesial devotional model, 
functioned in Poland as the closed Church. It followed the discourse of Toruń’s 
Radio Maryja, using the inter-Church arguments.
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Both formations took on a more unequivocal form in 2006. Ewa Czaczkowska 
(2006), then a columnist for the Rzeczpospolita daily, pointed out that in con-
nection with the controversy surrounding Radio Maryja, the Episcopate divided 
itself into two positions: the Toruń Church and the Łagiewniki Church. The Toruń 
Church emphasized supporting traditional Catholicism and its functioning in 
the public sphere according to the Catholic-national model, especially promoted 
by Radio Maryja (Guzek, 2015b; Krzemiński, 2017).
On the other hand, the Łagiewniki Church fully represented the openness of 
the Second Vatican Council and preach moderate social positions. On the polit-
ical level, it was associated with supporting PO’s political party. From the per-
spective of Church administration, it was identified with the figure of Stanisław 
Cardinal Dziwisz from Cracow, Pope John Paul II’s former secretary. The division 
began to become outdated in 2012 at the time of the dispute over the multiplex 
site for TV Trwam, a station owned by Fr. Tadeusz Rydzyk. Cardinal Dziwisz 
then showed support for the TV Trwam website.
On the civil society level, one should also speak about Church-affiliated 
manifestations. The basic expression of the presence of the Church in city 
squares and streets were marches organized for granting space on the Multiplex 
for Fr. Rydzyk’s TV Trwam. The station did not receive a place on the Multiplex, 
so it appealed to the mobilization capabilities of the social movement focused 
on Fr. Rydzyk’s media network (Secler, 2013). Next, it received the sup-
port of the Episcopate and a special delegate in the person of the Archbishop 
of Gdańsk, Sławoj Leszek Głódź. As a result, TV Trwam found itself on the 
MUX-1 multiplex.
1.8  Lasting Polish religiosity in context
Earlier, we discussed Casanova’s (2003) distinctions of the three levels of public 
religion in Poland. We focused the reader’s attention on the shape of these 
formations. In the description, however, we placed insufficient emphasis on 
Polish religiosity. In the face of the radical political and economic changes in 
Poland after 1989, it turns out that the attitude of Polish society towards reli-
gion is just beginning to change. At the level of its religiosity, it confronted sec-
ularization and the conviction of secularism in Europe. In this section, we will 
draw attention to the fundamental meaning of religiosity in the context of the 
discussed matter on the secular state. Following Irena Borowik (2010), we will 
give a report on the five hypotheses regarding this state of affairs. Next, we will 
combine these solutions with the context of the discussion on the idea of a sec-
ular state.
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The first refers to the historical hypothesis. It assumes that stable religiosity 
appeared during the transformation thanks to the place of religion according 
to the “historically established pattern” (Borowik, 2010:  264). It shows a fun-
damental conviction that historically formed relationships between Poles and 
Catholicism would remain valid even after the 1989 transformation. Borowik 
draws attention to the two periods that built this historical relationship and ulti-
mately contributed to its durability. The first comes down to a period of more 
than a hundred years of partitions. The Polish nation adhered to the Catholic 
tradition. This helped it particularly oppose Orthodox Russia and Protestant 
Prussia. At that time, Polish messianism arose. After 1989, traces of this messia-
nism began to appear again. This happened in the context of Poland’s accession 
to the European Union (Leszczyńska, 2002, 2009), and later in relation to the 
activity of the movement for the enthronement of Christ as the King of Poland 
(Perka, 2009).
The second period, which affected the strong relationship between Poles 
and Catholicism, followed the Second World War when Poland was under 
Soviet influence. At that time, the Church represented the voice of the oppo-
sition and was an actual symbol of freedom. In Borowik’s (2010: 265) opinion, 
it brought about “a particular social experience of religion extending to 
non-religious areas, and in particular in religious life and in the Church’s 
activities.”
Another of the proposed hypotheses treats Catholicism like a civic religion, 
which manifests itself in its vitality by implementing extra-religious functions. 
Borowik begins by looking at the Polish case in the key of a civic religion ac-
cording to Bellah’s (1967) concept. She also immediately sees a fundamental 
inconsistency between the two formations. Christianity in Poland stays strictly 
Catholic in the form of a cult characterized by deep devotion to the Virgin Mary 
in the icon of Black Madonna of Częstochowa. This contradicts the basic premise 
of the universality of a civil religion. On the other hand, Catholicism in Poland 
possesses most of the features that characterize a civil religion. It functions in 
connection with patriotism, as evident in using “God–Honor–Fatherland” that 
is quoted at various times, or propagated in recent years by some of the right-
wing circles of the “Church–School–Artillery–Mint.” Other social functions also 
connected with Catholicism in Poland especially refer to the historical memory 
and the overlapping of national and Church holidays as in the case of the August 
15 celebration.
When adopting the hypothesis of a civil religion as the basis for the con-
tinual level of high religiosity in Poland, political topics gain importance. The 
combination of state and sacred topics takes place in order to integrate society. 
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Borowik (2010) sees a parallelism here between (1)  the past integration of 
Catholicism in opposition to communism and (2) current integration, which 
somehow occurs despite capitalism. This hypothesis, however, does not take 
into account that the political activity of the Catholic Church has a broader 
dimension than just social integration. Like any institution, it also wants to 
maintain or increase his influence on the state. We find an example of this 
activity in the organization of the 1050th anniversary of the baptism of Poland 
(Guzek, 2017).
The third one, called the social hypothesis, assumes that religiousness 
persists because of little social security. Borowik starts from the regularity 
noticed in more than 80 countries about a strong relationship between reli-
giosity and social security (Norris & Ingelhart, 2004). She explains the high 
degree of Polish religiosity due to a combination of two factors. The first comes 
down to the small share of the richest people in society’s structure. The second 
concerns the aging of society. In the imagination of aging citizens, stability can 
be linked to the memories of rural and small-town religiosity. This confirms 
the regularity in relation to the relationship of religiosity patterns and places of 
birth (Piwowarski, 1971).
According to the socialization hypothesis, religiosity persists as a result of ef-
fective socialization. Borowik evaluates Poland’s cultural context as unambigu-
ously religious. She states that for a Pole, prayer is seen as natural as brushing 
one’s teeth. In other words, through socialization, Poles not only learn to function 
in their society, but also maintain a regular relationship with God. The process 
finds additional reinforcement in the fact that it is not accompanied by religious 
criticism characteristic of other confessions. Doctrinal questions can hardly be 
found in the field of public interest. It is not really about being a believer but 
more about formally being a Catholic.
The last privatization hypothesis assumes that “religiosity retains continuity on 
the surface, while underneath privatization is progressing” (Borowik, 2010: 271). 
This flows from the conviction that in Poland, there are two paradoxically dif-
ferent processes taking place. On the one hand, we can see a strong expression of 
institutional religiosity, yet, on the other hand, a selective approach to faith takes 
place. First of all, this means incomplete acceptance of dogmas, for example, dis-
belief in the devil and hell. The next issue refers to applying ethical principles. 
This is particularly evident in the selective approach of Poles towards contra-
ception, divorce, and cohabitation (Slany, 2002; Zaręba, 2008). The last element 
connects with the growing detachment towards the Church’s political role.
Such a state of affairs causes that Borowik sees in Poland the opposite of Grace 
Davie’s (1990) believing without belonging thesis which describes the United 
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Kingdom. Instead, Poland seems to show explicit belonging without believing 
(Borowik, 2010). This scheme also functions in the Scandinavian countries 
(Bäckström, 2015). In contrast to Scandinavia, however, the Polish case does not 
include a vicarious religion, meaning a model in which representatives of reli-
gious institutions replace the majority of believers in regular practices. The unin-
volved majority alone accepts the activities of a designated minority.
We will treat the hypotheses about Pole’s continually high religiosity as a con-
text for analyzing the idea of a secular state. Thanks to this, we can draw some 
interesting conclusions. In the case of the historical hypothesis, we can ask the 
question: are Poles ready for a secular state? During the partitions, national ideas 
were preserved largely due to the Catholic Church’s role as a guardian of our 
memories and traditions. Religion, therefore, played a key role in the nation’s 
survival. Functioning in the atheistic system imposed by the Soviets has shown 
that, in Poland, society functioning without a public religion will not work. 
Therefore, breaking relations between the nation and Catholicism, which have 
been formed over many generations, still seems unrealistic.
The idea of a secular state clearly does not coincide with the hypothesis of 
a civic religion. Although it is impossible to introduce one universal religion 
in Poland, Catholicism at many moments performed general social functions. 
Depriving it of this function would introduce a gap that we would need to fill in 
at various levels, in particular during the celebrations of national holidays and 
patriotic events, in the history and martyrology of the nation. Taking into con-
sideration that the country functions according to the endorsed Church model, 
the total secularization of state rituals would build a culture of celebrations for-
eign to the majority of citizens. When we combine the idea of a secular state with 
the socialization hypothesis, we notice that, despite everything, these are going 
in separate directions. The secular state deprives citizens of the opportunity to 
appeal to the deep layers of religiosity and the traditions of their forefathers. 
Bringing religion into the private sphere makes it difficult to learn its principles 
in the public space, for example, in school.
The link between the idea of a secular state and the religiosity of Poles functions 
as a part of the privatization hypothesis. It assumes that privatized religiosity has 
reached its best moment. The number of people who declare that they believe in 
their own way or do not practice at all is steadily growing (CBOS, 2015c; ISKK, 
2018; Mariański, 2011). At the same time, in the public sphere, knowledge about 
the secular state model is becoming more popular. Poles are able to more clearly 
separate the state’s order from the religious order. The whole process reveals the 
long-term decline in religious practices. As this process indicates, there appears 
to be room for discussion on the role of the media.
2  The notion of mediatization
The term mediatization sounds quite awkward in English. Mediatization, how-
ever, won the race among other competitive terms and enters into a growing 
research perspective based on the consequences of media action. Mediatization 
theorists, even though they do not take up a common position regarding what 
the concept is, assume that mediatization “has matured theoretically as well as 
empirically” (Hepp et al., 2015: 315). At the same time, they refute its alleged 
functioning as a conceptual bandwagon (Deacon & Stanyer, 2014). For this 
study, the framework of mediatization forms the analysis of the idea of a secular 
state but not from the perspective of mediation. Rather, we undertake an analysis 
of how the selective media relate to the idea of a secular state and the way it 
changed over the years.
2.1  Traditions of mediatization research
The development of mediatization research basically takes different directions, 
whose foundations were set by two earlier research trends. The first concerns 
the medium theory developed by theorists like Harold A. Inis (1964), Marshall 
McLuhan (1962, 1964), and Joshua Meyrowitz (Meyrowitz, 1994). It mainly 
focused on the influence of the media and technical aspects of the means of 
communication. The second trend, ecology of communication, relates to David 
Altheide and Robert Snow (1979, 1988) and concerns the formatting power 
of the media expressed in the media logic concept (Altheide, 1995). Current 
studies on mediatization research make it possible to distinguish three 
traditions which the theorizing of the concept of mediatization follows:  the 
institutional perspective, the social-constructivist approach also called the 
cultural perspective, and the material perspective (Couldry & Hepp, 2013; 
Lundby, 2014).
The institutional tradition, or institutionalist, as Couldry and Hepp (2013) put 
it, grew out of the study of journalism and political communication. It is based on 
the distinction between structure and agency, derived from the theory of struc-
turation and institutions developed by Anthony Giddens (1984). Represented 
primarily by Stig Hjarvard (2008b, 2014a, 2014b), it relies on a specific perspec-
tive for looking at the media as being more or less independent social institutions 
and their accompanying principles. It assumes that the social system or specific 
social areas, including politics and religion, adapt to the media, taking into ac-
count the game conditions they determine, meaning the so-called media logic 
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(Altheide & Snow, 1979). In simplified terms, representatives of a non-media 
social institution or the institution itself want to be actively represented in the 
media, so they must turn to this logic and start acting in accord with the forms 
present in the media.
The social-constructivist approach, also interchangeably referred to as the 
cultural perspective (Lundby, 2014), developed from Peter L. Berger and Thomas 
Luckmann’s (1967) theory of social construction of reality. It includes questions 
concerning “how the communicative construction of reality is manifested within 
certain media processes and how, in turn, specific features of certain media have a 
contextualized ‘consequence’ for the overall process whereby sociocultural reality 
is constructed in and through communication” (Couldry & Hepp, 2013: 196). 
In contrast to the institutional approach, which emphasizes the development of 
media institutions following the spread of media logic, the cultural perspective 
relies on the analysis of the role of individual media in the process of communi-
cating the construction of the social world. Mediatization understood in this way 
particularly characterizes the works of Andreas Hepp (2012) and Friderich Krotz 
(2009) associated with the German University of Bremen.
There is also a third approach to the study of mediatization, whose represent-
atives do not fit into any of these traditions (Lundby, 2014). The foundation of 
mediatization they developed refers to the medium theory (Meyrowitz, 1994) 
and the phrase coined by Marshall McLuhan (1964) that medium is the message. 
In recent studies, the approach also refers to Pierre Bourdieu’s (1977) theory of 
social fields. The perspective represented mainly by André Jansson (2014, 2018) 
and Niels Ole Fiennemann (2011) emphasizes that media always appear in a 
materialized form. As a result, the mediation process deals with specific technol-
ogies of human communication. Mediatization boils down to a transformation 
under the influence of changes in the material aspect of the media. An example 
of this process can be illustrated by digitalization (Jansson, 2014).
The tension present among particular perspectives of mediatization research 
leads to the necessity to choose a tradition whose components will constitute 
our research. In this book, it is adopted the institutional perspective. As we will 
show in further chapters, the media representation of the idea of a secular state 
and the related Church-state relationship in the long-term research indicate the 
process of adaptation of representatives of state institutions and Churches to 
the media logic intuitively perceived by them. Another reason that prompted 
us to choose the institutional approach comes from its greatest coherence with 
the spatial and structural paradigm (Jachimowski, 2006, 2012), which founded 
our earlier research perspective. It results from the conviction that the media as 
social institutions and entities of the media system build the communication 
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infrastructure that permits the existence of the so-called media space. This space 
includes related networks of mutual relations: a community inhabiting a given 
area, media institutions, and subjectively understood recipients of these media. 
Communication, therefore, requires a media space that operates on the basis of 
media infrastructure and a culture of using these media (Jachimowski, 2006). 
In contrast to the materialistic approach, here the existence of media is not its 
essence, but only a prerequisite for building and maintaining social communica-
tion and society’s communication subjectivity (Szostok, 2017).
2.2  Defining mediatization
More and more original mediatization conceptualizations are taking place within 
the mentioned research traditions. There are also proposals that go beyond these 
traditions. Andrea Schrott notes in this regard that “having so many descriptions 
of the term used can lead to the impression that everyone is talking about the 
same or at least very similar processes and aspects” (Schrott, 2009: 44) and com-
bining the results of various empirical studies turns out to be very difficult. The 
theorists of mediatization, however, agree that “mediatization is a concept used 
to critically analyze the interrelation between changes in media and commu-
nications on the one hand, and changes in culture and society on the other” 
(Couldry & Hepp, 2013: 197). Mediatization reveals itself in terms of processes 
and functions rather than in an essential manner. In particular, proposals for its 
conceptualization and any change that is intertwined with factors such as time, 
technology, or theory are crucial for understanding this process (Lundby, 2014).
Mediatization understood based on the dimension of time refers to long-term 
changes in society under the media’s influence. For Krotz (2014), this process has 
accompanied our species from the moment of the existence of human communi-
cation. Hjarvard (2013), on the other hand, narrows down mediatization to full 
media saturation at the end of the twentieth century. Fornäs (2014) suggests that 
mediation understood as a long-term process contains essentially different, pro-
gressive mediatizations rooted in mediation patterns typical of a given time. This 
is clearly contradicted by Hjarvard’s (2014a) approach, for whom full satura-
tion has led the media to the state of semi-independent institutions whose logic 
means the modus operandi of the whole process. Livingstone and Lunt (2014) 
present a lighter position, according to which traces of mediatization occur 
throughout human history, but only high modernity provides evident proof of 
the influence of the media on other areas of social life.
The three known definitions fit well into the considered mediatization factor. 
For Winfried Schulz (2004), mediatization denotes a process of social change 
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resulting from the functioning and development of communication media 
on the basis of extension, substitution, amalgamation, and accommodation. 
Although it does not stress the explicitly temporal aspect, its definition engages 
the process-oriented in a specific spatial and temporal context. Advances in 
mediatization, according to Schultz, are inevitably linked with the media relay 
function, which refers to the transfer of information combining time and phys-
ical distance. According to Friedrich Krotz’s (2001, 2003) approach, there is a 
mediatization meta-process, which has separate historical phases, implemented 
in a specific way in every culture and society. The change occurs as a result 
of the historical modification of communication as a basic human practice. 
However, this is not about the dominant role of communication technologies 
in the process of change, but rather about “the changes in how people com-
municate when constructing their inner and exterior realities by referring to 
media” (Krotz, 2009:  25). The concept of mediatization based on Kent Asp’s 
(1990, 2014b) approach points to the process in which individual actors and 
social institutions adapt to the various constraints and formats imposed by the 
media. This social learning process increases the power of the media over time. 
In other words, the more individuals and institutions adapt to the media, the 
more they are mediatized. The greater their mediatization, the stronger the 
power of the media.
In technology-based definitions, the basis for conceptualization concerns the 
transition from an analog to a digital environment, which progresses through 
the development of communication technologies. In contrast to previous 
phrases in communication technologies, for example, from handwriting to mov-
able type, the transition to the digital environment meant that media entered 
into previously unattainable areas. Johan Fornäs (2014: 499) sees this clearly in 
the mediatization of popular culture, which “has gone through a series of stages, 
where new technologies, institutions, and genres of mediated communication 
have stepwise affected the forms and modes in which popular culture devel-
oped.” Niels Ole Fiennemann (2014) points out that the process of change under 
the influence of the media follows the media constellation available in a given 
social context, which is defined by the term media matrix. In contrast to earlier 
stages, the digital space should be considered as mediatization along with the 
digitization process.
For the definitions based on theory, the understanding of mediatization affects 
the “process by which activities of various social spheres come to be conducted 
under the influence of the media, with the media, through the media, or by the 
logic of media” (Rothenbuhler, 2009: 279). The key term of these definitions re-
mains, therefore, media logic considered as the driving force of the process. The 
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fixed definition of mediatization authored by Stig Hjarvard (2008b: 113) proves 
helpful in illustrating this mechanism:
“The process whereby society to an increasing degree is submitted to or becomes depen-
dent on the media and their logic. This process is characterized by a duality in that the 
media have become integrated into the operations of other social institutions, while 
they also have acquired the status of social institutions in their own right. As a conse-
quence, social interactions – within the respective institutions, between institutions, and 
in society at large – take place via the media.”
As Hjarvard points out, mediatization not only means the dominance of media 
logic but also the constitution of the media as independent social institutions 
that function on their own terms. Hjarvard’s approach, therefore, indicates that 
media logic initiates and then strengthens the institutional side of the media.
In addition to the dominant perspective, media logic is part of the theory-
based mediatization concepts that benefit from a systemic approach. Michael 
Meyen (2009), using the term medialization, points to the reactions caused by 
structural changes in the media system or the general increase in the importance 
of public communication that take place in other social subsystems. For this ap-
proach, mediatization means the process of imposing the logic of the media on a 
selected sphere of social activity. When talking about the mediatization of poli-
tics, it should be defined as the process of imposing the logic of the media on the 
political system. When we accept religion as the domain, the logic of the media 
will dominate this sphere.
This conceptualization also corresponds with the idea of mediatization 
based on the sensitizing theory (Lunt & Livingstone, 2016). It assumes Herbert 
Blumer’s (1954) distinction between definite concepts, which precisely indicate 
the common features of a given class of phenomena, and sensitizing concepts 
that provide guidelines and references in a specific empirical study. As pointed 
out by Peter Lunt and Sonia Livingstone, mediatization sensitizes researchers to 
greater historical awareness, social transformation realized within or through 
particular areas of social life (such as politics or religion) and the intersection of 
metaprocesses such as globalization, individualization, and commercialization.
Combining the results based on different concepts of mediatization turns 
out to be difficult (Schrott, 2009), so for the purposes of this book, we adopted 
its meaning according to dimensions of Hjarvard (2008b), Asp (1990), as well 
as Couldry and Hepp (2013). We assume that the idea of a secular state and 
Church-state relations are subject to mediatization. This means that changes 
in the media and communication also affect how the problem is addressed in 
the media. Regarding the issue of the secular state and Church-state relations, it 
can be seen that individual actors and political and religious institutions adopt 
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the logic of the media. A precise answer about the essence of the mediatization 
of these phenomena, and, more broadly, religion, is given in the next part of 
the book.
2.3  Mediatization epistemology: The grand 
theory or the theory of middle range?
Althoughwe mentioned that Sonia Livingstone (2009) considers mediatization to 
be a broader concept than mediation, we have not pointed out the level of the social 
sphere on which the whole process takes place. Two conflicting positions exist on 
this point: mediatization as the grand theory and the theory of middle range.
The division of theories should be the starting point of our considerations. For 
the purposes of this book, we accepted Stefan Weber’s (2010) proposition, who 
distinguishes four types: paradigms, super theories, base theories, and theories 
of middle range. Paradigms denote an attempt to organize the image of the world 
based on generalizations of science and ideology. They work on shaping philo-
sophical systems and provide answers to basic ontological and epistemological 
questions. Super theories, as Weber calls them, mean essentially interdisciplinary 
grand theories understood in a twofold way. First, they indicate metatheories or 
second-degree theories. Second, theories are defined in such a way as to capture 
the whole. Niklas Luhmann’s (1996) society as a self-producing or autopoietic 
system of communications is an example of a super-theory.
The next level includes base theories, or theories based on a certain part of 
reality, the so-called base category, that fulfills the condition of an empirical 
study. As a result of empirical research, definitions and models are formulated 
here. This case is illustrated by research in the area of, among others, cultural 
studies (Hall, 1973), communication theory (Habermas, 1985), and semiotics 
(Foucault, 1994). The fourth type, referred to as the theories of middle range, 
was introduced to the social sciences by Robert Merton (1968) to describe 
narrow empirical studies that do not claim the right to global narratives but 
help describe the conditions of social life. Examples illustrate agenda-setting 
(McCombs, 2004), uses and gratifications (Katz, Blumler, & Gurevitch, 1973), 
and the spiral of silence (Noelle-Neumann, 1984).
As we already mentioned, a lack of agreement among mediatization 
theoreticians regarding the scope of the theory takes place. First of all, the meta-
process of mediatization, as Friedrich Krotz (2001) puts it, situates the concept 
next to individualization, characteristic of high modernity, globalization, and 
commercialization. Mediatization understood as the grand theory excels other 
types of communication, as illustrated in Fig. 2.1.
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Generally, we face two objections to the grand theory of mediatization. The first 
one states that understanding mediatization as a metatheory based on the long-
term process of social transformation accompanies the temptation to build “a 
general theory that integrates and explains processes of mediatization across time 
and sociocultural contexts – a grand theory of mediatization that incorporates 
most other social theories of relevance” (Ekström, Fornäs, Jansson, & Jerslev, 
2016: 1095). Such a view on mediatization arises difficulties in stimulating mul-
tidisciplinary research, which helps to better understand the whole process in 
separate contexts (Rakow, 2013). Second, when mediatization approaches the 
metatheory, Deacon and Stanyer’s (2014) accusation of being media-centric and 
the lack of a non-media argument is more clearly heard. In their opinion, there 
exists the possibility that effective mediatization only takes place in conjunction 
with other cultural, social, and political factors. Regardless of the topic related to 
the level of the theory on which we want to base mediatization processes, Hepp, 
Hjarvard, and Lundby respond to this objection, accepting Livingstone’s (2010) 
distinction between the media-centric and media-centered perspectives:
“Being ‘media-centric’ is a one-sided approach to understanding the interplay between 
media, communications, culture, and society, whereas being ‘media-centered’ involves a 
holistic understanding of the various intersecting social forces at work at the same time 
as we allow ourselves to have a particular perspective and emphasis on the role of the 
media in these processes.” (Hepp et al., 2015: 316)
They understand mediatization as a media-centered process in which the role of 
the media, while remaining crucial, takes into account the simultaneous partici-
pation of other social factors.
When we treat mediatization as the middle range theory, we have the choice 
of a mid-level analysis or a sub-process of mediatization. In terms of Hjarvard’s 
(2014b) institutional perspective, mediatization takes place at the mid-level of 
the cultural and social affairs. Thus, this process does not indicate the general 
Mediatized forms of social and  
cultural life
The relevance of media in everyday life, work, 
societal relations, groups, institutions, society, and 
parts of social activity (i.e., politics, economy)
Mediated communication Three forms: mediated interpersonal 
communication, interactive communication, mass 
communication
Communication as human practice Language, gestures, face-to-face communication
Fig. 2.1: Face-to-face-communication, mediated communication, and the mediatized 
conditions and forms of life. Based on Krotz, 2009: 24
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influence of the media on culture and society (as in the case of the grand theory) 
and at the same time remains above the analysis of individual social interactions 
(as in the case of the micro-level). Instead, mediatization indicates some general 
patterns of these interactions created by the media. Hjarvard perceives the pro-
cess at this level as being non-media-centric, which not only allows media logic 
to work but also the logic of other social institutions. Therefore, he postulates 
using the terms in the plural, media logics, and institutional logics, in order to 
emphasize the complexity of the process.
In the circle of middle-range theories, mediatization remains a sub-process 
(Krotz, 2014; Schulz, 2004), whose advantage is due to the direct measurability 
of the change in the scope of extension distinguished by Schulz (2004) (the 
increase in media opportunities), substitution (non-media practices become 
dependent on the media), amalgamation (media practices begin to intermingle 
with other practices) and accommodation (non-media actors start to operate 
based on the media’s terms of the game). The advantages of this approach include 
a clear division of categories, which enables more precise measurement of the 
mediatization process (Ekström et al., 2016). Its disadvantages include a lack of 
transparency regarding the functioning of media logic (Hjarvard, 2008b).
In the general division of the possibilities of analyzing mediatization, Knut 
Lundby (2014) points to three levels of micro/meso/macro and the fourth pos-
sibility, across levels. Micro-level studies deal with the mediatization practices 
of individual actors or small groups. The meso level focuses on institutions. On 
the other hand, the macro level works in particular fields of human activity, 
meaning culture and society. As we can see, this division does not fully reflect 
the differences from the communication theory perspective but introduces some 
valuable insights useful for implementing this theory.
In this book, it is used the analysis of the mediatization of the idea of a sec-
ular state as a study in the area of middle-range theory. Along with Hjarvard 
(2014b), we assume the possibility of the co-occurrence of many media logics 
and institutional logics that shape general patterns of interaction in the area of 
the secular state and Church-state relations. At the moment when we under-
took to describe the process of mediatization and to capture the social change, 
we considered it necessary to focus the reader’s attention on the processes sub-
mitted by Schulz (2004), especially those related to the logic of media accom-
modation. The specificity of the described processes means that this analysis 
takes into account, first of all, institutional changes related to the idea of the 
secular state and the dynamics of Church-state relations. At the same time, the 
analysis includes the agency of individual actors representing state and religious 
institutions.
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2.4  Understanding media institutions
Theorists on mediatization tend to consider this process as a perspective rather 
than a strict theory (Rothenbuhler, 2009). It assumes loosely interrelated 
concepts that collectively determine the processual mechanism of mediatization. 
In the institutional perspective, the key to theorizing on mediatization comes 
down to the “institutional, aesthetic, and technological affordances” (Hjarvard, 
2012a: 30) of the media. In this paragraph, we can discuss the basics of under-
standing the institutionalization of mediatization processes. We put special 
emphasis on explaining the very concept of a social institution.
Along with Hjarvard (2014b), our starting point in considering the notions of 
an institution is reflected in the structuration theory (Giddens, 1984). It assumes 
that the structure represents both a medium and the result of social practice. 
This peculiar duality avoids the extremes of distinguishing institutions at the 
expense of a social practice or favoring the social structure over the agency.
When conceptualizing social implications, one must start with time and space, 
which “are not just the dimensions of the context within which the human agent 
acts, they are an essential part of the design of action” (Hauer, 2014: 91). When 
we translate social practices into the continuum of time and space, we create 
an episode with two clear boundaries. The first concerns idiosyncratic practices 
which represent the lowest level of the time-space extension. On the other hand, 
social institutions embody “practices which have the greatest time-space exten-
sion” (Giddens, 1984: 17). They consist of individual interactions but have the 
ability to last longer than individual persons in a solid and material form or as 
principles embodied in human action. In other words, social institutions rely on 
the rules of social life, meaning “techniques or generalizable procedures applied 
in the enactment/reproduction of social practices” (Giddens, 1984: 21) and the 
resources that are present in a material or symbolic form and provide infrastruc-
ture for social practices and thus cement social life.
For presenting his theory, Anthony Giddens was criticized for excessive 
abstractness, an ontological character, and ambiguity in the field of structural 
duality (I. J. Cohen, 1989). His strong structuration theory reduced this criti-
cism by creating a strengthened version of the original theory developed for the 
needs of more recent empirical research done by Rob Stones (2005). It assumes 
the interdependence of social institutions and the human interpretation of these 
structures. In it, Stones postulates a departure from the abstract consideration of 
the structure and activities for their observation in specific situations and under-
standing the disposition and practices of social agents. In the original version 
of the theory, Giddens indicates that in the process of socialization carried out 
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within various institutions (i.e., family, religion, education), individuals acquire 
certain rules and resources and then reflect on them in a retrospective way in a 
specific situation. It was only Stones who introduced the theory of the meso-level 
ontological concept, which allows observing this structure and the operation of 
social actors. He treats it as a sliding scale on which a particular study is placed 
and analyzes the activities and structures in relative terms, omitting the abstrac-
tion of ontologies.
Unlike Giddens’s two dimensions of rules and resources, Stones (2005: 85) 
puts forward four process components that make up the quadripartite nature 
of structuration:  external structures, internal structures, active agency/agent’s 
practices, and outcomes. External structures determine the conditions of the 
game. Regardless of whether social agents recognize them or not, external 
structures allow or hinder the operation of social actors. In the situation of 
autonomy of external structures towards social agents, the influence of external 
conditions and general social conditions may ignore the will of social agents. 
Internal structures are divided into two components. The first term, known as 
conjecturally-specific knowledge of internal structures, covers the acquired over 
time “knowledge of interpretative schemes, power capacities, and normative ex-
pectations and principles of the agents within context” (Stones, 2005: 91). The 
second component includes general-disposition structures or habitus, which are 
accepted unreflectively as (Stones, 2005: 88):
“(…) transposable skills and dispositions, including generalized world-views and cul-
tural schemas, classifications, typifications of things, peoples and networks, principles 
of action, typified recipes of action, deep binary frameworks of signification, associative 
chains and connotations of discourse, habits of speech and gesture, and methodologies 
for adapting this range of particular practices in particular locations in time and space.”
Active agency concerns the way in which social agents engage in structures. They 
answer the question whether this “dynamic moment of structuration” (Stones, 
2005: 86) occurs routinely or reflexively. Outcomes, on the other hand, indicate 
the effect on internal and external structures in their stability or change.
The structuration theory can serve as a good framework for understanding 
the key concept of mediatization. According to Hjarvard (2014b), the theory 
shows how the media are located both inside and outside the human agency. 
When we consider them as external structures, on the one hand, they remain 
independent of the individual agency, and on the other, they rely on external 
rules (law, market rules) and communicative resources (the media environ-
ment). The media that we see as internal structures rely on our internal rules and 
resources in the form of patterns for action, familiarity with formats and genres. 
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Internal conditions understood in this way may allow social agents to operate in 
other ways than those provided by external structures.
The concept of institutions given by the structuration theory as being struc-
tured by rules and resources in such a way that they have the ability to sur-
vive beyond individual persons in a material form or as principles embodied 
in human action proves useful for properly understanding mediatization. On 
the one hand, this process precisely means the transformation of various social 
institutions under the influence of the media, yet on the other hand, the media 
themselves gain the status of semi-independent institutions (Hjarvard, 2014a).
News institutions, as Mark Ørsten (2004) defines these media institutions, 
base their principles on two levels. The first boils down to media ideology, which 
assumes three postulates:  independence, objectivity, and facticity. The second 
level concerns media logic, meaning rules and procedures in the form of formats 
and genres that constitute the functioning of media institutions. The conceptu-
alization of media institutions, therefore, leads to the belief that actors adapt not 
only to media logic but also to media ideology. Same media institutions are also 
subject to change based on the scenario of spontaneous changes or evolution 
(Asp, 2014a; Sjöblom, 1993). Meanwhile, the reasons for institutional change 
should be seen in economic, political, or cultural factors (LaPorta, Lopez-de-
Silanes, Shleifer, & Vishny, 1999).
2.5  Differentiating media
Mediatization’s essential element includes the process of the structural dif-
ferentiation of the media. According to Rothenbuhler (2009), the concept of 
mediatization indicates a process in which previous independent social activities 
became dependent on the media and the institutions they created. The root cause 
of this thinking, however, is the belief that the media themselves are indepen-
dent. The historical process of mediatization, therefore, is clearly linked with the 
mechanism of obtaining and maintaining independent media. This view is rein-
forced by Strömbäck and Esser (2014c), according to which structural differen-
tiation plays the role of one of the three dimensions of the mediatization policy.
In the historical perspective, structural differentiation ends within the limits 
imposed, on the one hand, by the process of the release of the media from the 
direct influence of the political world, and on the other from its dependence on 
the currently progressing corporate power. Such a boundary may raise doubts 
whether in practice today media in Europe possesses wider autonomy. This com-
plex problem requires deeper reflection. We will begin with a series of questions 
about whether, when, and to what extent the media have gained autonomy. 
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Answering these questions will allow us to properly address the phenomenon 
crucial for the mediatization process, which applies structural differentiation.
A comparison of 18 media systems in Western Europe in Comparing Media 
Systems: Three Models of Media and Politics prompts Daniel C. Hallin and Paolo 
Mancini (2004) to two claims in the area of differentiation. First, the authors 
recognize that the process of structural differentiation of the media occurred at 
different times depending on whether the country was represented by the media 
and political culture as a polarized pluralist, democratic corporationist, or the lib-
eral model. Second, depending on the particular model, the media of a given 
country is characterized by reaching full political autonomy or not.
The liberal model developed the most moderate form of pluralism, to which 
Hallin and Mancini include such European countries as Great Britain and 
Ireland, which creates favorable conditions for the expansion of universal com-
mercial media and the neutral professionalism of journalists. Already in the 
sixties of the last century, pluralist media regulations functioned dictating clear 
freedom from political groups. However, in the eighties, business representatives 
began to influence telecommunications policy (Horowitz, 1989).
Countries belonging to the democratic corporationist model (Hallin & 
Mancini, 2004), meaning the Scandinavian countries as well as Austria, 
Belgium, Denmark, the Netherlands, Germany, and Switzerland, although to a 
lesser extent, also represent moderate pluralism. On the one hand, they indi-
cate a strong attachment to the observance of the law, on the other hand, with 
the exception of Austria and Belgium, show ignorance of clientelism. The inde-
pendence of public electronic media characteristic of this model is subject to 
additional protection thanks to the functioning of an administration based on 
rational and legal power according to Weber’s ideal bureaucracy (Humphreys, 
1994). The sixties and seventies clearly consolidated the independence of the 
media and journalists. At the same time, however, they did not overcome the 
current high political parallelism. In Germany, in particular, the involvement of 
journalists in focusing on politics and commenting on the political life remained 
high (Maurer & Pfetsch, 2014; Pfetsch, 2001). As a result, we can talk about the 
coexistence of two seemingly contradictory orders: journalistic professionalism, 
which persists thanks to strong and apolitical press councils, and political paral-
lelism. On the one hand, journalism possesses the status of a profession of public 
trust. On the other hand, political parties continue to play a strong role in the 
social system.
In the case of polarized pluralism, which describes countries such as France, 
Greece, Italy, Portugal, and Spain, the strong involvement of the press on the side 
of one of the political options and public media susceptibility to the influence of 
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the political world proved to be extremely persistent (Hallin & Mancini, 2004). 
In addition, a real and extensive press has never developed in these countries. 
Appropriate political and economic conditions for differentiation appeared 
only in the mid-twentieth century. However, when at the turn of the seventies 
and eighties there was a change from the press being oriented towards political 
parties into a market-oriented press, differentiation did not bring about the ex-
pected autonomy from the world of politics.
Differentiation in the CEE countries looks different. When discussing this 
issue, we can use the division by Bogusława Dobek-Ostrowska (2015). In corre-
spondence to mainly Western models of media systems (Brüggemann, Engesser, 
Büchel, Humprecht, & Castro, 2014; Hallin & Mancini, 2004; Peruško, Vozab, & 
Čuvalo, 2013; Siebert, Peterson, & Schramm, 1956), she developed four proposals 
of media and politics in the CEE: authoritarian, hybrid liberal, politicized media, 
and media in transition.
The hybrid model is of interest to us, which includes Western Slavs (Czech 
Republic, Poland, and Slovakia) and the Baltic States (Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania), 
highlights the high standards of democracy, and a weaker level of media policy. 
The politicized media model present in Bulgaria, Croatia, Hungary, Romania, 
and Serbia points to the strong connections between media and business people 
with the world of politics (Bajomi-Lázár, 2014). In the case of Romania, it 
additionally has the character of a factor replacing the professional identity of 
journalists (Milewski, 2013). Here we have to take into account that the changes 
in the Polish media system after 2015, so after the end of this analysis, brought 
the country to a tension between the hybrid model and politicized one.
When talking about the media in the transition model, which refers 
to Moldova, Macedonia, Ukraine, Montenegro, Albania, and Bosnia and 
Herzegovina, the lack of strong opposition parties means that media replace 
them when opposing the government. This model shows a clear lack of trans-
parency regarding capital and the functioning of media outlets. The last of the 
models, called authoritarian, refers to Belarus and Russia, which according to 
subsequent Press Freedom Rankings belong to the non-free category. Its basic 
elements include poor competition on the media market and absolute depen-
dence on the capital of the oligarchy. The proximity of the world of politics and 
business causes that the media “are not close to politics or business but to politics 
and business. Business is politics” (de Smaele, 2010: 58).
In the case of all CEE types, we can talk about a jump in structural differenti-
ation only after the democratic transformations initiated in 1989 in Poland. The 
existence of post-Soviet systems that had aspirations related to a liberal democ-
racy and the free market forced sudden changes in the approach to differentiation. 
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The examples of Poland and Romania show the ambiguity of this process. On 
the one hand, those responsible for the new order emphasized (1) the issue of 
media autonomy or control, and (2) the ownership of media capital (Jakubowicz, 
2007; Marinescu, 1995). On the other hand, they have shaped the media law 
by opening gates for politicians to influence public media (Bajomi-Lázár, 2014). 
The dynamics of differentiation in Russia looked different. After the collapse of 
the USSR, the formal framework of political culture changed, but there was no 
change in the practice of politicians towards the media industry (Khvostunova, 
2013). In addition, due to the important role of the state in the Russian media 
system, the media themselves became simultaneously involved in the market 
and other functioning social non-market institutions.
Differentiation turns out to be problematic from the perspective of the evolu-
tion of media systems. As Hallin and Mancini (2004) emphasize, the diversity of 
media within the national media systems is diminishing due to the homogeniza-
tion of contents and media convergence. The authors point out that the increase 
of content homogenization, first of all, occurs when media institutions follow the 
principles of neutral professionalism. The discussed cases, however, point to the 
slight possibility of such a situation occurring. In addition, findings from three 
large-scale projects based on a global approach can hardly prove the global pro-
gress of the homogenization of contents (Hanitzsch et al., 2011; Weaver, 1998; 
Weaver & Willnat, 2012).
At the same time, two phenomena supported by the economy (1)  increase 
the importance of media corporations and their power in information access 
networks (Castells, 2009) and (2) media hybridization (Chadwick, 2013). Can 
we speak of structural differentiation as the basis for the expansion of the gen-
eral logic of the media? On the one hand, media conditioned by a given media 
system provide contents that visually indicate a specific logic of action, such as 
tabloidization. On the other hand, the same media systems did not create the 
basis for full media independence. In many cases, they revealed mechanisms 
of media politics. Wherever politics was overcome, market logic took its place. 
Therefore, differentiation itself should be thought of in terms of a postulate that 
we aspire to rather than a state that we are able to achieve quickly. Consequently, 
our view of media logic must take into account its mingling with the political 
and economic spheres.
2.6  Understanding media logic
Various attempts to conceptualize mediatization indicate that the key to the pro-
cess of media logic is not necessarily limited to the aforementioned principles 
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and procedures of the functioning of media institutions (Ørsten, 2004). However, 
the concept remains ambiguous to the extent that it appears both in the singular 
as media logic as well as in the plural as media logics or does not appear at all, 
giving way to other propositions. In this book, it is adopted an institutional ap-
proach that assumes the key role played by media logic, and this section will 
try to show the various possible ways that this term operates. Here we apply the 
general assumption that the prerequisite for understanding mediatization means 
understanding media logic (Mazzoleni, 2008a).
The starting point of our considerations is Harold Innis’s (1964) intuition, 
which in the discussion on media bias points to inherent logic, accompanying 
the media’s structure and technology. In David L. Altheide and Robert P. Snow’s 
(1979: 10) Media Logic, Innis’s intuition adopts a theoretical concept that allows 
us to understand the role of the media:
“In general terms, media logic consists of the form of communication; the process 
through which media present and transmit information. Elements of this form include 
the various media and the formats used by these media. Formats consist, in part, of 
how the material is organized, the style in which it is presented, the focus or emphasis 
on particular characteristics of behavior, and the grammar of media communication. 
Format becomes a framework or a perspective that is used to present as well interpret 
phenomena.”
The authors point out that the process of presenting and transmitting media relies 
on the perception and routine of the media, their coverage, and the resulting 
social interpretation. On the one hand, media logic processed logically is not 
external to the media itself (Strömbäck & Esser, 2009). On the other hand, effec-
tive media formats primarily result from the overlap of media logic and commer-
cial logic in many areas (Hamilton, 2004; McManus, 1994; Schlosberg, 2017).
The concept introduced and developed by Altheide (1995) and Altheide 
and Snow (1988, 1988)  becomes an inspiration for later, more or less far-
fetched definitions. Altheide’s (2004: 294) independent notion reduces media 
logic to “assumptions and processes for constructing messages within a par-
ticular media.” Schrott’s (2009) conceptualization considers media logic as 
an implicit regulation system that serves as an orientation and interpretation 
framework for public communication. However, Mazzoleni (2008a) sees in 
media logic the reference framework for the production of media culture, 
especially news.
Understanding media logic as initiated by Altheide and Snow (1979) 
confronts the serious charge of elusiveness, which results from the media-centric 
process that remains linear and singular (Asp, 2014b; Couldry, 2008; Hepp, 2009; 
Lundby, 2009b). First, when we talk about being media-centric, the problem of 
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exclusion of the possibility of shaping society by a logic other than the logic of 
media appears, which we referred to earlier when we mentioned conceptualizing 
mediatization. According to Couldry (2003), various dimensions of society result 
from processes that are not necessarily based on the media. Second, the weak-
ness of media logic according to Altheide and Snow (1979) includes its linear 
characteristic. Transformation under the media’s influence passes from the stage 
staring before media intervention to the final mediated form, and this prevents 
us from analyzing the process itself. Third, media logic appears in the singular. 
Altheide and Snow assume that although it contains many interpenetrating pro-
cesses, in essence, they all create one form of communication. As Lundby (2009b) 
argues, instead of talking about the general logic of the media, one should look 
for patterns of specific media in social interactions.
There are three ways to counter the allegations against the weak media logic 
concept. The first way relates to the institutional approach and assumes searching 
for such a conceptualization that will overcome problematic issues. The second 
assumes the transition to the analysis within the so-called new institutional 
perspective. The third, practiced as part of the social-constructivist approach, 
brings complete resignation from media logic. The institutional approach we 
have adopted does not mean completely resigning from the new achievements 
of institutionalism and the social-constructivist approach. Therefore, in this part 
of the paragraph, we refer briefly to each of the mentioned proposals, and then 
we will try to point out their useful and common elements.
When describing media logic according to the institutional trend, we are 
leaving behind Hjarvard’s theoretical concept that has not been discussed until 
now, which, although it is inspired by the original approach to media logic, at 
the same time overcomes the previous accusations. In this approach, Hjarvard 
(2008b:  105) initially defines media logic as “the institutional and technolog-
ical modus operandi of the media, including the ways in which media distribute 
material and symbolic resources and make use of formal and informal rules.” On 
the other hand, in his last works, he applies the understanding of media logic 
as “shorthand for the various institutional, aesthetic, and technological modus 
operandi of the media,” while assuming that the “logic of the media influences 
the social forms of interaction and communication” (Hjarvard, 2013: 17).
The specificity of Hjarvard’s conceptualization goes from the location of the 
accent on the dimensions of the modus operandi of the media and its impact on 
communication in the form of a symbolic reaction. Recalling that mediatization 
is based on “institutional, aesthetic, and technological affordances,” Hjarvard 
(2012a: 30) practically refers to the space of shaping media logic. First of all, it 
assumes that mediatization occurs in specific institutions based on the logic of 
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the specific media which these institutions are subject to. Therefore, we should 
talk about different media logics more than about a single rational logic. Second, 
emphasizing that the concept looks like a conceptual shortcut, Hjarvard (2013) 
refuses to understand the whole process in a linear way. Finally, he points out 
that the mid-level institutional analyses are key elements for him and can cap-
ture the pattern of social interaction that forces change under the influence of the 
media. Assuming a non-media-centric approach here, Hjarvard (2014b) takes 
into account several simultaneous and mutually intertwining logics from various 
institutions and media logics (in the plural).
At the same time that Hjarvard was developing his concept, Asp’s proposal 
appears in the current scholarship and tries to narrow down media logic to news 
media logic as an institution. He assumes that institutions operate at different 
levels of generality (Sjöblom, 1993), and that is why the discussion should be 
reduced to news media and, as part of their framework, ask about news media 
logic. Asp (2014b) next establishes news media logic as an institution in itself, 
analyzing it in the perspective of two approaches:  the normative (March & 
Olsen, 1989) and rational-economic (North, 1990). It does so by understanding 
an institution as “rules of the game in a society or, more formally, the humanly 
devised constraints that shape human interactions” (North, 1990: 3).
Based on these assumptions, Asp (2014b) states that news media logic is still 
an institution that reduces uncertainty and makes it possible to effectively pro-
duce news for recipients, which consists of two groups of rules:  professional 
norms and professional standards. It assumes that professional norms include 
“normative rules based on shared values that are taken for granted by the 
members of the institution” (Asp, 2014b: 261) such as independence and objec-
tivity. Professional standards, on the other hand, concern “shared and taken-
for-granted rules for the production of news suitable for an audience” (Asp, 
2014b: 261) which include craft rules (rules regulating the media routine), con-
stitutive rules (novelty, importance, interest), regulatory rules (rules for adapting 
the news to its recipients), and form rules (contents and forms adapted to a given 
medium). Despite the criticism of the singularity of media logic, Asp claims that 
in the case of the evolution of news media logic, single media logic follows, based 
on common professional norms and standards and not many media logics.
The last proposal, developed as part of the social-constructivist approach, 
replaces the media logic concept with a more contextual moment of communi-
cation change, which takes place as a result of the molding forces of media (Hepp, 
2009, 2012, 2013a). The German term Prägkraft der Medien [molding forces] 
used by Hepp expresses certain pressure that the media exert on the way people 
communicate. This means that changes under the influence of the media are 
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dependent on the specifics of these media. As a result, mediatization processes 
take place in various ways in different media and can influence each other (Lunt 
& Livingstone, 2016).
These different approaches have some elements in common. Therefore, 
by adopting the institutional perspective, we can use the selected elements of 
the other proposals. As indicated by Hepp (2009) and Ekström et  al. (2016), 
conducting analyzes of mediatization at the micro- and meso-levels, we also 
illustrate the different specificities of certain media. Consequently, we show how 
different modi operandi work together or against each other. Here we can see a 
common element in the institutional approach. The connection between insti-
tutional, aesthetic, and technological affordances and professional rules and 
standards takes place. We make a clear indication of the boundary between these 
concepts in the next section, in which we try to identify the basic components 
of media logics.
2.7  Components of media logic
The theoretical concept of media logic, which has been practically adopted 
in the study of the mediatization of politics (Brants & van Praag, 2006; Esser, 
2013; Maurer & Pfetsch, 2014; Mazzoleni & Schulz, 1999; C. O. Meyer, 2009; 
Schrott, 2009; Schulz, 2004; Strömbäck, 2008; Strömbäck & Dimitrova, 2011; 
Strömbäck & Esser, 2009; van Aelst, Maddens, Noppe, & Fiers, 2008), causes 
considerable confusion. Different authors point to its individual components. 
As a consequence, they also accept separate positions on the topic of the uni-
versality of mediatization itself. According to Rothenbuhler (2009), progress 
in media differentiation creates the opportunity to mediatize on a global scale. 
This would be a reply to the earlier call for international studies on the broad 
consequences of media on everyday life (Curran & Park, 2000; Sreberny, 2000; 
Thussu, 2009). However, Hjarvard (2009) cools this enthusiasm when claiming 
that mediatization does not characterize all societies, but only high modernity 
countries. At the same time, he admits that globalization creates the poten-
tial to spread mediatization processes beyond the context of highly developed 
countries.
In opposition to Hjarvard, we assume that in the CEE countries that belonged 
to the communist bloc, we can say that the seeds of mediatization were sown in 
the nineties. The process of shocking transformations in the political (Ekiert, 
2003) and media systems (Gross & Jakubowicz, 2013) in Poland, Czechoslovakia, 
Hungary, Bulgaria, and Romania, unmatched by other cases, concerned a 
sudden inundation of media into Western normative theories:  libertarian and 
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social responsibility (Siebert et al., 1956). This was accompanied by more or less 
predatory capitalism (Kieżun, 2012) and a form of media differentiation specific 
for this region. Foreign capital and media formats very quickly dominated the 
local media markets (Dobek-Ostrowska & Głowacki, 2008; Dobek-Ostrowska, 
Głowacki, Jakubowicz, & Sükösd, 2010; Pokrzycka, 2012). For this reason, we 
assume that, when speaking about media logics, we can see a pattern whose 
components will be most consistent both with the mediatization of Western 
countries, as well as Poland, representing the post-communist context of Central 
Europe.
When pointing out the components of media logics, let’s start with the three 
ideal-aspects listed by Esser (2013) referring to professionalism, the market, 
and technology. The first group, professional aspects, concerns one’s orienta-
tion in journalistic principles and standards. Esser’s approach turns out to be 
consistent with Asp’s (2014b) proposal, which, when speaking of professional 
norms, indicates the independence and objectivity of news media. By indepen-
dence, it should be understood that the media freely serve the public interest 
based on their autonomy. They do it in a twofold way. First, they perform a con-
trolling function, which means that they enter into the role of a fourth estate 
(Carter, 1959). Second, they interpret facts, which means that they become a 
social interest group (Cook, 2006). The demand for objectivity, although it is not 
deemed to be necessary (McQuail, 1987), organizes our view of the world of facts 
by appealing to the use of honesty and the primacy of information (Lichtenberg, 
2000). Fair journalism does not yield to outside influences and avoids favoritism 
or discrediting any one of the parties in the dispute that it describes. In addi-
tion, informative journalism stays accurate and unambiguous, which amounts 
to separating facts from opinions.
Another group in Esser’s (2013) typology indicate the commercial aspects. 
These apply to economic imperatives that the media implement as market 
institutions focused on viewers watching their programs and selling them 
products. Undoubtedly, autonomy towards the world of politics favors deepening 
the media’s dependency on the economy (Hallin & Mancini, 2004; Linards & 
Lucht, 2014). At the same time, this makes it possible to doubt the contradictions 
between the commercial and professional aspects. This results mainly from the 
assumptions and processes of constructing messages (Piontek, 2011), whose goal 
is to provide entertainment for the recipients (Postman, 1985). Commenting on 
Esser’s work, Magin (2015) points to techniques such as personalization, neg-
ativity, and visualization. Other viewpoints identify personalization, accen-
tuation, confrontation, concretization, and simplification (Asp, 1990, 2014b; 
Strömbäck, 2008).
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The first personalization technique mentioned in the media occurs in two 
ways: centralized and decentralized (Balmas, Rahat, Sheafer, & Shenhav, 2012). 
When we talk about centralized personalization, we assume that the media 
focuses their attention on the leaders of events and in constructing media lead-
ership (Casero-Ripollés, Feenstra, & Tormey, 2016; M. Mazur, 2014; Patterson, 
1994). In the case of decentralized personalization, the media’s attention concerns 
people who do not play the role of leaders (Piontek, Hordecki, & Ossowski, 2013).
Research in the fields of psychology, neurology, evolutionary biology, and eco-
nomics confirm the disproportionately greater interest of individuals on negative 
rather than positive news (Herwig, Kaffenberger, Baumgartner, & Jäncke, 2007; 
Kahneman & Tversky, 1979; Vonk, 1996; Weinstein & Crowdus, 1968). Such a 
conviction is related to the negativity technique widely used by the media. This 
is why the question about why a fact becomes a news theory, news values clearly 
indicate events that contain bad news. Another face of negativity in the media is 
revealed in materials related to politics. Election campaigns abound in counter-
measures used by political opponents in the form of cynical and disarming news 
that disrupt the fair-play conditions of the political game (Kepplinger, 2000; 
Kerbel, 1999; Thompson, 2000).
The technique of confrontation, especially in political communication, reveals 
the use of the “confrontainment genre,” which covers conflict and scandal instead 
of compromise (Esser, 2013; Hallin & Mancini, 2004). In contrast, the simplifica-
tion technique, which appeared along with the decreased interest in high-quality 
content, provides a narrow image of the world that satisfies the largest number 
of recipients (Katz et al., 1973; Lasswell, 1935). It is associated with appealing 
to the emotions (Casero-Ripollés et al., 2016). However, it brings about a nega-
tive effect by dulling the recipients’ imagination and limiting intellectual work in 
response to the message (Kinz, 1998; Kristeva, 1995).
The last of Esser’s (2013) technological aspects refers to the way in which 
communication technologies shape the media’s contents. Each medium forces 
journalists and media workers to adopt the appropriate technology and grammar 
in a different way (Meyrowitz, 1993). The technology involves using specific 
formats on the basis of the text, audio, images, or digital media. Grammar, on 
the other hand, organizes the temporal aspect and spatial structure to which 
Asp (2014b: 262) includes “formative rules (e.g., article length); narrative rules 
(e.g., the inverted pyramid); and rules related to the composition of the partic-
ular media (e.g., domestic–foreign news).” As Schulz, Zeh, and Quiring (2005) 
point out, in the case of policy mediation, the progress of grammar reveals the 
unprecedented expansion of new genres. Technological aspects, therefore, play a 
significant role in shaping media logic.
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2.8  Forms and objects of mediatization
The concept of media logics and indicating their most important components 
leads to the conclusion that the degree of mediatization between institutions may 
vary, depending on the adaptation of these institutions to media logics. Franz 
Marcinkowski (2005) speaks in a similar manner about mediatization, indicating 
that not all political institutions mediatize in the same way in a given system. The 
problem pointed out by Marcinkowski is related to unresolved till now issues 
about what should be examined and how this should be done. In this section, 
let’s review the scientific literature in terms of what constitutes a characteristic 
change under the influence of the media. The starting point in this reflection is 
the divisions of mediatization according to Hjarvard (2008b) and Hepp (2009).
When thinking about the possible forms of mediatization, Hjarvard (2008b) 
divides it into direct (strong) and indirect (week) processes. The first form 
appears when previously unmediated institutions and activities transform into a 
media form, as exemplified by electronic banking or virtual bitcoin currencies. 
In the second form, the media and the associated world of symbols clearly affect 
current activities, which can be seen in narrow empirical studies in the field of 
mediatization (Hepp & Krönert, 2010; Hjarvard, 2004). From this perspective, 
the mediatization of the idea of a secular state emerges as a result of media pres-
sure and thus falls into the indirect and week forms of the process.
Hepp (2009) has a different approach to the forms of mediatization, pointing 
to its quantitative and qualitative aspects. When he talks about the quantitative 
perspective of mediatization, he focuses on the countable and noticeable his-
tory of the growth of media technologies and the various ways they are used. 
Along with Krotz (2007), he assumes observing this non-linear growth of medi-
ated communication on three levels: temporal, spatial, and social. The temporal 
level refers to the growth of media technologies over time, now becoming per-
manently available as in the case of 24–hour news channels or the Internet. At 
the spatial level, the media occur in different locations or become independent 
of a fixed location, as illustrated in the case of a mobile phone. Finally, the social 
level indicates that the social context stays intertwined with the use of the media. 
Hepp (2009) defines the qualitative perspective of mediatization as qualitative 
changes resulting from changes in specific media. He points to the material 
dimension of such change (Gumbrecht & Pfeiffer, 1994), which consists in the 
fact that media technologies give communication practices their structure.
Hepp’s division turns out to be useful in two aspects. First, by analyzing the 
mediatization of the idea of a secular state, we may look at the process, focusing 
primarily on mediatized moments, identified thanks to temporal, spatial, and 
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social dimensions (Hepp, 2013b). Second, the result of mediatization has a 
clearly qualitative character, primarily determined not by the number of growing 
media but by the quality of interaction between political and religious actors and 
journalists.
When recalling mediatized moments, we have to embed them in the context 
of communicative figurations, meaning “patterns of processes of communica-
tive interweaving that exist across various media and have a ‘thematic framing’ 
that orients communicative action” (Hepp, 2013b: 623). This concept is based on 
Norbert Elias’s (1978) figurations as networks of individuals, which constitute 
large social units as part of their mutual interactions. Thanks to the references to 
figurations, an individual remains connected to society, and the society itself has 
a structure that is not external to the individual. Figurations appear sporadically 
in research on media and communication (Couldry, 2011). However, thanks to 
Hepp’s conceptualization, it can be assumed that a single communication net-
work creates a specific communicative figuration. From the perspective of the 
subject of mediatization, when speaking about change in the social world, we are 
thus thinking about changes in communicative figurations.
For Kent Asp (2014a), the subject of mediation to be investigated is not present 
in mediatized moments but in the causal mechanism of the mediatization pro-
cess, that is, adaptation considered in close connection with the context in which 
it occurs. Following Habermas’s (1985) division into a lifeworld and system, the 
author makes two assumptions. First, he claims that entities adapting to media 
logic have different action logics (1) in the lifeworld, meaning the horizon of the 
everyday world, which is lived and not subjected to problems and (2) in a system 
that operates in an instrumental way. Second, Asp treats adaptation as a one-di-
mensional learning process.
How do we answer the question asked at the beginning about the subject of 
mediatization? Previous replies suggest that the right solution can be found in the 
alternative mediatization moments or the causal mechanism of adaptation. The 
institutional approach, which we assumed in the analysis of the mediatization 
of the idea of a secular state, inclines us to take the causal mechanism of adap-
tation side. Nevertheless, even though we assumed along with Hjarvard that the 
mediatization process does not have a linear character, we will adjust the con-
cept by permitting the possibility for it to have mediatization moments (Hjarvard, 
2013). When analyzing mediatization, our idea of a secular state includes the sub-
ject of research, which considers the adaptation mechanism of the political and 
religious actors to media logic. It is assumed that, in the framework of non-linear 
adaptation, we can identify some moments of tension, meaning mediatization 
moments, during which the consequences of this process appear visible.
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2.9  Operationalizing mediatization research
In the previous section, we pointed to the subject of the research on mediatization. 
In the present section, we will focus on possible ways to study mediatization. We 
want to specify the path of process analysis, which in the next part of the book 
will translate into the study of the idea of a secular state and the Church-state 
relationship. As the starting point of this reflection, let’s refer to three types of 
postulates that formulate Ekström’s et al. (2016) mediatization research.
Based on the analysis of long-term studies on mediatization, we are convinced 
that the following elements should be considered when examining the character-
istic changes: historicity, specificity, and measurability. The first of the postulates 
assumes the temporal recognition of mediatization as a response to the state 
in which “too much of the existing research has hypostasized the existence of 
mediatization and then focused on analyzing the contemporary effects of this 
taken-for-granted process” (Ekström et  al., 2016:  1098). These authors point 
out that mediocrity understood as a process immersed in time is tested in the 
area of appropriately selected mediatization moments, meaning the selection of 
a set of points in time which will ensure a systematic comparison of the use of 
particular media.
The second postulate in specifying mediatization, according to Ekström et al., 
refers to the analysis of various media in the perspective of their media specificity, 
that is, the characteristics resulting from the type of media, genres, technologies 
or institutions, and the context specificity, meaning their social and geographical 
dimensions. Ekström et al. see three options for insight into both processes. The 
first puts research into a specific social context and narrows it down to one type 
of medium. We can then capture the subject, time, place, and way of mediatizing 
given social interactions (Fornäs, 2016). The second solution narrows the study 
down to some particular focus or approach and conducts a comparative study 
of different types of media. The third approach, on the other hand, is to grasp 
how different media mediate and next mediate the selected area of life or social 
practices. The last of the postulates by Ekström et  al. concerns measurability. 
The authors call not only for quantitative but also qualitative empirical analyzes 
of mediatization as a media-related change, which takes place within “certain 
realms of activity” (Ekström et al., 2016: 1103).
According to Andreas Hepp (2013b), the study of mediatization can be 
undertaken by following one of the two perspectives. The first, described as di-
achronous mediatization research, refers to popular comparative studies over 
time. They relate to the analysis of “the communicative figurations of certain 
mediatized worlds at different points in time and comparing their results” 
The notion of mediatization78
(Hepp, 2013b: 624). These provide conclusions about the changes in the media 
and social changes that have occurred over time. Their implementation fulfills 
the postulate of historicizing, meaning the reconstruction of the communicative 
figuration from a given period in the past.
The second approach, or synchronous mediatization research, involves 
comparisons within mediatization moments. Hepp (2013b:  625) assumes that 
mediatization has moments that he himself describes as “eruptive moments” or 
as “mediatization waves.” They characterize the development of media, which 
results in a qualitative change in the media environment. The author suggests 
two ways to study mediatization from this perspective. The first is to focus at-
tention on communicative figuration before and after the wave of mediatization 
and then comparing them. The second method concentrates on comparisons 
between generations, assuming that generations bring together groups of people 
with common experiences and even a common form of media socialization.
In the approaches taking into account media logics, the perspective of 
mediatization research looks different. In the classic proposal by Winfried Schulz 
(2004), the process of social change results from the development of media in the 
form of extension, substitution, amalgamation, and accommodation. Thus, the 
study of mediatization boils down to media analysis in each of these modes. 
The solution that bypasses these modes brings into operation the mediatization 
research by Kent Asp (2014a), paying attention to the causal mechanism of 
adaptation.
In his opinion, the study of mediatization focuses on the extent to which 
individuals and institutions outside of the media adapt to media logics. In con-
trast to previous proposals, Asp assumes that the analysis should take into ac-
count the whole of mediatization as a one-dimensional process from social 
learning, rather than individual process modes. In practice, he sees the four 
modes of mediatization proposed by Schulz (2004) as various manifestations of 
adaptation to media power.
Among the three forms of media and context specifics submitted by Ekström 
et al. (2016), our study touches on the process in which various media mediate 
and mediatize the idea of a secular state and the relationship between the Church 
and state. We are inclined to study the causal mechanism in mediatization. 
Therefore, we focus on the extent to which political actors and representatives of 
religion adapt to media logics. Based mostly on the research material from the 
media, we essentially get the media coverage for the analysis, which keeps a trace 
of clear interaction between the parties. It will not be an overestimation to accept 
that a systematic qualitative analysis of these materials will point to mediatized 
moments. However, one issue is worth clarifying. Strömbäck and Esser (2014a) 
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see certain degrees of political mediatization, depending on the involvement of 
the media and political actors in the various logics of action. In this study, we 
move away from looking at mediatization in the context of degrees in favor of a 
long-term adaptation analysis, in which we perceive clear moments of tension, 
that is, already described mediatized moments.
2.10  Mediatization affects the media effect
Theoretical and empirical studies on mediatization increasingly indicate that 
the analysis of the effects of this process goes beyond the simple division of the 
world into dependent and independent variables. However, there is still a lack of 
agreement among researchers whether mediatization can be simply reduced to 
the media effect, as we usually describe the consequences of media operations. On 
one side of the dispute, Schulz (2004) claims that mediatization simultaneously 
contains and exceeds the media effect. On the other hand, Hepp, Hjarvard, and 
Lundby (2015) maintain that mediatization focuses not on the media effect, but 
the mutual relationship between changes in the media and communication and 
changes in culture and society.
Early studies on the media effect draw our attention to two aspects. First of all, 
Paul Lazarsfeld and Robert Merton (1960) indicate that the first consequence of 
the media effect comes down to the existence of media institutions. Therefore, in 
the case of mediatization, it is impossible to assign it to already founded media 
institutions. Mediatization is itself the consequence of the expansion of these 
institutions, followed by the driving force for their operation. In this sense, we 
cannot treat it in terms of the simple media effect. Second, Walter Lipmann 
(1922) recognizes that the media plays the role of a bridge between images in 
and outside our heads. In recent years, some studies clearly return to this intui-
tion (Guo et al., 2015). Their results compared with the mediatization process do 
not clearly indicate whether it goes through a simple translation of the message 
into the recipient’s thinking.
What, then, does the effect associated with mediatization consist in? The best 
answer we can give is based on the three levels of a society’s functioning. When 
it comes to the level of individuals and small groups (micro) and institutions 
(meso), they include the division into the media effect and the mediatization 
effect (Couldry & Hepp, 2013; Kepplinger, 2008). According to this distinction, 
mediatization does not assume to influence the audience on the basis of the 
models of direct media influence known to us (Carey, 2002; Gerbner & Gross, 
1976; Jansson-Boyd, 2010; Katz et al., 1973; McCombs, 2004; McLuhan, 1964; 
McQuail & Windahl, 1993; Noelle-Neumann, 1984). In turn, the mediatization 
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effect points to the non-linear interplay of media changes on the one hand and 
changes in culture and society on the other (Hepp et al., 2015).
However, we cannot omit Schulz (2004), who claims that mediatization also 
includes and exceeds the media effect. At the micro level, there function indi-
vidual social interactions that can be geared to submission to media logic or other 
institutional logics. The researcher determines whether the logic of the media 
dominates. If the answer is positive, an open way to analyze the media effect 
appears. Earlier, we assumed along with Hjarvard (2014b) that mediatization 
points to some general patterns of interaction created by the media that take 
place at the meso level. Rational actions of individuals focused on submitting to 
the logic of the media may have an effect not only on an individual but also on 
social institutions. The process remains clearly non-media-centric, which means 
the possibility of not only media logic acting, but also the logics of other social 
institutions to act. The basic consequences of this non-media-centric approach 
include a significant weakening of the possibility of observing the direct media 
effect.
In this study, it is examined the mediatization of the idea of a secular state at 
the micro and meso levels. The result of the analysis will therefore not directly 
provide knowledge about the correctness of macro mediatization. This follows 
James Coleman’s (1994) assumption that any effect on a macro level of society 
has always been indirect. Therefore, the formulation of conclusions regarding the 
social macro level is possible only on the basis of empirical data from the lower 
levels, “which are not empirically verifiable in their entirety” (Hepp, 2013a: 49).
Collecting the whole, we can assume that the mediatization effect means 
a specific form of influence that at the micro-level enables the media effect to 
occur, but at the meso-level it clearly exceeds it, concentrating on general inter-
action patterns that emerge in the mutual relations between change in the 
media and changes in society. This mediatization effect reveals itself in the five 
dimensions proposed by Schrott (2009). They allow predicting the probability 
that individuals and institutions will be pressured to adapt to media logics.
The first concerns the dimension of causes and rational criteria, meaning 
the evoked principle and accompanying rationalization in a given case based 
on which the justification for adjusting to mediatization in a given matter 
arises. The second dimension concerns the context that indicates the limits of 
the influence of media logic and determines the way to present a given idea. 
Schrott defines the third dimension as control, which triggers sanctions related 
to mediatization. In democratic media systems, this comes down to the fear of 
not being covered, or not speaking out. The fourth dimension, or externaliza-
tion of contingency, points to a group of problems that can be resolved using 
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media logic and the remaining ones which should be quieted. The fifth dimen-
sion concerns competing institutions. It assumes that the greater the competi-
tion between institutions, the greater the possibility for actors to find a balance 
between these institutions. This is related to the question concerning what other 
institutions may be against the behavior of the actors.

3  Mediatization of religion and politics
So far, we have presented issues related to the general theory of mediatization. 
In the third chapter, we will introduce the mediatization of religion and the 
mediatization of politics as specific fields for a subsequent analysis of the idea of 
a secular state and the Church-state relationship. The research on the literature 
on mediatization of religion and the mediatization of politics is proceeding in 
autonomic directions. It reveals the specifics and separate achievements of both 
areas of research. Given these differences, we discuss each area separately. In the 
first part, we recall key phenomena related to the progressing mediatization of 
the religious sphere and emphasize the appropriation of media logic within the 
agency of representatives of religion. In the next part, we address the problem of 
mediatization in relation to politics. We point to the possibilities of shaping this 
relationship on the one hand in the scientific literature based on media domi-
nance, and on the other hand from the perspective of media politics. Applying 
theoretical solutions in the mediatization of religion and the mediatization of 
politics, we consider the problem of mediatization according to the idea of a sec-
ular state in the broad context of social change exerted by changes in the media 
and communication.
3.1  Designating mediatization of religion
Mediatization as a double-sided process (Hjarvard, 2012b) follows two basic 
directions of development. First of all, the media have gained relative autonomy 
in comparison to other social institutions such as education or religion. Second, 
the media are linked with these institutions to such an extent that in a sense they 
impose new rules on their functioning. This view also refers to the realm of reli-
gion. This specific form of mediatization, meaning the mediatization of religion, 
however, has a separate theoretical background and a growing number of ed-
ited volumes with empirical studies (Furseth, 2018; Hjarvard & Lövheim, 2012; 
Lövheim, 2013; Lundby, 2018).
At the beginning of the research on religious mediatization in Rethinking 
Media, Religion, and Culture (Hoover & Lundby, 1997), its editors departed from 
a simplified combination of media studies and religious studies in favor of more 
sophisticated forms of creating religious meanings and their transformation 
within limits set by the media. The prospect of a joint study of the media space 
and religions outlined by Steward M.  Hoover and Knut Lundby has revealed 
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two major conclusions. First, undoubtedly, contemporary religion articulated by 
both religious and secular actors “cannot be grasped without understanding the 
media and how it influences society and culture” (Hoover & Lundby, 1997: 553). 
Second, the popularity of research on the interaction between the media and 
religion has clearly increased in the academic world, which can easily be attrib-
uted to the so-called religion and media turn (Engelke, 2010).
In this context, a fundamental thesis should be set that marks the space for 
analyzing the mediatization of religion. As Hjarvard notes (2008a:  11) in The 
Mediatization of Religion: A Theory of the Media as Agents of Religious Change:
“[…] modern media not only present or report on religious issues; they also change 
the very ideas and authority of religious institutions and alter the ways in which people 
interact with each other when dealing with religious issues.”
Mediatization of religion, therefore, affects religious institutions and people 
functioning in the context of religious issues. This characteristic change, which 
takes place under the influence of the media, refers directly to the ideas and the 
authority of the former, as well as the interaction among the latter. This case 
raises the question of the direct causes of change in religious institutions and 
the environment of people associated with religion. For precisely designating 
the area of religious mediatization analysis, Hjarvard uses Meyrowitz’s three 
metaphors of communication media: media as conduits, media as language, and 
media as environments (Meyrowitz, 1993).
First, the metaphor of media as conduits hides the ability of the media to 
transfer symbols and messages from the sender to the recipient at a distance. 
In Hjarvard’s (2008a) analysis, this metaphor refers directly to the media con-
tent. As such, the media distribute a number of religious symbols. They consist 
of the public side of religious rituals and sacred events (Dayan & Katz, 1994; 
Hoover, 2006; B.  Meyer & Moors, 2005). They point to the existence of sec-
ular contents of a religious nature in society’s imagination (Knott et al., 2013b). 
However, it should be remembered that the metaphor of media as conduits is 
mostly based on educated media genres, which to some extent also determine 
the religious symbols presented, depending on whether we are dealing with news 
or entertainment.
The second metaphor, media as languages, first of all reflects the “various ways the 
media format the messages and frame the relationship between the sender, content, 
and receiver” (Hjarvard, 2008a: 12). In the context of the mediatization of religion, 
the basic mechanisms that organize this space should include using genres of pop-
ular culture. This takes place on two levels. The first concerns media property. Public 
media that provide religious institutional representation in their programs function 
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with certain tension among formats of popular culture, the mission of public radio 
and TV, and high ethical standards. Commercial media, generally being profit-ori-
ented, follow the primacy of entertainment. The second level concerns directly used 
genres. Religious representation in public news goes in a different direction than the 
entertainment media (Hjarvard, 2008a; Nybro Petersen, 2013).
The last of the metaphors that affects the media as environments focuses on 
the way in which relatively set features of a given medium determine individual 
human interactions and social communication. Hjarvard (2008a) recognizes 
that in contrast to fleeting messages, the media themselves are a stable environ-
ment that is changing and spreading to other areas of social life.
From the perspective of the metaphors used, the mediatization of religion 
in question turns out to be an important tool in media analysis as a factor 
influencing the transformation of religion in society (Lövheim & Lynch, 2011). 
At the same time, however, the mediatization of religion requires clarification, 
which helps us to overcome a simplistic view of the phenomenon.
3.2  Understanding mediatization of religion
As noticed by Hoover and Lundby (1997), the regularity that the media uses 
religion more often than religion uses the media gives us a glimpse of the phe-
nomenon of religious mediatization developed in this chapter. Intuition suggests 
that the concept of the mediatization of religion indicates a certain instrumental 
treatment of religion, which after all has been present among people since time 
immemorial (Eliade, 1959). Complicating this problem requires careful op-
erations and understanding the concept. We solve this problem based on our 
reflections on the essence of the mediatization of religion. We next refer to the 
agency involved in this process and its consequences.
Accepting the perspective of media as playing the role of agents of reli-
gious changes along with Hjarvard (2008a, pp.  10–11), we understand the 
mediatization of religion as:
“The historical process in which the media have taken over many of the social functions 
that used to be performed by religious institutions […]. Through the process of 
mediatization, religion is increasingly being subsumed under the logic of media, both in 
terms of institutional regulation, symbolic content and individual practices.”
Due to its general tone, such conceptualization requires an explanation. First, 
it is clear that the basis for the definition determines the influence of media 
logic on the changes in religious institutions. Taking into consideration that 
these institutions take part in transformation under the influence of various 
contemporary phenomena, for example, individualization and secularization, 
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it is necessary to clarify that the mediatization of religion, as a process that 
accompanies it, does not go in one direction (Hjarvard, 2012b; Lövheim & 
Lynch, 2011). Liv Ingeborg Lied observed that this process “may be truer for 
some cultural sectors or discourses than for others” (Lied, 2012:  187). As we 
can remember, in the previous chapter, it was assumed that the mechanisms of 
mediatization also appeared in CEE after the collapse of the Soviet regime, and 
the media jumped into differentiation. We suggest, therefore, that looking at 
mediatized religion from this perspective has to be embedded in the context of a 
particular society and its national or regional media culture.
The presented concept (Hjarvard, 2008b) does not directly determine the 
nature of the changes that occur in religion, understood here in an essential way. 
Hjarvard (2012b) supplements this gap in his later work by pointing out that 
as a result of mediatization processes, a new religion does not appear, but new 
social conditions for privatization and understanding the current religion ap-
pear. When he mentions that media logic determines changes in “institutional 
regulation, symbolic content and individual practices” (Hjarvard, 2008a:  11), 
he clearly ignores the importance of the agency of mediatization participants. 
Following the suggestion of Mia Lövheim (2011), when we accept the perspec-
tive of mediatizing religion, we face the problem of analyzing and understanding 
the role played by religious actors. In this way, we transfer the center of gravity 
from the difficult intangible social process to the agency of religious actors (single 
institutions, religious groups, individuals, but also symbols and narratives).
In the matter of the agency of religious representatives, Günter Thomas 
(2016) takes a further step by pointing out that religious institutions anticipate 
the media’s representation of religion. In his view, the mediatization of religion 
results from the activity of religious actors and institutions, influenced by the 
media’s representations of religion. Such a thesis brings about two fundamental 
consequences. First, it confirms the previous criticism of the lack of agency in the 
discussed concept. In fact, empirical studies on the mediatization of religion are 
able to add something to the current theory from the perspective of the analysis 
of religious actors as participants in the process. Second, Thomas clearly specifies 
that mediatization is something in the form of a mirror process in which the 
power of religious actors reflects images and narratives from the media.
3.3  Three forms of mediatized religion
To understand what is going on in the concept of mediatizing religion means 
to describe the forms of its occurrence. In his taxonomy, Hjarvard (2012b) 
accepts a clear division into three forms that require separate discussion and 
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criticism: religious media, journalism on religion, and banal religion. As Fig. 3.1 
indicates, each of these three concerns a separate way of communicating religion 
in the public sphere. Each one also points to a specific type of power and control 
when representing religious content.
The first form of mediatized religion proposed by Hjarvard concerns reli-
gious media. The author refers to organizations and practices performed and 
controlled by religious actors. He also points out that religious actors include 
religious institutions as well as individuals. Hjarvard assumes that religious 
media are primarily subject to the supervision of religious institutions, but at 
the same time, they must adapt to media logic in various ways. As a result, as 
confirmed by studies from various geographical areas in Europe, religious media 
strive for standards recognized by all media, including professional journalism 
and technology. In this perspective, the issue of religious actors turns out to be 
problematic. Religious organizations are able to control their media and fine 
tune their editorial policy according to media logic. The practices of religious 
individuals, however, remain limited to the possibilities set by media interfaces 
(H. A.  Campbell, 2010a; Cheong, 2013; Kołodziejska, 2018). Their practices 
should, therefore, be seen not as the expression of religious media but as the reli-
gious users’ activity in the media (Borg, 2009; Guzek, 2015b; Rončáková, 2013).
Such a narrowly defined perspective of religious media turns out to be prob-
lematic due to one more reason. As Thomas (2016) points out, as long as religious 
actors administer religious media, they will represent the form of technologically 
advanced mediation rather than mediatization. Continuing with what was said 
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Fig. 3.1: Hjarvard’s three forms of mediatized religion. Source: Based on Hjarvard, 
2012b:40
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earlier, Lövheim (2011) only sees changes in the agency of these actors towards 
media logic that are able to show the ongoing process of mediatization.
The second form of mediatized religion defined by Hjarvard (2012b) as jour-
nalism on religion affects the visibility of religion in the public sphere. Numerous 
empirical studies confirm the significant position of religious issues in media 
agendas (Cole, 2006; Knoblauch, 2014; J. Mitchell, 2010; Sumiala, 2013) and the 
increase of media content related to the religious sphere (Knott et al., 2013b). 
At the same time, the media coverage of religious issues takes into account the 
logic of the media and the workshop of journalists, not the perspective and 
motivations of religion. Hjarvard (2012b) states that since journalism is associ-
ated with secular values in the service of society, news media can, therefore, take 
on the role of instruments for modernizing religion. This approach to matters 
indicates a clear change between past and contemporary societies. Whereas in 
the past, religions reacted relatively cautiously to the emergence of subsequent 
media (Pokorna-Ignatowicz, 2002; Vian, 2012), presently, the many new forms 
of communication force changes in the activities of religious actors in a pene-
trating, fast, and effective way (H. A. Campbell, 2010b).
Journalism on religion in practice relies on a certain logic of framing. Based 
on Hjarvard’s (2016) observations, we can notice that this type of framing is due 
to several principles related in particular to the primacy of economics in the 
media. Religious content, above all, must be worth publishing. Religious actors 
must be willing to serve only as a source of information for a journalist. In non-
factual genres, religious representatives must agree to such a position of religion, 
which places it in line with many cultural resources used to attract the attention 
of recipients.
In relation to journalism on religion, one more postulate appears. The context 
of North and South America indicates that placing the media in the center of 
the religious movement leads to the mutual joining of both orders to the extent 
that from the organizational perspective, their separation turns out to be unnec-
essary (Hoover, 2006; Martino, 2013). The Catholic and Orthodox faiths pre-
vailing in CEE clearly water down the possibility of radically joining all areas of 
their Church life, especially the sacraments, with the world of the media. In turn, 
both denominations emphasize the real liturgy as the center of community life 
(Grube, 2003; O’Collins, 2008). The religious culture of the geographical region 
in question, therefore, limits access to the transformation of religious rituals ac-
cording to the key of media logic.
The last of the described forms of mediatized religion concerns the 
so-called banal religion. Hjarvard (2008a) introduces this term into his theory 
of mediatizing religion by using the earlier concept of banal nationalism by 
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Michael Billig (1995). In his original approach, Billig emphasizes that various 
national symbols remain in use, but not as a result of the expansion of national 
culture. After moving the mechanism to the area of religion, Hjarvard identifies 
numerous banal religious representations and experiences that have no relation 
to or a limited relationship with institutional religions. They maintain their reli-
gious dimension, but they lose their connection with the original symbolism. 
Hjarvard calls them banal, precisely because of their non-affiliation with institu-
tional religions. Consequently, he attributes extraordinary mobility to them and 
points out that the banal religious representations have a certain value of decon-
textualization and a “non-propositional character” (Hjarvard, 2012b: 36), which 
allows their imperceptible functioning in society, while enriching the social con-
text with whatever is religious.
The concept of banal religion submitted by Hjarvard has particularly deep 
connections with the way high modernity societies function. On the one hand, 
the presence of banal religion in the social imagination connects with the process 
of secularization. When religious institutions lose their monopoly on the wor-
ship of symbols and gods, the elements of banal religion replace the imaginations 
created by these institutions (Hjarvard, 2008a). On the other hand, the traces 
of banal religion in the media point to the daily perceptions and practices of 
members of society. Banal religion, therefore, plays a significant role in under-
standing how daily religious practices really take place.
Finally, it must be mentioned that the banal form of mediatized religion turns 
out to be doubly problematic. First of all, the concept clearly ignores the key 
perspective of metaphysics for religion and the order of life (Lied, 2012). Banal 
religion arises as a result of combining meanings and stripping symbols of their 
original sense. When considering banal religion, we see that the supernatural 
space is replaced by action, emotions, and acted contexts. Second, the ideas and 
experiences on the basis of which the representations of banal religion appear in 
the media can arise without any links to the source of representation (individual 
persons, collectivity) and institutional religion (Lynch, 2007). This is confirmed 
in the media coverage of religious issues in the UK, where the so-called secular 
sacred elements also emerge within the religious content (Knott et al., 2013b).
3.4  Spheres of mediatized religion
After reviewing the forms of mediatized religion, let’s now focus on the spheres 
in which the whole process takes place. Mediatization of religion, regardless of 
its form and direction, affects specific spaces of social life. We must take into ac-
count that the public sphere is becoming more and more mediatized. The initial 
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debate regarding this sphere, marked by Jürgen Habermas’s (1991) key con-
cept of the role of the media, was underestimated. This resulted in the fact that 
Habermas perceived the media not so much as forming a public sphere but per-
forming specific functions in it (Butsch, 2007). In this sense, his concept clearly 
does not match the growing role of the media and changes related to the digital 
revolution in the last two decades. Consequently, when considering the public 
sphere, we should first seek to understand it in an appropriate way to the current 
realities of the dominant communication method of mediation. Starting from 
these assumptions, we now move on to the proposal by Terje Rasmussen (2014), 
who defines the public sphere as a space created by “communication about public 
matters in journalism, opinion, and argumentation, in face-to-face communica-
tion as well as in mediated communication.” In the public sphere understood 
as such, the position of religion changes dynamically. We even see that religion 
transforms in several ways, as revealed in specific spaces of the public sphere.
As a starting point in terms of these specific spaces, let’s focus on Lövheim’s 
(2012) typology of religion communicated in the public sphere (Fig. 3.2). She 
highlights the possibility of the overlap of religious actors and content in the 
public sphere.
Categories appearing in the adopted typology allow us to designate spaces 
in public communication within which religious actors occupy a certain posi-
tion, define themselves, and take action (Lövheim & Axner, 2015). Three cri-
teria adopted by Axner (2013) prove helpful in finding this position: (1) claims, 
authority, and legitimation, (2)  types of issues/framing of these issues, and 
(3) the use of religious language/arguments. The first concerns the question of 
who these religious actors taking part in public debates are? Is it their personal 
opinion or the voice of a religious community? Do they place themselves in the 
position of authority over their community or the whole of society? Another 
criterion assumes looking at the issues currently being undertaken by religious 
actors. The question is whether religious actors frame issues in such a way as to 
reach a larger number of recipients than a fellow believer. In practice, Lövheim 
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Religious Performing religious  
communication
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Fig. 3.2: Typology of religion communicated in a public sphere. Source: Based on 
Lövheim, 2012; Lövheim & Axner, 2015: 39
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and Linderman (2015) indicate that it is about appealing to values that are more 
than particularly religious, while Axner (2015) sees this in actors changing the 
position of their religious discourse, for example, how to participate in defending 
democracy to show how we should build a democracy. The third criterion refers 
to the language and argumentation used by religious actors. It concerns specifi-
cally checking the use of religious language and religious symbols in a particular 
type of media. Here an important element refers to the determination of possible 
negative attributes assigned in this religion process.
The position of religious actors can be located in several separate spaces of 
the mediated public sphere:  the religious media sphere, journalism sphere, cul-
tural sphere, and digital sphere (Lövheim & Axner, 2015). The religious media 
sphere includes the first of the three forms of mediatized religion, or religious 
media, identified by Hjarvard (2012b). In the original approach, it expresses the 
coexistence of religious actors and religious contents. The context of the Catholic 
world indicates the erosion of this regularity in at least two areas. First of all, 
the number of hybrid events increases, which connect the sacred issues of indi-
vidual communities and the dynamics of media events (Hepp & Krönert, 2010). 
Second, as the example of Poland illustrates, Catholic media are able to enter the 
role of first-class news sources at every level of the media system in areas where 
saturation with secular media makes this nil or insufficient (Guzek, 2016a).
The second space of mediatized religion, called the journalism sphere, refers 
to Hjarvard’s category of journalism on religion. In this sphere, religious contents 
do not necessarily interact with the active role of religious actors. Its organi-
zation connects with the primacy of establishing the order of information by 
journalists publishing in the news, editorials, and columns. The key to under-
standing the position of religion in this sphere lies in religious language and reli-
gious argumentation sifted through the journalist principles of newsworthiness 
and the principles of media logic (Lövheim & Axner, 2015). The third concerns 
the discussed cultural sphere of mediatized religion which refers to the areas of 
media content that do not tackle the spheres of news, editorials, and columns. 
Here, we are talking about the entertainment space provided by the media, espe-
cially the stories of banal religion.
When discussing this topic, however, it should be noted that the division 
between the journalist and cultural spheres calls for precision. Individual studies 
related to mediatized rituals or agenda-setting reveal the combination of news 
and entertainment and the smaller or greater presence of a banal representation 
of religion (Aksamit, 2012; Sumiala, 2014). The last of the addressed spaces by 
Lövheim and Axner is called the digital media sphere. The authors point to its 
new and original philosophy of action, separate from previous media. In the 
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digital media sphere, the private space mixes with the public space, which favors 
the establishment of the so-called mass-self communication (Castells, 2012). In 
their analysis, apart from the religious contents and religious actors, the accent 
falls on users who do not formally represent religious institutions, yet for whom 
religion becomes an element they identify with.
The above-outlined spheres of mediatized religion coincide to a large part 
with previously presented forms of mediatized religion. However, we see in this 
section that regardless of the form adopted by mediated religion, environmental 
variables shape the positions adopted by religious actors.
3.5  Mediatization in the context of secularization
The transformation of religion, when influenced by changes in the media, 
indicates connections of mediatization with gradual secularization. The 
increasing number of references to religious issues in the media seem to suggest 
de-secularization (P. L. Berger, 1999; Hjelm, 2012) or re-sacralization (Demerath, 
2003) processes. However, the previously mentioned studies (Künkler et  al., 
2018; Norris & Ingelhart, 2004) confirm Hjarvard’s (2008a) approach, in which 
the mediatization of religion plays the role of an element of secularization. 
Collective and individual religious actors accommodate themselves to the dom-
inant media logic. At the same time, (1) the religious content becomes indepen-
dent from the control of religious actors and begins to function on the principle 
of a banal religion, and (2) the actors themselves lose control over the rank-and-
file representatives of their religion. As a result, religion clearly loses its presently 
important social role.
When it comes to the relationship between mediatization and secularization, 
Hjarvard (2012b: 24) specifies in a separate way that “the mediatization of reli-
gion involves the decline of institutionalized religious authorities (and the rise 
of media as authorities) at the same time as the mediatization of religion also 
reflects the continued presence, transformation, and significance of religious 
imaginations in secular societies.” If the religious authority in Hjarvard’s reso-
lution does not raise doubts, then talking about media authority raises the need 
to clarify what we actually mean. We can clarify this issue based on the con-
cept of religion in the understanding of the Czech theologian and philosopher 
Tomáš Halík.
In one of his lectures on the role of Christianity in Europe, Halík (2004) adopts 
a functional perspective in which it is not religion that integrates society, but 
what integrates society is its religion. He assumes that from this point of view, 
the word religion can be replaced with the Latin equivalent religio to express the 
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power of building social cohesion. Halík identifies successive forms of religio in 
the history of European civilization.
In the Roman Empire, he perceives religio in the ritual practices of the 
inhabitants of Rome. In the period between Constantine’s reform and 
Charlemagne, he sees a change towards the political religio that is slowly 
becoming Christianity. Halík states that in modern times, the Christian religio 
is separated from the Christian faith, and the lack of justification for the func-
tioning of the Christian religio brings about secularization. In his opinion, in 
the eighteenth century, science has become Europe’s religio. At the beginning 
of the twentieth century, its place is taken by the political religio of totalizm and 
national socialism. On the other hand, after the Second World War, the media 
are growing and adopting the role of a force that integrates society.
The fact that, according to Halík, the media remain the religio of moder-
nity should be considered in two ways. First, assuming the truth of the thesis 
presented by the author, the media determine the most lasting current social 
order. In this sense, they are, therefore, authoritative. Second, Hjarvard (2012b) 
would agree with Halík that the media appropriate a number of aspects tradi-
tionally attributed to religion (Halík, 2004). The progressing phenomenon of 
mediatization, therefore, gives grounds to assume that the globally mediated 
world will not change to a different type of religio for a long time.
Such an outlined view on mediatization and secularization leads to several 
fundamental decisions regarding the mutual dependence of these phenomena. 
Hjarvard (2011) reports that mediatization secularizes religion. This process, 
however, differs depending on the social level which we analyze. He himself refers 
to the three levels of secularization according to Karel Dobbelaere (2002): soci-
etal secularization, organizational secularization, and individual secularization. 
In the case of secularization at the social level, Hjarvard perceives that in his 
native Danish context, the role of the Church and faith have been minimized. 
Religious rituals continue to play a role in the lives of marginal social groups. 
However, media have dominated the binding and communication function of 
Lutheranism. In the Polish context, the situation is different. The country still 
functions in the context of a public religion (Casanova, 1994).
At the organizational level, Hjarvard (2011) recognizes that the Danish 
Protestant Church has adapted to the logic and media formats. On the other 
hand, it has also developed its online communication channels. In Poland, it 
can be seen that the problem of the adaptation of religion to media logic is just 
beginning to crawl, according to research studies (Guzek, 2012; Przybysz, 2008). 
However, unlike Denmark, the Catholic Church in Poland has developed its own 
media structure, which complements or replaces secular media at all levels of the 
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media system (Guzek, 2016a). Yet, when referring to the level of individual sec-
ularization, Hjarvard (2011) claims that the media pose a challenge concerning 
individual religious orientation. This takes on two dimensions. Individuals use 
the media during their religious practices. The units are themselves responsible 
for the production and circulation of banal representations of religion. This 
production process can go both towards secularization and the subjectiviza-
tion of religious imaginations. In the case of Poland, the whole process is more 
difficult, since the media enter into pastoral practices based on the principles 
set by the Church’s teachings. Therefore, laxity in the sphere of creating banal 
representations of religion takes place.
Mediatization of religion understood as an agent of secularization, when we 
consider it against the backgrounds of Denmark and Poland, will resolve one 
fundamental postulate. The contexts of both countries clearly diverge from the 
common measure. On the other hand, in both cases, similar mechanisms can be 
seen in the field of banal representations of religion. Therefore, in order to con-
sider Poland’s case, we have to refer to this dominant feature of mediatization 
when we look at its secularization potential.
3.6  Mediatization in the context of republicization
As some studies in Europe show, instead of religion being weeded out from high 
modernity, we can see their coexistence (Davie, 2007; Woodhead & Catto, 2012). 
This postulate of multiple modernities (Eisenstadt, 2002) gives grounds for 
seeking the context of mediatization appropriate to the case in Poland. In under-
taking this analysis, we ought to clarify two basic doubts. The first concerns 
the accuracy of the argument undermining the mechanism of accommodating 
media logic by religious actors. The second comes down to the contextualization 
of the process of mediatizing religion in Poland.
I mentioned that some scholars see the origins of mediatization in Luther’s 
occurrence. Subsequent centuries confirm that their mechanism of accommo-
dating media logic by religious actors has a universal value. In opposition to this 
view, David Morgan (2011) proves that in the context of Evangelical print in 
Great Britain at the end of the eighteenth century, religious actors did not have 
to adapt to the logic of secular media. Also, the nineteenth-century case of the 
Polish-language religious press of Upper Silesia showed this type of regularity. 
This case, however, requires a short description.
Between 1795–1918, Poland did not exist as a nation, and Poles functioned 
within the framework of three invading countries: Austria, Russia, and Prussia. 
In the industrialized Upper Silesia, which belonged to Prussia, families and 
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Polish priests were responsible for maintaining Polish culture and traditions. 
Thanks to the initiative of Rev. Jan Alojzy Ficek, in 1848, at the then Deutsch 
Piekar (today’s Piekary Śląskie), a group of parishioners organized moral and 
educational work to fight drunkenness among the local Polish population. One 
of the elements of this activity was publishing Tygodnik Mariański [the Marian 
Weekly]. The functioning of this first religious magazine in Upper Silesia pointed 
to mutual tensions between religious actors and representatives of the public 
administration. Rev. Ficek imposed mechanisms and models for transmitting 
patriotic contents to Poles during the partitions (Guzek, 2010; Pater, 1991; 
Wuwer, 2002). The local authorities responded to his activity by using repression 
as general Prussian hostility towards the Catholic Church and Polish identity.
In the light of the presented cases, reservations should be kept towards the 
general mechanism for accommodating media logic by religious actors. The 
best solution, therefore, turns out to be Morgan’s (2011) thesis that the standard 
mechanism of mediatization will be limited only by the specifics of the analyzed 
case. Studies on the mediatization of religion in Poland are fledgling, therefore, 
it is worth referring to David Herbert’s (2011, 2015) concept of republicization 
of religion. Herbert points to three separate contexts (post-colonial, post-
communist, and Western society) in which the visibility of public religions has 
increased in the last three decades. At the same time, he sees this republicization 
of religion “as a result of a combination of developments in communications, 
media markets and socio-political factors in different contexts across the world.”
Herbert emphasizes that the increase in the visibility of religion relates to the 
specific activity of religious and political actors. First of all, the functioning of 
religious institutions on the commercial media market takes place thanks to the 
increased involvement of representatives of religion. The Polish example of Fr. 
Tadeusz Rydzyk, director of Radio Maryja, proves that the agency of this reli-
gious actor in the sphere of the media can stimulate and consolidate a nation-
wide audience, which will eventually turn into a massive community supporting 
its medium (Guzek, 2015b).
Second, the activity of political actors boils down to initiating and maintaining 
discourses on religion as a public matter. However, religion plays a role in these 
discourses mainly for the political elite and a secular audience. It is therefore 
embedded in the context of conflict and controversy. Herbert draws this con-
clusion on the basis of studies, which point to a clear tendency of the media’s 
interest on the Islamic issue, especially in Great Britain (Knott, Poole, & Taira, 
2013a; Poole, 2002, 2012). In the case of Poland, the involvement of political 
actors in religious discourse boils down to the question of the presence and 
role of the Catholic Church in the public sphere. However, one must remember 
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about the specific context of such a presentation. First, during the communist 
period, the Church was the basic space for expressing anti-communist opposi-
tion. Second, after the system change, the Church co-formed the parareligious 
state, in which it formally functioned in separation from the state, and thanks to 
its moral authority, it strengthened its political position. We can thus clearly see 
that republicization comes as the result of the agency of religious actors.
Although Lövheim treats republicization as an approach to mediatization, 
Herbert postulates their dissociation. In the discussed case of mediatization, the 
key to understanding the broader media coverage of religion comes down to 
accommodating to media logic. Herbert points to some areas of publicization, 
for example, the parliamentary debate about a denominational law that does not 
reach the public space. In the light of his assumptions that political actors make 
religious issues a pressing problem in the public sphere, the example of a parlia-
ment debate turns out to be inappropriate. As a last resort, the visibility of reli-
gion in the public sphere boils down to what comes to our attention through the 
media. It is therefore impossible to get to mediatization symptoms in any other 
way than through the agency of religious and political actors who increase the 
visibility of religion.
3.7  Conditions and consequences of the 
mediatization of religion
So far, we have outlined the basic concept known as the mediatization of religion. 
However, we did not have two elements needed to present a complete picture of 
this phenomenon: the conditions in which the entire process may take place and 
the consequences it brings about. Apart from republicization of religion, current 
theories narrow the mediatization of religion down to Western Europe. When 
applying the concept to the case in Poland, we keep in mind that CEE countries 
depart from the context of high modernity countries. In addition, we take into 
account that Poland is specific when we consider its socio-religious formation.
Let’s start with Gordon Lynch’s (2011) observation that mediatization of 
religion occurs when four features dominate in a social context. First, non-
confession media institutions dominate in the system. Few media with a clearly 
confessional attitude function outside the mainstream and in a limited form. 
Second, society lacks a direct relationship with religious institutions. For this 
reason, access to religious and even sacred contents mainly happens through the 
media. Third, it is extremely easy to identify the dominant religious institution 
in society. Finally, a high degree of secularization occurs at the individual, insti-
tutional and social levels.
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When transferring Lynch’s division on the discussed case in Poland, it seems 
difficult to judge how many features remain in common. As in other European 
countries, non-confessional media dominate the Polish media system. However, 
it should be remembered that in no other country is the position of religious 
media so significant (Guzek, 2015b). Three elements illustrate this: (1) the oper-
ation of Catholic media within a separate media subsystem, (2) supplementing 
and in some cases even replacing other media when implementing the informa-
tion function, and (3) consolidating the auditorium.
The lack of connection with religious institutions outlined by Lynch turns out 
to be exaggerated when we look at the context in CEE. This works well in the 
case of public religion in Poland. We are referring to the relationship between 
the nation and the dominating Catholicism consolidated during the communist 
period and the political system that has been firmly established after the trans-
formation. When we look at other post-communist countries, especially the 
former members of the Soviet Union where Orthodoxy prevails, we also think 
about the growing tendency to combine religiosity with being a good citizen 
(Pew Research Centre, 2017).
The third of Lynch’s (2011) determinants is present in CEE countries, espe-
cially in the last two decades. In Poland, the Roman Catholic Church has con-
tinually taken the dominant position ever since the Polish People’s Republic. 
In countries that previously functioned as part of the Soviet Union, religi-
osity linked with Catholicism or Orthodoxy is re-emerging after the fall of 
Communism. However, we cannot look at the mediatization of religion through 
the prism of established Churches or folk Churches who have lost their social 
position. Rather, we are talking about the Church as an element that maintains 
great social significance despite the formal separation of Church and state. This 
is due to the last of the conditions that Lynch combines with the possibility of 
mediatization, which concerns secularization at the individual, institutional, 
and social levels. Poland can be considered from the viewpoint of ongoing sec-
ularization (Borowik, 2010), but the clear religious emancipation of individuals, 
institutions, or society is not happening here. When we add Russia to this case, 
we can see that the region should be referred to as having a moderate pace of 
secularization (Künkler et al., 2018).
The prerequisites for the mediatization of religion turn out to be incompat-
ible with the CEE context. At the same time, a few studies on the media and 
religion in this region directly or indirectly concern the issue of mediatization 
(Kołodziejska, 2018; Kołodziejska & Neumaier, 2017). This incoherence turns 
out to be justified when we look at both contexts from the viewpoint of treating 
contemporary times not as a monolith but as a bloom of multiple modernities 
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(Eisenstadt, 2002). As a result, when talking about the preconditions for 
mediatization of religion in CEE countries, especially in Poland, we must use the 
agency of religious actors presented along with the concept of the republicization 
of religion.
This concerns revising Lynch’s (2011) postulate about the lack of society’s 
relationship with religious institutions and the domination of religious content 
submitted by the media. By adding the agency of religious actors, we will see 
two new elements. The first one boils down to the coexistence of religious rep-
resentation in a society based on two channels: the Church and the media. The 
degree of consistency of these representations is different, and their colliding 
with each other cannot be ruled out. The second element assumes the entangle-
ment of religious and political actors. Actors representing religious institutions 
do not formally have instruments that influence the actions of political actors. In 
practice, their personal authority or the authority of the religious institution they 
represent enables them to influence political actors.
In addition to these conditions, the mediatization of religion also reveals 
some effects. By closing the argument about this concept, we recall the basic 
consequences that flow from the discussed process. Hjarvard (2012b) points 
out that the process causes a multi-dimensional transformation of religion that 
crowns it with a new social condition. Thus, the mediatization of religion ulti-
mately changes religious texts, practices, and social relations. However, indi-
vidual studies indicate a number of specific regularities. In the area of religious 
rituals, the process reveals shared ideas about insiders and outsiders in society 
(Sumiala, 2014).
From the perspective of thinking in terms of the media system, the 
mediatization of religion boils down to a process in which religious institutions 
and their agents change in anticipation of the media’s expectations. In practice, 
as Thomas (2016: 42) assumes, this process shows a “structural and processual 
response to the expectation of the media system’s expectations.” From the posi-
tion of process dynamics, mediatization of religion causes three elements:  the 
structural transformation of religious authority, changes in religious identities 
and changes in traditional devotional practices, and communication practices 
(Herbert, 2011).
In a more general way, Thomas (2016) considers the issue of the consequences 
of mediatization of religion by describing the four main trends associated with 
the process. The first consists in the self-development of media contents on the 
subject of religion by the media. This is clearly confirmed in most European 
media systems. The second points to the functional differentiation of society 
that dethrones religion. Recalling the earlier point of view by Halík, the media 
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has become the religio of Europe, replacing all previous religio:  science and 
Christianity. Third, he sees the passage from the Church’s faith to an infatuation 
with the media, ending with banal representations of religion. Fourth, the life of 
religious institutions at all levels of its activity takes place in the perspective of 
being under the scope of the media. This provides the basis for understanding 
the accommodation of religious actors to the logic of the media.
3.8  Conceptualizing the mediatization of politics
In this chapter, it is limited the previous considerations to the phenomenon 
of mediatizing religion. Looking at the relationship between the Church and 
state according to changes in society under the influence of changes in the 
media, however, requires us to refer to the second specific part of the theory 
of mediatization, the mediatization of politics. Here, a basic difficulty arises. 
When we talk about mediation in the context of politics, Jesper Strömbäck and 
Frank Esser (2014a) suggest cautiously treating it in terms of a theoretical per-
spective rather than a complete theory. Undoubtedly, works in the field of the 
mediatization of politics (Brants & van Praag, 2006; Mazzoleni & Schulz, 1999; 
Strömbäck, 2008; Strömbäck & Dimitrova, 2011; van Aelst et al., 2008) confirm 
that the specificity of this area requires individual treatment.
At the very beginning, we can refer to Strömbäck and Esser’s (2014b) pop-
ular concept. They perceive mediatization of politics as a long-term and pro-
gressive process of the growing importance of the media, whose effects transfer 
onto political processes, institutions, organizations, and political actors. As they 
specify, mediatization of politics refers to the reactive or proactive adaptation of 
political entities to the logic of the media in order to meet their communication 
needs through the media.
This approach to the matter entails several fundamental decisions. First of 
all, the accent on the change in society or religion presented in earlier concepts 
that results from changes in the media has been narrowed down to the growing 
importance of the media. However, the emphasis on the results of mediatizing 
policy more than on the process itself does not interfere with the previous 
decisions. In addition, it reveals the important results of mediatization in the 
form of the coupling of the political and media sphere. A problem arises con-
cerning the question: what should be treated as political? Clarifying this issue 
further allows us to separate the mediatization of politics within the framework 
of the mediation of society.
In the narrow sense, when we touch upon political phenomena that are 
the subject of political science (Skarzyński, 2012), we distinguish between the 
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political (narrower) and the social (broader). When we think about politics in 
a broader way, we see an “ensemble of practices and institutions whose aim is 
to organize human coexistence” (Mouffe, 2013: XII). In the first approach, the 
mediatization of politics reflects the process of increasing the importance of 
the media in the functioning of political phenomena such as power, elections, 
participation, and so on. In the second, the mediatization of politics coincides 
with the mediatization of society, emphasizing the functions of social structure. 
In order to maintain the specificity of mediatizing politics, we must, therefore, 
move towards a narrower understanding of what is political and maintain rigor 
at the level of analyzing the political phenomena and not social phenomena.
Based on the presented definition of mediatization policy, Strömbäck and 
Esser (2014a) articulate its four dimensions. Reference to these dimensions 
sheds additional light on the whole concept. The first dimension emphasizes 
the degrees to which the media constructs sources of information on politics 
and society. Keeping in mind the recent decisions on the essence of politics, 
we should rather talk about the process of creating sources of information on 
political phenomena. Therefore, it concerns the extent to which political actors 
adapt to the logic of the media so that they are able to be newsworthy sources of 
information.
The second dimension touches upon the degree of media differentiation in 
social and political institutions. As we explained in the second chapter, this 
is about capturing the media in the current context: (1) their incomplete dif-
ferentiation from the world of politics and (2)  their partial dependence on 
the business world. The third dimension indicates the extent to which cov-
erage of political issues is based on the results of either media logic or political 
logic. The fourth, on the other hand, concerns the extent to which political 
institutions and political actors submit to these logics. In the light of a narrow 
view of politics, it can be seen that the last two dimensions of mediatization 
clearly coincide with that which is invoked as the first one. As a result, we can 
comprehend the mediatization of politics as a phenomenon taking place at the 
interface between issues such as the mechanism of adaptation to the logic of 
the media, the inclusion of political logic and the differentiation of media from 
the world of politics.
3.9  Media logic versus political logic
Referring to the dimensions of the mediatization of politics (Strömbäck, 2008; 
Strömbäck & Esser, 2014a), we mentioned that political issues appear in media 
coverage following the implementation of media logic or political logic. In the 
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previous argument, however, we omitted the topic of understanding political 
logic. This could have led to the impression that mediatization is quite homoge-
neous in terms of theory and practice. In this part of the book, we fill up this gap 
by juxtaposing media logic and political logic. In this way, we try to show how 
both concepts interfere with each other.
The issue of media intervention in political events helps us to understand 
the relationship between media logic and political logic. In one of their ear-
lier papers on this subject, Strömbäck and Esser (2009) paid attention to three 
elements. First, the media have become a key source of information, including 
news on political topics. Second, the media have gained partial autonomy from 
the world of politics and media-external institutions. Third, as a consequence 
of the previous two, the media’s control and intervention have grown stronger. 
These authors assumed that “medial logic trumps political logics” (Strömbäck 
& Esser, 2009: 220). Thus, in the light of the dominance of the media’s control 
function over the political sphere, they have perceived the primacy of media 
logic in opposition to political logic.
Under the influence of the critics of the concept that media logic is too elu-
sive and vague, Strömbäck and Esser (2014b) have clarified that their perspec-
tive concerns the news media logic based on the dimensions of professionals, 
commercialism, and media technology. On the other hand, they perceive the 
actions of political logic formed by polity, policy, and politics. At the same time, 
they have conceptualized these constituents as follows: polity as the “system of 
rules regulating the political process in any given country,” policy as “the process 
of defining problems and forming and implementing policies within a certain 
institutional framework,” and politics as “the process of garnering support for 
one’s candidacy, party or political ideas” (Strömbäck & Esser, 2014a: 5). Such a 
case indicates a change from the dominance of media logic over political logic 
towards tension between the two logics.
Zbigniew Oniszczuk (2011) draws attention to the alternative option in 
four possible contexts of media politics, which he understands as Janusz 
W.  Adamowski’s (2007) explicit entry into the space of media operation. The 
first context refers to media concentration on political leaders, the dramatization 
of political contents and appealing to emotions. As a result, the media become 
a contribution to a specific symbolic policy. Second, Oniszczuk moves towards 
a policy of a staff of political parties in the media. It operates on the basis of 
loopholes and inaccuracies in law in order to secure media positions for repre-
sentatives of political parties. The third context concerns focusing the media’s 
attention on pseudo-events, staging, and exaggerating the effects of PR activities. 
The last, fourth context, boils down to the direct or indirect influence of political 
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actors on the media, whose implementation leads these actors to achieve set 
political goals.
So what does mediatization of politics have to do with politicizing media? 
Is it possible to equally treat the primacy of the media over politics, the tension 
between the two spheres or the primacy of politics over the media? As we have 
mentioned, mediatization is based on incomplete media differentiation. The 
degree of this differentiation varies depending on the media system in question. 
However, the regularity of the independence of the media from the clear influ-
ence of policies in favor of dependence on business remains common. We see 
a loss here on the side of political actors. On the other hand, it does not escape 
our attention that the media develop their own logic, and so they do not reflect 
the logic of outside institutions. On the basis of this logic, the media distributes 
material and symbolic social resources, a reference point for political actors. The 
fact that political actors adjust to the ways in which the media operate confirms 
the primacy of mediatization of politics over politicizing media.
3.10  Results of the mediatization of politics
In the general theory of mediatization, we argued that the results of the process 
cannot be spoken of in terms of a simple media effect. We also tried to highlight 
the possible levels of analysis of the so-called mediatization research. However, 
when we look at this issue in the mediatization of politics, a few remarks should 
be made. First of all, the repeatedly referred to media differentiation is the pre-
condition for considering the results of the whole process (Meyen, Thieroff, & 
Strenger, 2014). Only in a society that allows relative media autonomy can there 
be a need for political actors to adapt to the logic of the media. Its existence 
means that these actors are convinced that their presence in the media’s agenda 
affects their political legitimacy. In the case of authoritarian rule or dictatorship, 
it is the media that function on the basis of political logic, imposed by the gov-
ernment or ruling parties holding political power. In a liberal democracy, polit-
ical logic, however, gives way to media logic.
In the previous chapter, we referred to three levels of mediatization research 
(micro, meso, macro). Here, we would like to mention the proposal by Michael 
Meyen, Markus Thieroff, and Steffi Strenger (2014), in which the three levels 
of mediatization mainly concern the results of mediatization in the political 
space. In this proposal, mediatization of politics boils down to changes in polit-
ical strategies. Political parties shift their focus to leaders and figures known in 
the media. The party’s program functions in the shadow of a charismatic leader, 
who provides its voters mostly with entertainment rather than a good example 
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(Brzoza, 2014). In addition, the parties select candidates for parliament using the 
criterion of popularity and media expectations (T. Meyer, 2002).
Schrott’s (2009) previously mentioned five dimensions of mediatization 
presented how individuals and societies adjust to the logic of the media. In the 
case of political mediatization, Meyen et al. (2014) narrow this mechanism down 
to resources. In their opinion, political parties primarily care for the infrastruc-
ture that will provide them with good quality media materials. They rebuild their 
PR departments, catch talented journalists, and find appropriate locations for 
their election conventions. In the case of the macro level, mediatization of poli-
tics results in the formulation of programs and restrictive guidelines in the field 
of expressing party members and parliamentarians.
The results of the mediatization of politics require considering two additional 
perspectives: media visibility and the systemic approach. In referring to the first 
concept, we go back to what Małgorzata Molęda-Zdziech (2013: 101) outlined:
“Media visibility has contributed to the emergence of a second type of political legit-
imacy. In addition to existing electoral legitimization, there is media legitimization 
(cathodic) obtained through telegraphy (good looks and one’s image disseminated by 
the media, especially television).”
In the author’s opinion, the mediatization of politics leads to the formation of a 
new, less formal approach to politicians. In practice, political activity functions 
according to the mechanism of continuous verification by media users and 
potential voters. This new form of legitimacy is also associated with the growing 
popularity of research on electoral preferences (Dobek-Ostrowska, 2006).
Separate results of policy mediatization reveal the analysis of the system per-
spective. The term reflexive mediatization appears in the thesis by Marcinkowski 
and Steiner (2014). They describe the specific situation of a political system that 
consists in its being based on mass-media performances. In practice, non-media 
systems, such as the political system, appropriate the media’s ability to focus the 
public’s attention. This laconic grasp of the systemic approach to mediatization 
engages specific terminology.
First of all, Marcinkowski and Steiner recognize that as a result of the func-
tional differentiation of modern societies, we can talk about media and politics as 
two among many other subsystems (including economics, religion, education). 
A paradox arises here. On the one hand, each of these subsystems is different. 
Every person also creates within their boundaries their own image of society. On 
the other hand, the systems in question are equivalent. Referring to the systemic 
approach by Luhmann (2012), these authors (Marcinkowski & Steiner, 2014: 76) 
state that:
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“[…] the social system as a whole appears to be the sum of multiple perspectives. In 
other words, the functionally differentiated society recognizes no preferred perspective 
from which a whole generally accepted ‘true’ description of society can be gained.”
Next, Marcinkowski and Steiner distinguish a function or the subsystem role in 
the whole system and performance, or the relation of this subsystem to other 
parts of the social system. In the media perspective, the first one understands 
the ability to provide the system with self-observation. On the other hand, they 
reduce the second to creating public interest and acceptance for specific social is-
sues. Marcinkowski and Steiner recognize that, although individual subsystems 
have autonomy, they simultaneously receive stimulating stimuli from their envi-
ronment. In this sense, the mediatization of a given social sphere has somewhat 
of a performance relationship to them. These authors also have no doubt that 
other subsystems remain focused on using the effects of media performance and 
in their strategic communication. They define this relationship using the term 
reflexive mediatization.
All elements of the social system today need to be embedded in public atten-
tion resources. They are setting themselves up for media performances and then 
adjust their strategic activity to their activity. The mediatization of politics is very 
specifically present here. This political subsystem directs people towards mass-
media performances and what we previously defined as the media logic. In the 
sense of reflexive mediatization, the political subsystem begins to reflect what 
the media are able to easily identify and pass on. However, this does not mean 
a process of political colonization by the media or a decline in political culture. 
The initiative and the causative power still persist on the side of politics, which 
provides ideas and proposals for change so much that in these conditions there 
are growing mutual dependencies among particular parts of the social system. 
The systemic approach thus proves that the mediatization of politics equals a 
complex process of mutual connections between political decisions and media 
performances.
Part II   

4  Methodological background
We will now present the next part of the book whose contents are based on the 
empirical findings in the area of media representing the idea of a secular state. 
The current reflection generally referred to two phenomena. The first chapter 
was concentrated on the concept of a secular state and the Church-state relation-
ship. The second and third chapters were referred to the theory of mediatization. 
By drawing attention to the theory of the mediatization of religion and politics, 
we brought up the approach used in the prospective analysis of the idea of a sec-
ular state. Let’s now begin the next part, whose contents are based on the empir-
ical findings in the area of the media covering the idea of a secular state.
4.1  Introduction to the research design
The final title of the book, The Mediatizing Secular State: Media, Religion and 
Politics in Contemporary Poland, was formulated at an advanced stage of this 
study. It is noticed that our attempt to look at the dependencies between media 
contents and the idea of a secular state are clearly part of the theoretical proposals 
for mediatization. We conducted the research according to the mixed methods 
based on the qualitative and quantitative analyzes of the collected material. In 
this part of the book, therefore, we will present the design of our research, paying 
particular attention to the subsequent elements of the research, characterizing 
data sources and the adopted methods and foundations for their triangulation.
In order to reassure the reader, we must point out that the epistemological 
conclusions in the field of combining methods and individual approaches are 
presented below. At this stage, let us refer just to the research period and the gen-
eral presentation of the three stages of this research design.
We undertook an analysis in the years 1989–2015 and have supplemented it 
with data from 2017. The starting point of the analysis refers to the partly free 
elections to the Polish parliament on June 4, 1989. The fact that Solidarity won 
and focused on Lech Wałęsa’s party allowed the former anti-communist opposi-
tion to create a government headed by the first non-communist prime minister 
Tadeusz Mazowiecki. This symbolic separation from the Polish People’s Republic 
created a new context for the category of a secular state and its Church-state 
relationship. We concluded this analysis on October 25, 2015, with the latest 
elections to the Polish parliament, when the nation’s political power for the first 
time since 1989 entered into the hands of just one political formation, the United 
Right (an informal coalition of parties PiS, PT and PR).
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This closure of the analytical framework, of course, has its limitations. After 
the takeover of power by the camp centered around Jarosław Kaczyński, there 
was a marked change in the quality of Church-state relations. The specifics of 
this fusion of political power and institutional religion can be seen as material 
for another publication. Here we treat the timeframe adopted in a flexible way. 
First, the results of this study based on such a long period collide with the data 
from the 2017 questionnaire, which deals with the issues of the secular state and 
Church-state relations after 1989. Second, we also approach the collected mate-
rial on media analysis in a flexible way, which is shredded and incomplete. We 
will talk about the specifics of this limitation later.
The basis of this research design is determined by three subsequent research 
stages. The first one begins with a media contents analysis. Its results are used here 
in a double way. First of all, they provide a general quantitative understanding of 
the distribution of categories used in the material of the studied media. Second, 
they serve as a reference point in the subsequent qualitative analysis of media 
contents. Together with the content analysis, we analyze legal acts and campaign 
documents of political parties in the field of Church-state relations.
The second stage of our research comes down to the grounded theory. We 
perform procedures related to this approach and describe the material and its 
dependencies in order to build the seeds of our own theory. In the process of the 
saturation of the media material and grounding the theory, we select essential 
findings from the content analysis, the analysis of legal acts and the campaign 
documents of political parties. As a result, we present larger descriptions of the 
phenomena, their actors and the regularities forming them in the framework of 
these issues. The theory we build is embedded in the parallel phenomena present 
in the scientific literature on mediatization. As a result, we read the results in the 
key of the mediatization of religion and politics.
The third stage of research, it is refered to the questionnaire methods. With 
the quota sample of the population, we analyze the current attitude of the 
respondents towards the idea of a secular state and the Church-state relation-
ship. This helps determine to what extent the media belong to the basic sources 
of information on the subject matter. We also checked whether knowledge about 
the secular state is associated with media representations or other professional 
sources, for example, law and electoral programs. In the analysis, We also try to 
grasp the respondents’ knowledge about past events that have influenced the way 
the idea of a secular state in Poland is shaped.
The further stages of this research allow us to capture the multi-faceted pro-
cess of the mediatization of the idea of a secular state. In essence, we provide the 
reader with information about the evolution of the secular state category in the 
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analyzed media, Poland’s legislation and politics. We lead the reader through 
the meanders of shaping the specific approach of Poland’s authorities towards 
religion, especially towards the Catholic Church. It shows the process of the 
mediatizing of religious and political actors when it comes to Church and state 
relations. Finally, it points to the issue of narrowing down the perspective of the 
secular state to the model promoted by the media.
4.2  Materials
By initiating this research study, we wanted to show the process of the media’s 
development of its presentation of the secular state and Church-state relations. 
To achieve this goal, it is assumed that the material to be analyzed should include 
the contents of selected media, Polish legislative acts, political party programs 
and materials, and a questionnaire survey.
The basic research material analyzed and presented in this book consists 
of a wide media contents sample concerning the issue of the secular state and 
the Church-state relationship. The non-probability sampling of media and 
the texts themselves were specifically chosen. Within a wide range of media 
contents, information and news are the basis for knowledge about the changing 
reality. Important studies prove this practice is successful in obtaining knowl-
edge about social phenomena, including political and religious information 
(Lievrouw & Livingstone, 2013; McCloskey, 2010). Keeping this in mind, we 
have reduced the media material in this study to news from the daily press and 
television. We omitted publications, assuming that the news will provide the 
current picture of the dynamics of the state’s secularism and its association 
with religion.
Selecting our material was based on the temporal criterion, its range and 
contents. We initially included the media that have been continuously func-
tioning nation-wide since 1989 and undertook issues concerning the Church 
and state. In the case of leading news television services, the sample included 
the Wiadomości [News] broadcasted by public TVP1. Subsequent websites 
did not qualify as samples because they appeared in the media relatively late, 
such as TVN’s Fakty [Facts] broadcasted for the first time in 1996 and Polsat’s 
Wydarzenia [Events] in 2004. In the case of Facts, it should also be remembered 
that TVN’s broadcast technology for many years did not cover the entire terri-
tory of Poland.
TVP1 Wiadomości was broadcast for the first time on November 18, 1989. 
The main reason for using this TVP1 service in the sample was its long-term 
leading position among Polish news programs, its wide range of topics and 
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most balanced political contents (Gackowski & Łączyński, 2015). At the time of 
the emergence of competitive services, the Wiadomości in an evolutionary way 
adopted formats characteristic of TV stations from the United States, including 
the dominant infotainment present today (Fras, 2013). Their slow change 
towards a more dynamic site was accompanied by maintaining the characteristic 
discreet narrative style for public media. The service itself repeatedly attempted 
to describe Church-state events. Its inclusion in the sample under investigation 
was therefore well-founded.
When it comes to the printed press, the daily criterion was met by two 
general-information editions, Gazeta Wyborcza [the Electorial Gazette] and 
Rzeczpospolita [the Republic], acknowledged as belonging to the prestigious 
journalism class (Oniszczuk, 2011). The remaining titles were characterized 
by either a short period of issuing, as in the case of the sensational Fakt [Fact] 
journal created in 2004 or the clearly weak coverage of the secular state topic and 
the Church-state relationship, as in the case of the sensational Super Express daily.
The first edition of Gazeta Wyborcza appeared on May 8, 1989. Initially, it was 
published by the opposition gathered around Solidarity Movement in connection 
with the elections to the Contract Sejm. Next, the daily came into the hands of the 
Agora Company. Gazeta Wyborcza quickly began to clearly speak out on polit-
ical matters (Mielczarek, 2007). Thanks to this, for over two decades, it served 
as a front supporting the democratic left. It maintained a significant position 
among other daily newspapers despite (1) the reconfiguration of the daily press 
market caused by the appearance of the sensational journal Fakt, and (2) the gen-
eral collapse of the press market, declining readership and expenditures caused 
by the development of digital media.
The Rzeczpospolita daily mainly appeared during the interwar period in 
Poland. In 1982, it was resumed as the press body of the communist government. 
After the June 4, 1989, elections, it became independent from direct ties with 
the government. Since 1991, the Presspublica Company published it, with 51 % 
of its shares in the State Treasury. In the following years, the remaining shares 
were bought by the French syndicate owned by Robert Hersant (1991–1996), 
Norway’s Orkla (1996–2006), and the British Mecom (2006–2011). The owner-
ship structure of the newspaper was also overturned from the state’s 49 % share. 
In 2011, the entire share of Rzeczpospolita entered into the hands of Gremi Media 
publishers.
Rzeczpospolita has never received such high sales and readership results as 
Gazeta Wyborcza. Due to its characteristics, however, it can be assumed that in 
the group of prestigious newspapers, it provides a counterweight to the leftist 
views regarding the subject of a secular state and the Church-state relations. 
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Since the beginning, this daily functioned as a national liberal-conservative 
issue, clearly including legal and economic contents.
In the course of gathering the research material, we assumed that as a conse-
quence of choosing some media for analysis, we would extract all the contents 
from them relating to the idea of a secular state from 1989 to 2015. In practice, 
collecting all of the material turned out to be impossible. We started organizing 
the research project assuming that in the digital archives of Gazeta Wyborcza, 
Rzeczpospolita, and TVP’s stationary archive at the Powstańców Square in 
Warsaw would provide us with all the materials available from this analyzed 
period.
Based on the thematic search engine available in Gazeta Wyborcza’s dig-
ital archive, we obtained materials from November 12, 1991. In the analogous 
procedure at the Rzeczpospolita’s digital archive, the first material for analysis 
was dated June 2, 1993. In the case of the TVP News archive, the attempt 
turned out to be narrower. In an electronic correspondence on June 7, 2016, 
Ewa Borkowska from the TVP Archive informed that the available collections 
contained Wiadomości recordings starting in March 2007, and other samples of 
previous materials were included in the National Digital Library. All acquired 
materials had a full transcript written in the signature. However, in the same 
databases, there was no information about the place of a given news item in the 
release schedule structure. Similarly, in the case of press texts, the archives of 
Gazeta Wyborcza and Rzeczpospolita omitted to note the place of the text in the 
structure of the newspaper. Access to only part of the material sought and their 
incomplete descriptions limited this analysis.
We selected materials for analysis based on keywords referring to the Church-
state relationship and the joint agency of Poland’s religious and government 
authorities. It was used the following keywords: concordat, secular state, Church-
state relations; the cross in public places; Bartholomew I in parliament, John Paul 
II in parliament, the Dalai Lama in parliament, and Kirill in parliament. The 
obtained material included 836 items, with 463 articles from Gazeta Wyborcza, 
247 from Rzeczpospolita, and 126 items from TVP’s News.
Additional research material allowed us to place the analysis in the legal and 
political context of the state’s functioning in its relationship with religions. To this 
end, the analysis covered the provisions on Poland’s religious denominational 
laws implemented after 1989. This group of materials included the Constitution, 
the Concordat with the Holy See, and laws on the relationship between the State 
and particular religions and religious associations. In addition, it was collected 
and analyzed the campaign materials of various political parties from the par-
liamentary elections in 1989–2015, as well as electoral materials and candidate 
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programs in the subsequent presidential elections after 1989. This data included 
the parliamentary elections in 1989, 1991, 1993, 1997, 2001, 2005, 2007, 2011, 
2015 and the presidential elections in 1990, 1995, 2000, 2005, 2010, 2015.
In the analysis, we used materials published regularly in the form of a report 
by the Institute of Political Studies of the Polish Academy of Sciences (ISP PAN). 
At the same time, materials from the presidential and parliamentary campaign 
of 2015, which have not yet appeared in the next volume of the report, were 
obtained directly from the employees of the Archives of the Political Parties of 
ISP PAN. Finally, we completed the collected materials with a survey carried out 
on our behalf by a pooling company.
We prioritized the selection of research material based on media content. The 
basic point of the study referred to the mediatization of a secular state. It was 
analyzed first of all based on the changing representation of media content and 
related changes in the legislation and programs of political parties. Therefore, 
it was accepted that in the media material we would search for patterns of 
representing the idea of the secular state and the relationship between the 
Church and the state. We went beyond the level of analyzing media mediation 
itself, since we wanted to place this media representation in the context of the 
dynamics of the postulates of political parties regarding religious issues and the 
binding legal frameworks. Such a procedure allowed us to confront the ques-
tion about the principles of the mechanism of mediatization in the ideas of the 
secular state. The final analysis of the survey questionnaire’s data serves as an 
attempt to check the potential mediatization effect of the secular state.
4.3  First stage: Media content analysis
Among the research methods used in media studies since the mid-twentieth 
century, content analysis undoubtedly takes first place. It also remains popular 
in other disciplines (Franzosi, 2008), inter alia, political science and sociology 
of religion. Anders Hansen and David Machin (2013: 85) describe it as “one of 
the most efficient and the most widely used research methods for the systematic 
and qualitative analysis of media output/content.” In addition, content analysis 
belongs to a group of tools that are suitable for integrating with other research 
methods. We also used this form in this study as a reference point for the quali-
tative grounded theory.
In Bernard Berelson’s (1952:  18) classic approach, Content Analysis in 
Communication Research, the method means “the objective, systematic, and quan-
titative description of the manifest content of the communication.” Subsequent 
attempts to develop it have brought about the appreciation of the quantitative 
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aspect (Holsti, 1969; Krippendorff, 2013; Neuendorf, 2002), but on the other hand, 
also a departure from the assumptions of objectivity (Riffe, Lacy, & Fico, 2005). 
In relation to the first process, it is mainly about the frequency of the appearing 
of specific content and the potential impact of media on recipients postulated on 
this basis (Pisarek, 1983). Hansen and Machin (2013: 89) sum it up as follows:
“Content analysis can help provide some indication of relative prominences and 
absences of key characteristics in media texts, but the inferences that can be drawn from 
such indications must be firmly anchored in a theory that articulates the relationship 
between media and their social contexts.”
With regard to the second issue, awareness of the research process requires a 
great deal of humility in admitting that the analysis fulfills the researcher’s design 
and the specific research context. The results of the study itself are limited to 
social regularities, not the hard laws typical of science. Regardless of whether 
we accept Holsti’s (1969) or Krippendorf ’s (2013) definitions as the basis for 
contents analysis, we consider the systematic and replicable examination of 
messages within a given theoretical framework.
Instead of applying the chosen theory to the problem of the media’s represen-
tation of the idea of a secular state, it was assumed that content analysis refers to 
the later grounded theory. We left the theoretical decisions for the second stage 
of the research. At this stage, we will set up a unit for analyzing the articles in 
newspapers and news items from TV services. Next, based on Atlas.ti’s text data 
analysis support software, we designated the coding frame of 206 categories for 
specifying and describing references to the secular state and Church-state re-
lations (Fig. A.1). We approached the process of creating a coding frame in an 
emergent way, meaning after a preliminary examination of the data (Wimmer & 
Dominick, 2015).
Normally, the selection of the category results from the purpose of the 
conducted research and the limitations in access to the analytical material. In this 
study, the external conditions narrowed the choice of the analytical categories. 
First of all, the materials obtained from the digital archives of the newspapers did 
not allow identifying the publication page, the layout of the pages, the size of the 
space intended for particular articles, or illustrations accompanying the texts. In 
the case of the TVP archive, the scheduled time of a news item, important for 
a media researcher, was missing from the agenda of the given issue. However, 
from the perspective of the whole project, the lack of such data did not turn out 
to be a great loss. During the process of grounding the theory from the data, we 
used the frequency of individual subjects, themes, and issues in conducting the 
content analysis.
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4.4  Second stage: The grounded theory
As already mentioned, it was approached the content analysis as a reference 
point for the grounded theory, which works well in the study of social processes 
(Konecki, 2009) and ways of interpreting reality by its participants (Suddaby, 
2006). In recent years, more media studies have appeared based on the meth-
odology of the grounded theory (Hijmans & Peters, 2009; Neumaier, 2015; V. B. 
Martin, 2008; Tucker-McLaughlin & Campbell, 2012). In their case, it mainly con-
cerned material obtained from conversations and in-depth interviews. Therefore, 
the usefulness of the grounded theory in this project needs justification.
As Ellen Hijmans and Vincent Peters (2009) have noticed, the grounded 
theory belongs to one of the best-developed methods for qualitative research. 
From the outset, its founding fathers, Barney G. Glaser and Anselm L. Strauss 
(1967), assumed conducting social research based on two procedures: a contin-
uous comparison of the research material and theoretical sampling. The develop-
ment of the grounded theory caused the articulation of the third assumption: the 
lack of initial hypotheses (Charmaz, 2006; Strauss & Corbin, 1990). The theory 
established as a strategy for conducting qualitative research is thus based on 
three principles (Hansel & Glinka, 2012). First of all, it does not undertake the 
initial hypotheses. This prevents the researcher from looking for phenomena 
characteristic of the applied theory. Second, it requires constantly comparing 
the collected fragments of the research material, completing them with notes, 
and contrasting them. This will lead the researcher to create successive codes 
and categories on their basis and the theory itself for the analyzed phenomenon. 
Third, the grounded theory implies a theoretical sampling strategy. This means 
that the researcher is not set on obtaining a representative research sample but 
broadening their knowledge on the issue by selecting research material.
These frequently repeated steps (data acquisition, analysis and reflection on 
observations through continuous comparisons, and theoretical samplings) used 
in this approach first of all lead to providing an appropriate theory based on the 
collected data. In this sense, the grounded theory clearly draws from the gains 
of symbolic interaction, which Blumer (1969) best summarizes in three points. 
(1)  Human agency in relation to objects results from the meaning that these 
objects have for them. (2) The importance of subjects arises in social interactions. 
(3) This meaning remains contingent, as it changes under the influence of the 
interpretation of and interaction among individuals.
From the point of view of this study, we should ask in what way the grounded 
theory is able to serve in the analysis of the mediatization of the idea of a secular 
state? We see two key issues that speak for its implementation. First, this research 
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boils down to the reconstruction of the process of shaping the idea of a secular 
state and the Church-state relationship in the media discourse. At the basis of 
this process remain the agency of the state and Church institutions, especially 
their representatives. While content analysis only indicates the frequency of spe-
cific topics, the grounded theory allows for the integration of the media content 
as well as legal documents and political materials into a coherent story about the 
mediatization of the idea of a secular state. The dominant qualitative component 
is, therefore, key to understanding how the entire process and the agency of the 
representatives of both parties proceeded.
The second element that confirms our attitude toward the analysis ac-
cording to the grounded theory comes from the integration of its results with 
this mediatization research. The scholarship on the subject of mediatization has 
been dominated by quantitative studies. Their quantitative dimension consisted 
in considering mediatization by comparing two points on the time continuum, 
the state of matters from before the process and the state at the time of obtaining 
the material for comparison. Thanks to the grounded theory, we are able to 
depart from this type of comparison in favor of a process characterized by spe-
cific dynamics, upheavals and previously mentioned molding moments, or 
mediatization waves. By approaching the collected research material in this way, 
we are now able to say more about the process of accommodating political and 
religious actors to the changing conditions of the mediasphere. We focus on the 
possibility of creating a theory that will refer to the key agency of these actors 
and changes in the very method of articulating the postulate of a secular state.
The research procedure of the grounded theory appeared in literature in 
numerous variations. We based this analysis on Hijman and Peter’s (2009) 
proposal adapted to the needs of media research. Here, the research process 
co-creates four phases of theory development: exploration, specification, reduc-
tion, and integration. The first comes down to defining the research problem 
and the derivation of relevant concepts from the research material. The second 
specification phase consists of precisely defining the concepts based on research 
material and providing arguments for defending the discovered concepts. The 
third phase, which comprises the key issue in the entire procedure, meaning 
reduction, refers to limiting the topics from the analysis in order to form the 
core theory. In contrast, the last phase, integration, consists in grasping the units 
of the analysis in order to identify their specific features and the relationship 
between these features.
In applying this grounded theory’s procedures, it was used the Atlas.ti 
program for computer-aided analysis of the qualitative data. The software clearly 
improved our further use of analysis techniques:  coding, summarizing, and 
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displaying. We assumed two stages in coding. The first was carried out as part 
of pre-coding, and so We applied the codes of the sequence of events to the col-
lected material expressed by means of verbal nouns (Glaser, 1978). As a result, we 
completed this stage of analysis with a group of 214 codes and 268 notes based 
on the encoded material (Fig. A.2). The second stage of concentrated and selec-
tive coding consisted of working through these codes. Here we used the most 
frequently emerging codes to integrate and organize large batches of material.
The additions and notes prepared during the procedure turned out to be 
useful in the next stage of the study. We contrasted their contents with the pre-
vious content analysis, material from the legal analysis, and political documents. 
This allowed us to establish the axial categories or conceptual themes. These 
build a comprehensive presentation of the problem of the secular state and the 
Church-state relationship. While summarizing the results, we clearly reduced 
the analytical perspective to the agency of political and religious actors. Finally, 
in the course of the phase of displaying, we extended the analytical perspective of 
the previous solutions in the area of the theory of mediatization.
4.5  Third stage: Survey questionnaires
Media messages seem to be the most visible elements of the social debate on the 
issue of the secular state. Scientific reports based on opinion polls in Poland have 
frequently addressed our attitude towards Church-state relations and the place of 
religion in the public sphere (CBOS, 1994a; CBOS, 2013; CBOS, 2015a; CBOS, 
2015b). However, these studies have significant limitations for this project’s per-
spective. First, they bypass sources of knowledge and opinions about the Church-
state relationship and state secularism. As a consequence, there is a gap to fill 
with regard to (1) the place of media in the catalog of these sources, and (2) the 
relationship between the opinions of respondents and the contents provided by 
the media. A problem arises concerning the results of mediatizing the idea of 
a secular state. In other words, the question arises whether the mediatization 
evident in the earlier analyzes enters into social consciousness. We based the 
third stage of the study on a questionnaire survey whose results come close to 
answering this question. We conducted research in such a way as to be able to 
postulate the degree of the relation between the mediatized secular state and the 
society used by the media.
At this stage, it was based the research on data from a study commissioned 
to the BBS Obserwator, a Polish social research laboratory. The questionnaire 
survey took place between April 19 and May 19, 2017, on a sample of 1,000 adult 
Poles (569 women and 431 men). Trained and supervised telephone pollsters 
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collected research material using Computer Assisted Telephone Interviews 
(CATI). During the procedure, they were assisted by the CATI Support 4.0 com-
puter program. The database used in the study relied on the telephone book for 
the residents of Poland. It covered both landline and mobile phones. Prior to the 
study, the numbers were validated.
The prepared questionnaire (Fig. A.3) was tested in a pilot study, which was 
carried out on May 18, 2017. Nineteen pilot interviews were conducted, in which 
all interviewers conducting the research took part. Each interviewer performed 
one interview. The pilot study did not show any errors in the prepared research 
tool. As a result, the unchanged questionnaire was used in completing the 
actual poll.
The questionnaire, which was included in the final annex, consisted of 44 
single and multiple choice questions. The questions concerned the subject of 
the secular state, Church-state relations, the religiousness of the respondents 
and the sources of obtained information on the issues discussed. We formu-
lated questions about the religiousness of Poles in such a way that they remain 
consistent with the tools from the previous research on religiosity conducted by 
the Public Opinion Research Center (CBOS), the Institute of Sociology at the 
University of Warsaw (IS UW), and Institute of Philosophy and Sociology of 
the Polish Academy of Sciences (IFiS PAN). In the questionnaire, we included 
questions about opinions on the secular state, the Church-state relationship, 
the religiousness of the respondents and sources of knowledge about the sec-
ular state. The last group of questions we asked addressed the knowledge of 
respondents associated with the secular state and practices concerning Church-
state relations. Depending on the issues raised, the respondents answered by 
choosing from among specific facts based on the Likert scale with five positive 
responses:  “strongly agree,” “agree,” “disagree,” “strongly disagree,” or “hard to 
say”; or based on the answer from the three-item list: “yes,” “no,” or “hard to say.”
The test for the study was based on the initially assumed gender and age num-
bers and the place of residence, which reflected the structure of the adult residents 
of Poland taking into account the surplus (Fig.  4.1). As a result of weighing 
the differences, we obtained a representative sample of adults in Poland based 
on sex (women: N = 569; men: N = 431), age (18–24: N = 61; 25–34: N = 91; 
35–44: N = 125; 45–54: N = 182; 55–64: N = 256; ≥65: N = 285), and place of res-
idence (village: N = 356; town: N = 644). The sampling error was +/− 5 % with a 
confidence interval of 95.
56.9  % of women and 43.1  % of men took part in the sample. The largest 
age groups were represented by respondents aged 65 and over (28.5  %) and 
those over 55 years of age (25.6 %). The division of respondents to cities and 
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the countryside reflected the structure of residents in Poland (Fig. 4.2). The per-
centage of rural residents included 35.6 % of the respondents, where 16.2 % lived 
in cities of up to 20,000 inhabitants, 17.9 % from 20,000 to 100,000, 15.6 % from 
100,000 to 500,000, and 14.7 % in cities with over 500,000.
In the statistical analysis, variables such as education, social and occupational 
group, place of employment, income per person in a household as well as the as-
sessment of material conditions and income per person in the family were also 
taken into account. However, these did not control variables in the selection.
As shown Fig. 4.3 the largest number of people in the survey included those 
from the groups with higher education (43.8  %) and secondary education 
(39.7 %). The least numerous representation were people with only primary or 
junior high school education completed.
In terms of social and professional structure (Fig.  4.4), the group of retirees 
predominated (24.4 %). The second highest group was the management staff and 
specialists with higher education, accounting for 15.5 %. The least numerous rep-
resentation of respondents were unskilled workers (0.9 %) and housewives (1.9 %).
Women Men Total
Age Number (%) Number (%) Number (%)
18–24 28 4.9 33 7.6 61 6.1
25–34 45 7.9 46 10.7 91 9.1
35–44 60 10.6 65 15.1 125 12.5
45–54 108 19.0 74 17.2 182 18.2
55–64 159 27.9 97 22.5 256 25.6
Over 65 years 169 29.7 116 26.9 285 28.5
Total 569 100.0 431 100.0 1000 100.0
Fig. 4.1:  Sample selection: Age and sex of the respondents (%). Source: Own research
Place of residence Number (%)
Countryside 356 35.6
Cities with up to 20,000 residents 162 16.2
Cities from 20,000 to 100,000 residents 179 17.9
Cities from 100,000 to 500,000 residents 156 15.6
Cities with over 500,000 residents 147 14.7
Total 1000 100.0
Fig. 4.2:  Sample selection: Place of residency (%). Source: Own research
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Considering the income of the respondents per person in a household (Fig. 4.5), 
it can be seen that the highest number of respondents earned over 2,000 PLN 
(27.4 %). The least number of respondents had incomes not exceeding 649 PLN 
per person in a household (6.6 %). Quite a significant number of respondents 
(19.8 %) refused to state their earnings, which may be associated with the cur-
rent belief in Poland that these remain sensitive data (Dyoniziak, 1997).
The last variable (Fig. 4.6) indicates the optimism of the respondents regarding 
their material conditions. 49.9  % of the respondents assessed their material 
conditions as average, 39.7 % assessed their financial situation to be good, and 
only 6.6 % as being poor.
Education Number (%)
Important Higher 438 43.8
Average 397 39.7
Technical or professional 125 12.5
Elementary/junior high school 40 4.0
Overall 1000 100.0
Fig. 4.3:  Quantitative and percentage structure of education (%). Source: Own research
Social and Professional Group Number (%)
Important Management staff, specialists with higher education 155 15.5
Medium staff, technicians 70 7.0
Administrative and office employees 104 10.4
Service employees 60 6.0
Skilled workers 40 4.0








Other groups 69 6.9
Overall 1000 100.0
Fig. 4.4: Quantitative and percentage of the social and professional structure (%). 
Source: Own research
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4.6  Triangulation of the methods
The reader may have noticed that we based the three successive stages of the 
research design on qualitative and quantitative methods. It is true that the 
majority of the methodological textbooks focus on selected methods from one 
branch. However, the broad traditions of combining qualitative and quantita-
tive studies date back to the beginnings of social sciences (Hesse-Biber, 2010; 
Plano Clark, Huddleston-Casas, Churchill, Green, & Garrett, 2008). Within 
their framework, these procedures can be called, among others, convergent val-
idation/triangulation (Webb, Campbell, Schwartz, & Sechrest, 1966), and con-
vergent methodology/multimethod/multitrait (D. T. Campbell & Fiske, 1959). 
Proponents of this connection share the conviction that “qualitative and quanti-
tative methods should be viewed as complementary rather than as rival camps” 
(Jick, 1979: 602). The ultimate goal of this approach illustrates and deepens the 
depth of the studied phenomenon (Mertens & Hesse-Biber, 2012).
Following this directive, the study undertook the issue of triangula-
tion. According to Norman K.  Denzin (2017), triangulation concerns a wide 
Income per person Number (%)
Important From 649 PLN 58 5.8
From 650 to 999 PLN 127 12.7
From 1000 to 1399 PLN 134 13.4
From 1400 to 1999 PLN 209 20.9
2000 PLN or more 274 27.4
No reply 198 19.8
Overall 1000 100.0
Fig. 4.5: Quantitative and percentage income structures per person (%). Source: Own 
research
Material conditions Number (%)
Important Poor 66 6.6
Average 499 49.9
Good 397 39.7
No reply 38 3.8
Overall 1000 100.0
Fig. 4.6: Quantitative and percentage structures of material conditions (%). 
Source: Own research
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combination of different methodologies within the framework of the same 
phenomenon. Kenneth R.  Howe (2012) points to two possible ways of doing 
this. The first includes disjunctive mixed methods/triangulation, in which the 
researcher may attempt to integrate the qualitative and quantitative data. The 
second, referred to as the conjunctive approach to mixed methods/triangulation, 
is not so much about the integration of different types of data, but rather the 
designation of a wider explanatory framework (Denzin, 2017). Howe (2012: 93) 
specifies that he follows this triangulation at the paradigm level, which assumes 
“removing positivism from the scene, long since abandoned in philosophy” or 
“removing the grounds for paradigm incompatibility.”
After accepting the second of the presented perspectives for undertaking 
this research, we have to explain what exactly the interpretative framework we 
used relied on. First of all, we agree with the view that language differences in 
the qualitative and quantitative approaches refer to epistemological differences 
(Brown & Colton, 2001). Differences in the language and epistemology of both 
approaches, therefore, inclined us to apply Howe’s postulate. This means that the 
postulate of objectivity and the representation which we carried in the first and 
third stages of research lose importance at the moment of inference based on all 
data. Consequently, the analysis departs from a research study on the classical 
type of positivist paradigm.
At the level of the triangulation of the material and research methods, we 
assumed that the tension between the quantitative and qualitative results would 
resolve the problem of granting priority to the latter. In setting the hierarchy 
of the analysis, we relied on Joachim Cohen’s (2014) suggestion that the use of 
the quantitative material in a project dominated by the qualitative method is 
a starting point in formulating research questions and the grounded theories. 
In practice, this involved two more issues. First of all, we started our grounded 
theory procedures only after performing a content analysis. The second is that 
the results of the content analysis were a reference point for the grounded theory 
analyzes. Similarly, we completed the final survey after the content analysis and 
grounding the theory. Finally, we conducted the analysis not on the principle 
of attempting to combine antagonistic approaches, but rather by focusing on 
strengthening the analyzed material. As a result, this allowed us project to be 
oriented towards “capturing a more complete, holistic, and contextual portrayal 
of the unit(s) under study” (Jick, 1979: 603).

5  Covering the secular and Church-state 
relationship
Let’s start the reflection on the mediatization of the idea of a secular state based 
on the analyzed media. We will now consider the media coverage of the sec-
ular state and the Church-state relationship in the years 1989–2015. We can 
treat the results of this content analysis as a reference point for the later ap-
plied grounded theory. The primary sources of this analysis are taken from two 
newspapers, Gazeta Wyborcza and Rzeczpospolita, and the public television 
information Wiadomości TVP service. Although today the media remain hybrid 
(Chadwick, 2013), in the last 25 years, the source of knowledge about the sec-
ular state primarily referred to traditional media, including television and the 
press. Their contents, therefore, provide significant intuition in understanding 
the discussed issue.
In 1989, Poland entered the path of systemic changes. The legal and polit-
ical situation concerning the nation’s Church-state relations was characterized 
by separating the Church from public life. The Church adapted to the unfavor-
able conditions of the communist regime, and could hardly have dreamed pos-
sible what was actually happening. As a result of the contractual election on June 
4, 1989, a practicing Catholic who represented the interests of the opposition 
became the prime minister. There immediately appeared demands for shaping 
religious issues based on cooperation and even compensation for the harm 
suffered by the Church. The early years of political transformation brought a 
new kind of challenge for relations between the Church and state. The developed 
idea of the secular state and the variant of a state with an unbiased worldview 
were yet to come.
In May 2015, Andrzej Duda won the presidential election in the second 
round. In October of that year, the political formation that promoted the new 
president took over power. The United Right gained the majority in parliament 
(an informal coalition of PiS, PR, and SP), allowing it to form an independent 
government. In a short time, radical changes in all areas of social life began to 
take place under the motto of “good change” in the social consciousness. Along 
with the PiS and coalition power takeover, Church-state relations took on new 
colors (Guzek, 2017).
This analysis refers to the period between the two aforementioned moments 
from the years 1989 to 2015. At that time, the media provided a clearly differentiated 
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coverage of religion, the idea of the secular state, as well as the Church-state rela-
tionship. In order to look at this coverage in a deeper way, we will start with a 
quantitative analysis based on the frequency of references to various spaces of the 
secular state.
5.1  The secular state and the Church-state 
relationship: A quantitative overview
Let’s now turn to a general recognition of the presence of various categories 
related to the secular state and Church-state relations. Of course, we cannot gen-
eralize on the basis of incomplete material. However, we can see how the avail-
able material worked in the categories of analysis. We are primarily referring to 
gathering the basic groups of categories and other categories that were distin-
guished according to their frequency in the collected material.
Groups of believers; 1.1
 Church-state
relationship; 17.8 Controversies; 2.9



















Fig. 5.1: Groups of topics in all examined media (%)
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Content analysis results indicate that the dominant categories in the sur-
veyed media referred to political players. As Fig.  5.1 shows, political actors, 
state and political institutions and political parties comprised 46.6  % of the 
categories present in the analysis. At the same time, the largest group of ana-
lyzed categories, amounting to 19.5 %, referred to political actors. The cate-
gory group that found itself on the other side of the Church-state relationship 
was associated with representatives of religion and amounted to 19.3  %. In 
the analyzed quantitative material, the frequency advantage of the coverage 
of political players over the coverage of religious players thus determines the 
view of the media through the prism of the domination of political actors and 
their agency.
Fig. 5.2 indicates that in the case of Gazeta Wyborcza, the dominance of the cat-
egories associated with political players (43.2 %) over religious players (22.9 %) is 























Fig. 5.2: Groups of topics in Gazeta Wyborcza (%)
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comparable to the material from the general media analysis. The domination of 
categories based on Church-state relationships (21.0 %) characterize this news-
paper. Looking for a pattern to understand the contents in Gazeta Wyborcza, 
we can see the need to emphasize not only the agency of political and religious 
actors but also their mutual reference.
In Rzeczpospolita, categories referring to political players amount to slightly 
more than the data for all media. In the case of all media, it was 43.4 %, while 
Fig. 5.3 indicates that in Rzeczpospolita, this number is 45.9 %. Interestingly, in 
this newspaper, as much as 66.4 % of the coverage category is occupied by rep-
resentatives of the political and religious spheres. Another 20  % includes the 
Church-state relationship. Their sum in the form of 86.4 % allows us to assume 
that the Rzeczpospolita’s analyzed material draws from the operation of entities 
related to the shaping of religion and state relations.
In the case of incomplete material from Wiadomości TVP1, the advantage 






















Fig. 5.3: Groups of topics in Rzeczpospolita (%)
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According to Fig.  5.4, the disproportion of political players (60.2  %) as com-
pared with religious players (11.1 %) is more than fivefold. The group of cate-
gories related to political actors dominating in the content analysis is as high 
as 38 %. In contrast to other media, a lot of space remains devoted to religious 
symbols, 12.7 %. Such an excess of the average for all media (1.2 %) shows that 
Wiadomości TVP1 accentuates not only the agency of political actors but also 
objects representing ideological content.
A general look at the groups of dominant categories in the analyzed media 
can be supplemented with specific, most frequently appearing categories 
of coverage. This operation in our overview allows us to answer two basic 
questions. First of all, which categories of analysis are dominated by frequency? 
Second, are we able to see a pattern in these categories when we look at 
them?
According to Fig. 5.5, only the issue of the concordat plays a primary role in 
















denominations; 1.1 Controversies; 0.8
Types of Church-state
relationship; 0.4
Groups of believers; 0.3
Other social actors; 0.1
Fig. 5.4: Groups of topics in Wiadomości TVP1 (%)
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about the postulates appearing in subsequent periods of the analysis: the signing 
of the concordat, its ratification, renegotiation, or termination. This category 
occupies 8.5 % of the entire analysis and leaves behind a sequence of occurrences 
by the Sejm and deputies (4.9 %) and the government (4.7 %). However, this is 
a misleading representation. From the quality of the material analyzed later on, 
it follows that the concordat rather functions as a reference. This means that 
politicians especially articulate the need for its signing or suspension. However, 
they do not provide justification for such a proposal.
In a similar way, based on the principle of reference, successive categories 
also operate, namely constitutional (3.7 %) and the Holy See/Vatican (3.6 %), 
that function in terms of frequency. They appear in the broader narratives of 
politicians as key slogans in the form of whether or not the given resolution will 
be consistent with the Constitution? How will the Holy See react to changes in 
the area of religious law?
In the group of the most frequent categories, we see a regularity regarding the 













































































































































Fig. 5.5: Key categories of the general analysis (not adding up to 100 %)
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these are institutional entities that hold real political power in Poland: the gov-
ernment, the Sejm and its deputies (9.6 %), and political parties (5.5 %). Next in 
line remain the Polish Bishops’ Conference or bishops speaking on social issues 
(5.1 %). Then there appear two individual actors: on the political side, Aleksander 
Kwaśniewski (1.9 %), and on the religious side, Bishop Tadeusz Pieronek (1.4 %). 
Such a pattern points to two issues.
The advantage of institutional actors over individuals in the analyzed material 
proves that the idea of a secular state and its Church-state relations result from 
dominant collective interest groups rather than by implementing individual 
strategies. Second, the agency of Aleksander Kwaśniewski and Bishop Tadeusz 
Pieronek occurred in the nineties. In the second decade after the systemic trans-
formation, activists from individual political and religious institutions are the 
primary spokesmen.
In Fig.  5.6, it can be seen that the categories that dominate in Gazeta 
Wyborcza, excluding references to the concordat, amount to 14.8 % and particu-
larly concern institutional actors. Considering the significant number of appeals 






































































































Fig. 5.6: Key categories in Gazeta Wyborcza (do not add up to 100 %)
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(10.1 %). Only one individual actor in the group of dominant categories appears 
(Aleksander Kwaśniewski with 2.4 %). Therefore, Gazeta Wyborcza focuses on 
the efficiency of the institution.
What describes the key categories in Gazeta Wyborcza are references to the 
presence of two clusters. The first of the clusters concerns media coverage of 
the Sejm and deputies (5.3  %) and the government (4.8  %) as the two most 
common categories of political institutions and the Holy See/Vatican (4.7 %) 
as the most frequently present in the material about a religious institution. The 
second cluster results from a similar percentage of contents on the subject of 
Aleksander Kwaśniewski (2.4  %), which represents political individuals and 
groups of bishops speaking out on social issues (2.5 %). This shows a clear per-
spective in Gazeta Wyborcza’s texts that includes two sides of the Church-state 
relationship.
The percentage distribution of the dominant categories in Rzeczpospolita, 
presented in Fig. 5.7, to a significant degree approach the distribution in Gazeta 
Wyborcza. The difference becomes clear when it comes to the representation of 


























































































Fig. 5.7: Key categories in the Rzeczpospolita (do not add up to 100 %)
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position of the Polish Bishops’ Conference (3.5 %) in references to the bishops’ 
activity on social issues. The collected material additionally indicates that the 
activity of the Polish Bishops’ Conference appears more often than references to 
the Holy See (3.0 %).
In addition, the most frequently appearing categories in Rzeczpospolita should 
be seen as an element of negotiations between the Episcopate and the state 
authorities. Data in Fig. 5.7 indicate such regularity when we take into account 
three factors. First of all, the issues of the concordat, the constitution, and the 
law of denomination occupy a total of 16.3 % of the frequency of all categories. 
Second, here we can notice the priority of political and religious actors, where 
the government and the parliament together get 10 %, while the Polish Bishops’ 
Conference and the Vatican get 6.5 %. Third, in the case of the joint Church and 
state committee among the media investigated, Rzeczpospolita has the highest 
frequency of appeals to the agency of this entity (4.1 %).
In the case of material from Wiadomości TVP1, Fig. 5.8 clearly expresses the 
incompleteness of the scope of the collected material. The material covers the 
Smolensk crash, which dominated Wiadomości TVP1’s broadcasts for several 
months. When we ignore the Smolensk news, it turns out that the most material 





























Fig. 5.8: Key categories in Wiadomości TVP1 (do not add up to 100 %)
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5.2  Placing the secular state and secularity 
in the quantitative material
In the analyzed media material, the secular state and its variants clearly gave way 
to the political and religious agents shaping Church-state relations. A look at the 
quantitative material, however, turns out to be the basis for the subsequent analysis 
of various categories of the secular state in the field of the grounded theory. Let’s, 
therefore, trace the available data, focusing primarily on the frequency of the var-
iations in the understanding of the state’s approach to religion.
The group representing the categories of the types of secular states turns out 
to be dynamic when we look at the analyzed media material from Fig. 5.9. These 
dynamics consist of periods associated with the ratification of the concordat and 
the enactment of the constitution. Debates appear on various options for shaping 
the relationship between the state and religion. Of course, it cannot be seen on a 
simple list of the frequency of various types of secular states. There is no indica-
tion of the moment in time when the media coverage was limited to the slogan 


























Fig. 5.9: Church-state relations in general (%)
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What appears in the analyzed material concerns the slight frequency advan-
tage of secularity, secularism, and the separation of Church and state (58.1 %) 
over various forms of the autonomy and neutrality of both entities (41.9 %). 
When we look at the second group, we see a kind of unique category relating 
to state impartiality (7.2  %). This results from the process of negotiating the 
significance of Church and state autonomy, which in Poland’s conditions ulti-
mately took the form of a declaration of impartiality of the state towards reli-
gion. Ultimately, it also complements the category of state ideological neutrality 
(12.6 %), occurring with considerable frequency among the Church-state rela-
tions models.
The categories in question occur in Gazeta Wyborcza’s materials in 
proportions reflecting the distribution of the categories of the media analyzed in 
their entirety (Fig. 5.10). The difference only affects the increase in the frequency 
in the coverage of the autonomy of the Church and state from 18.9 % to 23.3 % 
and the decrease in the coverage of the secular state idea from 32.4 % to 26.4 %. 
At the same time in the mentioned daily, 18.6 %, meaning a similar value, in 
the media generally refers to the category of separation of Church and state. 

























Fig. 5.10: Church-state relations in Gazeta Wyborcza (%)
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field of the secular state and the Church-state relationship primarily concern 
the sphere of building the mutual independence of both institutions. However, 
when we compare the mention of state ideological neutrality (11.6 %) with the 
Church’s neutrality towards the state (3.1 %), then we see the dominating cov-
erage of the state agency.
The material in Rzeczpospolita shows the domination of the category of a sec-
ular state. We learn from Fig.  5.11 that as much as 42  % of the frequency of 
the categories related to the Church-state relationship concerns the secular state. 
Against this background, 44.3 % of the categories related to separation, neutrality, 
and autonomy in total turn out to be relevant. Definitely much less is mentioned 
about state impartiality (3.4 %). We can draw one conclusion from this distribu-
tion of the frequency of the categories in question. The Rzeczpospolita accepts 
the secular state as a starting point in the published contents of the Church-state 
relationship. A specific counterbalance to this perspective seems to be separa-




























Fig. 5.11: Church-state relations in Rzeczpospolita (%)
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Models of the Church-state relationship in a small way appeared in the ana-
lyzed material of Wiadomości TVP1 with a 0.4 % share of the entire list of fre-
quencies of the categories used. As a consequence, as Fig. 5.12 indicates, their 
distribution remained even. Based on this, we can see that the main edition of 
Wiadomości TVP1 to a small extent supplements the dominant qualitative mate-
rial from the surveyed newspapers. Seeking answers to the reasons for this, we 
are inclined to give two competitive answers. The first states that the fragmentary 
nature of the material is not able to reflect the specificity of the TV coverage of 
the categories in question. The second assumes that television, as a medium of 
dynamic narrative, avoids going into details and differences in the Church-state 
relationship. This means that both mentions of autonomy, impartiality, and sep-
aration appear on the surface of the analyzed discourses and not in the area of 
their essence.
In addition to the discussed models of Church-state relations, the content 
analysis also provides us with knowledge about the distribution of topics that ap-
pear within these relationships. Therefore, we refer to the material that functions 
in harmony with what was presented in Fig. 5.1 that takes up as much as 16.5 % 
of the frequency of all the analyzed categories.
Secular
state









Fig. 5.12: Church-state relations in Wiadomości TVP1 (%)




















































































































































































































































































































Placing the secular state and secularity in the quantitative material 137
Let’s take into account the frequency of the occurrence of categories in the 
Church-state relationship group. According to the data from Fig. 5.13, three cat-
egories dominate there: the concordat (47.6 %), constitution (20.6 %), and laws 
and policies on religion (15.5 %). In total, their turnout in this group of catego-
ries is as high as 83.8 %. Earlier, it was shown that the research outcomes depend 
on the agency of political and religious institutions and individuals. When we 
add the current findings to this, we come to several conclusions. First of all, the 
Church-state relationship, and consequently the way in which the idea of a sec-
ular state is shaped, results from the discussion on the shape of legal regulations 
and the relationship between the Church and state. Activities in this area take 
place through the involvement of religious and political actors. The compromise 
between the Church and the state (3.1 %) plays a relatively important role in the 
whole process, which is combined with the provisions guaranteed to the Church 
in the legal system (3.1 %).
Fig. 5.14 shows a similar distribution of the categories among all the media 
and in Gazeta Wyborcza. In the case of this newspaper, Church negotiations with 
the state (8.5 %) are also important in addition to the main themes from the 
Church-state relationship category, which indicates the dynamics of Church-
state relations in media coverage. At the same time, this category is ahead of the 
compromise and provisions provided to the Church.
Rzeczpospolita, which also presents a common scheme of the three dominant 
categories, differs in one detail from Gazeta Wyborcza. According to Fig. 5.15 
in Rzeczpospolita, negotiations, job searches, compromises, provisions, and 
interpretations appear at a similar level of frequency. In total, these comprise 
14.6 % of the categories in the group. It additionally testifies to the relative com-
plexity of the topics raised within the framework of the issue of the mutual 
references of the Church and the state.
According to Fig. 5.16 in Wiadomości TVP1, the material collected contains 
three specific features. First of all, the basic reference point of Church-state re-
lations rests on the Constitution (35.3 %) and not the Concordat (17.6 %) as in 
the past. Just as in the concordat, provisions issued to the Church also appear 
(17.6 %). This directly relates to the claims of various parties regarding the degree 
of cooperation between the Church and the state, especially after the period of 
ratification of the concordat and the constitution. Second, the material shows 
the occurrence of consultations between the Church and the government on a 
similar scale, including the compromise between the Church and the state. Both 
occur with a frequency of 5.9 %. Third, we see the clear agency of the president 
as the host of meetings related to the subject of religion and the place of religion 
in public life in Poland (5.9 %).
































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Covering the secular and Church-state relationship140
5.3  Who is important: Political actors
So far, we have tried to show the general distribution of categories in the col-
lected research material, the types of Church-state relations and the issues raised 
within this relationship. Now we will present issues concerning political actors 
made up of state institutions, individuals, and political parties. As we wrote ear-
lier, the agency of political actors appears in the surveyed media with the highest 
frequency. At the same time, the percentage distribution of individual state 
institutions and individual political actors enriches the later grounded theory.
The list included in Fig.  5.17 illustrates two regularities. First of all, the 
frequency of the emerging political individuals goes hand in hand with their 
huge diversity. The list contains the names of representatives of all the leftist or 
right views scale, including successive presidents of the country, prime min-
isters, ministers, representatives of the parliament, representatives of political 
parties, and local government politicians. Second, the frequency of these groups 
operates in certain clusters. Presidents appear most often, next are prime min-
isters, deputies, senators, and politicians from parliamentary parties and non-
parliamentary parties. Thus, the list clearly shows the domination of the coverage 






















Fig. 5.16: Contents of Church-state relations in Wiadomości TVP1 (%)
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Actor % Actor % Actor %
Aleksander 
Kwaśniewski
9.9 Marek Borowski 1.0 Przemysław Gosiewski 0.4
Lech Wałęsa 4.7 Jan Olszewski 0.9 Beata Mazurek 0.4
Józef Oleksy 4.6 Jerzy Buzek 0.8 Michał Boni 0.4
Lech Kaczyński 4.4 Władysław Bartoszewski 0.8 Ryszard Czarnecki 0.4
Bronisław 
Komorowski
3.9 Jacek Kuroń 0.8 Jan Jankiewicz 0.4
Donald Tusk 3.9 Jarosław Gowin 0.8 Bogdan Klich 0.4
Włodzimierz 
Cimoszewicz
3.8 Marian Krzaklewski 0.8 Janusz Kurtyka 0.3
Waldemar Pawlak 3.3 Hanna 
Gronkiewicz-Waltz
0.8 Adam Strzembosz 0.3
Jarosław Kaczyński 3.0 Alicja Grześkowiak 0.8 Jolanta Szczypińska 0.3
Józef Zych 2.6 Jolanta Szymanek-Deresz 0.8 Zbigniew Wassermann 0.3
Maria Kaczyńska 2.5 Marek Siwiec 0.7 Janusz Piechociński 0.3
Hanna Suchocka 2.3 Aleksandra Jakubowska 0.6 Armand Ryfiński 0.3
Dariusz Rosati 2.1 Anna Komorowska 0.6 Jan Krzysztof Bielecki 0.3
Zbigniew 
Siemiątkowski
2.0 Ewa Kopacz 0.6 Artur Dębski 0.3
Jadwiga Wiśniewska 1.8 Joanna Senyszyn 0.6 Piotr Ikonowicz 0.3
Janusz Palikot 1.7 Jacek Rostowski 0.6 Krzysztof Janik 0.3
Tadeusz Mazowiecki 1.7 Jacek Sasin 0.6 Jerzy Jaskiernia 0.3
Jerzy Szmajdziński 1.5 Andrzej Balicki 0.6 Stanisław Żelichowski 0.3
Michał Kamiński 1.4 Bogdan Borusewicz 0.6 Bolesław Piecha 0.3
Ryszard Bugaj 1.4 Wojciech Olejniczak 0.5 Andrzej Stelmachowski 0.3
Izabela Sierakowska 1.4 Longin Pastusiak 0.5 Paweł Zalewski 0.3
Krzysztof 
Skubiszewski
1.2 Anna Sobecka 0.5 Marek Kuchciński 0.3
Mariusz Błaszczak 1.2 Jerzy Wenderlich 0.5 Zofia Kuratowska 0.3
Bronisław Geremek 1.2 Aleksander Małachowski 0.5 Stefan Niesiołowski 0.3
Grzegorz Schetyna 1.0 Antoni Macierewicz 0.5 Tomasz Kalita 0.3
Andrzej Olechowski 1.0 Roman Giertych 0.5 Roman Jagieliński 0.3
Ryszard Kalisz 1.0 Tadeusz Iwiński 0.5 Zbigniew Bujak 0.3
Paweł Graś 1.0 Ryszard Kaczorowski 0.5    
Radosław Sikorski 1.0 Aleksander Bentkowski 0.5    
Fig. 5.17:  Individual political actors (%). Source: Own research
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As shown in Fig.  5.18, Aleksander Kwaśniewski is the most frequently 
appearing figure in the context of the study. It is necessary to combine his pres-
idency with the period of the ratification of the concordat and the adoption of 
the constitution. The overall compilation shows that the presidents mentioned 
above (in the following order:  Aleksander Kwaśniewski, Lech Wałęsa, Lech 
Kaczyński, Bronisław Komorowski) and former prime ministers (in the fol-
lowing order: Józef Oleksy, Donald Tusk, Włodzimierz Cimoszewicz, Waldemar 
Pawlak, Jarosław Kaczyński) comprise the basic group of politicians covered by 
the media. This gives grounds to believe that media coverage throughout this 
period contains significant threads related to individuals. Here we can see the 
presence of mediatization strategies.
The results from Gazeta Wyborcza presented in Fig.  5.19 show that 
mediatization appears here especially in relation to the main actors of the 
political scene from the nineties. Apart from Kwaśniewski, Oleksy, Wałęsa, 
and Cimoszewicz, key political figures for all the surveyed media remain leftist 
politicians (Dariusz Rosati, Zbigniew Siemiątkowski) and the right-wing’s 
strongly exposed Hanna Suchocka. Their coverage falls on periods of tensions 
and negotiations between the Church and the state. This gives us the basis for 
asserting that the agency of individuals especially dominates during the period 










































































































Fig. 5.18: Key political individuals (not adding up to 100 %)
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contrast, in Rzeczpospolita daily, the frequency schedule reflects the general 
statements of the media coverage of individual politicians, already presented 
in Fig. 5.18.
Incomplete material from media coverage in the news by Wiadomości TVP1 
presented in Fig. 5.20 shows the dominance of presidents and prime ministers 
from competing parties. These include Lech and Jarosław Kaczyński and the 
people associated with PiS (31  %), Donald Tusk and Bronisław Komorowski 
from PO (17.6 %) and Waldemar Pawlak from PSL (3.3 %). Characteristic of 
equal succession amounting to 7.1 % is the prime ministers most often covered 
on the TVP1 news service, namely Jarosław Kaczyński and Donald Tusk. This 
suggests their significant participation in the media coverage of religion and 
the state.
After individual politicians, this analysis also distinguishes categories of key 
state and political institutions, with the exception that we treat political parties 
separately. As a result, Fig. 5.21 indicates the dominance of the Sejm and its dep-
uties (32.8 %) and the government (31 %). The joint Church-state commission 





































































Fig. 5.19: Key political individuals in Gazeta Wyborcza (not adding up to 100 %)
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to believe that in the case of political actors, the media coverage includes the 
clearly formalized agencies of the Sejm, government, and a joint Church-state 
commission on the one hand, and the less formal agency of the Sejm’s deputies 
on the other.
Comparing the severity of state and political institutions based on Fig. 5.22 
leads to several insights. First of all, the dominant frequency of the Sejm and 
deputies in the case of Wiadomości TVP1 occurs 9.5  % higher than average. 
The government category in Wiadomości TVP1 is 8.2  % more common than 
average. At the same time, coverage of the Constitutional Tribunal turns out 
clearly weaker (it amounts to 2.1 % on the TV website with an average of 5.3 %). 
Television material is quite saturated with state and political institutions, how-
ever, the result relies on the partial material.
Considering the importance of political parties in shaping Poland’s struc-
ture after 1989, we placed them in a separate group of content analysis cat-
egories (Fig.  5.23). The PSL obtained the highest frequency, 17.8  %, in the 
material being studied. However, this is mainly based on an appeal. This party 
does not play the main role. The case looks different when indicating SLD 
(11.8 %) and PiS (11 %), both characterized by an extremely different approach 




















Fig. 5.20: Key political individuals in Wiadomości TVP1 (not adding up to 100 %)
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Constitutional Tribunal 5.3 4.7 6.9 2.1
Government 31 30.5 29.8 39.2
Joint Church and State 
Committee
21.6 22.5 23.6 7.2
The Sejm and deputies 32.8 34.1 28.6 42.3
The Senate and senators 9.3 8.2 11.1 9.3
Fig. 5.22: State and political institutions in comparison (without political parties) (%). 
Source: Own research
presence of a short-term initiative called Ruch Palikota [Palikot’s Movement]. 
It occurred with a frequency of 4.5 %, and the vast majority of the statements 
of this movement’s ideology refer to the call to implement the postulate of a 
secular state.
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5.4  Who is important: Religious actors
The postulate concerning the secular state transfers various approaches to 
shaping the Church-state relationship. Among the actors who are greatly inter-
ested in its implementation or not satisfied with its implementation are religious 
representatives. After indicating the results of the content analysis regarding the 
basic political actors, in the present paragraph we focus on their adversaries. 
In this part, therefore, we characterize the interrelatedness of the occurrence of 
categories associated with religious actors, both individuals as well as religious 
institutions and groups. As in the previous paragraph, here we emphasize the 
individual actors of the drama. However, we are referring to individuals and 
institutions lobbying for a particular status of religion in society.
In the case of individual religious actors, Fig. 5.24 mainly refers to the three 
most frequently emerging categories obtaining a total of 49.7 % within this group. 
At the same time, we see that Bishop Tadeusz Pieronek and Pope John Paul II 
appear in the material with similar frequency. There is no significant difference 
here showing who comes out in the qualitative analysis. In a large number of 
cases, John Paul II functions as a reference. Meanwhile, Bishop Tadeusz Pieronek 
always has clear agency in the Church-state relationship. He works on the same 
BBWR KPN PO PSL PiS Ruch
Palikota










Fig. 5.23: Political parties in general (%)
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principle as Cardinal Józef Glemp (15.2 %), and next on the list are Archbishop 
Józef Kowalczyk, Nuncio (6.8 %), and Archbishop Józef Michalik (6.2 %).
In Gazeta Wyborcza, the frequency scheme of three key persons, such as 
John Paul II, Bishop Tadeusz Pieronek, and Cardinal Józef Glemp, is repeated. 
According to Fig.  5.25, however, references to John Paul II prevail (20.2  %). 
Among the visible figures, but with a lower frequency, appears the aged Catholic 
Apostolic Nuncio, Archbishop Józef Kowalczyk (8.6 %). In addition, a certain 
role should be attributed to Fr. Tadeusz Rydzyk, who runs Radio Maryja along 
with several archbishops. These included the metropolitans from Przemyśl (Józef 
Michalik with 5.5 %), Lublin (Józef Życiński with 3.7 %), and Gdańsk (Sławoj 
Leszek Głódź with 2.4 %).
Unlike Gazeta Wyborcza, in Rzeczpospolita, the number of significant reli-
gious individuals is growing. Fig.  5.26 indicates the presence of Cardinal 
Kazimierz Nycz from Warsaw (4.3  %) and Archbishop Wiktor Skworc from 

























Fig. 5.24: Individual religious actors (%)
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three Church leaders. The daily also shows a relatively high frequency of reli-
gious leaders, Pope John Paul II (15.8 %), Pope Francis (4.3 %), and Patriarch 
Kirill (2.7 %).
After the content analysis results presented in Fig.  5.27, we can see that 
Wiadomości TVP1 presents the most diverse coverage of religious individuals. 
In addition to three popes (20.5 % of the group), the Polish archbishops (37 %) 
appear in the materials, representatives of the Holy See (8.2 %), but also the cur-
rent spokesman of the Polish Bishops’ Conference, Rev. Józef Kloch (12.3 %). 
We cannot forget about the most-frequently appearing person of Cardinal 
Kazimierz Nycz (16.4 %). The way he replaces Cardinal Józef Glemp points to the 
continuing long-standing significance of the Warsaw Church in the dynamics of 
shaping Church-state relations.
The Church naturally has an institutional structure. The content analysis 
presented in Fig. 5.28 allows us to see two religious institutions dominating in 
frequency. The Holy See/Vatican and the Polish Bishops’ Conference occupy 




















Fig. 5.25: Individual religious actors in Gazeta Wyborcza (%)
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that for key political institutions such as the government and the Sejm with its 
deputies, the Vatican and the Polish Episcopate are the counterweights.
When in the remaining material we are looking for further religious 
institutions with a relatively frequent presence in media coverage, a certain reg-
ularity appears. First, the Cracow Curia (3.9 %) and the Katowice Curia (3.4 %) 
function in the media material more often than the Apostolic Nunciature 
(1.9 %). Second, Radio Maryja also appears (3.1 %). Religious institutions, there-
fore, include those which have a specific political agency.
A comparison of the coverage results of religious institutions based on Fig. 5.29 
points to some interesting probabilities. First of all, we note that references to the 
Holy See and the Vatican take up half of the percentage of attendance in the 
analyzed group in the case of Gazeta Wyborcza. Similarly, 48.6 % of the religious 
institutions group refer to Wiadomości TVP1 in the Polish Bishops’ Conference. 
At the same time, the frequency of the Vatican (25.7 %) reveals itself as the lowest. 


























Fig. 5.26: Individual religious actors in Rzeczpospolita (%)
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coverage. In the research material, this implies the transition from individuals to 
institutional actors, previously noticed in the case of the frequency of political 
actors.
5.5  Locating the agency: Believers, non-believers,  
and covered confessions
In the collected quantitative material, our attention is drawn to two significant 
groups of categories that allow us to clearly specify the context of the entire pro-
ject. We will mention the group referring to particular religious denominations. 
Next, we will mention the categories of followers belonging to particular 
faiths, but also non-believers. In this way, we want to understand better the 
circumstances of asking whether a secular state is possible and if so, what should 
it be like?
Based on Fig. 5.30, we learn that the Catholic Church predominates in the reli-
gious denominational groups (53.5 %). This shows that the debate concerning the 
























Fig. 5.27: Individual religious actors in Wiadomości TVP1 (%)
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Military Ordinariate of
the Polish Army; 0.6 










Nunciature; 1.9 Pontical Academy of
eology in Cracow; 1.2
Fig. 5.28: Religious institutions in general (%)




The Holy See/Vatican 44.8 49.2 39.4 25.7
Polish Bishops’ Conference 39.5 35.8 45.6 48.6
The Katowice Curia 3.4 2.4 2.8 17.1
Radio Maryja 3.1 4.3 1.1 0.0
The Cracow Curia 2.9 2.7 3.3 2.9
Catholic University of Lublin 2.6 2.7 2.8 0.0
Apostolic Nunciature 1.9 1.9 2.2 0.0
Pontifical Academy of  
Theology
1.2 0.8 1.7 2.9
Military Ordinariate of the 
Polish Army
0.7 0.3 1.1 2.9
Fig. 5.29:  Religious institutions in comparison (%).
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to Catholicism. The element of diversity appears in the second dominant cate-
gory, which generally concerns Churches in Poland. When it comes to shaping 
the media coverage of the Church-state relationship, we go beyond the perspec-
tive of the dominant Catholic religious group. Among the remaining Christian 
denominations, the Orthodox Church (12.5 %) prevails over the Lutheran Church 
(4.7  %) and Seventh Day Adventists (1.2  %). It should be connected with the 
larger covered agency of Orthodox representatives and the coverage of apostolic 
visits to Poland of the Orthodox Patriarchs Bartholomew I and Kirill.
What characterizes Gazeta Wyborcza concerns the increased frequency 
of references to the Catholic Church at 55.8 %. As we can see in Fig. 5.31, the 
frequency of Churches in general (27.9 %) is slightly smaller than the general list 
of media. This still confirms the participation of religious diversity in narratives 
about the Church-state relationship. When we take into account that the number 
of references to Catholicism is over three times greater than all other religions 
put together, we can assume one regularity. Gazeta Wyborcza’s basic narrative 
about religion in Poland is primarily from the perspective of Catholicism.
According to Fig. 5.32, in the Rzeczpospolita daily, the perspective of Churches 
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Fig. 5.31: Religious denominations in Gazeta Wyborcza (%)
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Fig. 5.32: Religious denominations in Rzeczpospolita (%)
Covering the secular and Church-state relationship154
same time, the frequency of references to the Catholic Church drops to 49 %. This 
makes it possible to notice that the Commonwealth is based on a more diverse 
narrative. The problem of Church-state relations and understanding the secular 
state are built based on the election of Christian Churches as the people forcing 
changes. Characteristically, with a decline in the attendance of all religious groups, 
the Adventist Church (1 %) still appears in the media coverage. This shows that 
this small community performs a significant activity in the public space.
Media coverage in Wiadomości TVP1 has a very homogeneous structure. 
Fig. 5.33 indicates that in the vast majority of the analyzed research material about 
religion, as many as 91.7 % of references in the category of religious denominations 
concern the Catholic Church or the Orthodox Church. At the same time, both 
denominations receive the highest percentage of appeals in previous lists, with the 
Catholic Church at 66.7 % and the Orthodox Church at 25 %. In the remaining 
8.3 %, references generally cover all Church denominations in Poland. This state 
indicates a clearly narrow perspective of the analyzed materials. It omits the voices 
of the Churches that grew out of the Reformation. This practice is also repeated in 
the case of the followers of individual reformation denominations.
Continuing the previous idea, Fig.  5.34 shows no references to Protestant 
believers, especially Lutherans. In turn, the dominant groups are the Roman and 
Greek Catholics (58.7 %) and non-believers (27.5 %). Orthodox believers appear 
in the third place (13.8 %). The characteristics of this category group can be seen 
in the significant turnout of non-believers in the collected material. Their pres-
ence reveals the agency in favor of a secular state.
Issues concerning the conflict between religion and the state are expressed 
by non-believers or on behalf of non-believers. We are thus dealing with the 
over-representation of non-believers visible in the media in relation to their 
actual participation in the population. We perceive this practice as typical of the 
struggle for minority rights.
Based on Fig. 5.35, we see that Gazeta Wyborcza is clearly over-representing 
the frequency of non-believers (34  %). The dominant frequency of Roman 
Catholics (52.8  %) additionally suggests a certain polarization optics. 
According to the content analysis, the clash between postulates of two interest 
groups appears:  Roman Catholics and non-believers. Such an approach 
suggests viewing the contents of Gazeta Wyborcza through the prism of two 
doubts. The first concerns the shape of the proposed secular state. The second 
concerns the way of protecting the rights of non-believers to have freedom 
from religion.
Fig.  5.36 shows that Rzeczpospolita clearly avoids over-representation of 
non-believers. The frequency of their occurrence in this group (12.5 %) clearly 











Fig. 5.34: Groups of believers, non-believers (%)
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contradicts expanding the idea of a secular state. A significantly larger share of 
Catholics (66.6  %) and Orthodox (20.8  %) suggests narratives dominated by 
appeals to denominations with a large tradition of cooperation with the polit-
ical authority. Taking into account the widest availability of Rzeczpospolita for 
people within the trusted Church circles, we suggest looking at the entire mate-
rial of this newspaper concerning the agency promoting Church-state relations.
As shown in Fig. 5.37, incomplete material from Wiadomości TVP1 shows a 
balance between the views of non-believers, Roman Catholics, and the Orthodox. 
All three groups perform with the same frequency of 33.3 %. This indicates that 
in groups of categories referring to individual denominations and representa-
tives of believers and non-believers, it is Catholics, non-believers, and to some 
extent Orthodox Christians who are visible enough in media coverage to provide 
material for the general context of the analysis.
5.6  Religion becoming public
The last of the contents analysis topics concerns issues through which religion 
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Fig. 5.37: Groups of believers and non-believers in Wiadomości TVP1 (%)
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three areas. The first refers to the events where religion and politics meet. They 
mean the joint presence of religious and political actors. The second area to a 
great extent reflects the controversy surrounding the secular state and creating 
the place of religion in the legal and social system. The third of the areas refers 
to religious symbols in the public space. Due to the frequency of these three 
domains, we particularly explain the dynamics of the debate on state secularity 
and the extent of topics that the discussed idea touches upon.
Among the categories that we have included in the public visibility of religion 
(Fig. 5.38), the highest frequency refers to three issues. As much as 32.2 % of 
the material contains references to bishops’ statements on social matters. Next, 
20.9 % concentrate on clergy in the public space and 20.7 % on the Smolensk 
crash. It can be seen here that the public visibility of religion comes especially 
through the coverage of members of the Church’s hierarchy. The relatively high 
frequency of religion in school (7.4 %) and the joint celebrations of the Church 
and the state (4.9 %) are also important in the debate about the secular state. 
They show that in the category of groups referring to public visibility of religion, 
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Fig. 5.38: Public visibility of religion in general (%)
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Fig. 5.39 indicates that in the case of Gazeta Wyborcza, the frequency of the 
agency of bishops and priests is 70.4 %, which remains even higher than the gen-
eral material in this category. In addition, a lot of space is devoted to the issue 
of religion teachers and religious education in schools (9.4 %). Relatively little 
space falls on religious issues in connection with the Smolensk crash (2.8 %). It 
turns out, therefore, that for events related to the Smolensk crash, the religious 
framework does not matter.
Based on Fig.  5.40, it is noticed that in Rzeczpospolita we are dealing with 
the frequency of more topics related to religion and Church-state relations. 
The newspaper covers the visits of Bartholomew I, Patriarch of Constantinople 
to the Polish Sejm (2.4 %) and the confusion of political and religious agency 
that occurred during the would-be ingress of Archbishop Stanisław Wielgus in 
Warsaw (3.2 %). The lustration lie of Archbishop Wielgus became the basis for 
the discussion on the cooperation of the clergy with the apparatus of the com-
munist security services. However, this topic was not able to overcome the regu-
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The research material collected from Wiadomości TVP1 archives presented 
in Fig.  5.41 clearly contains an over-representation of the coverage of the 
Smolensk crash (61.5 %). The other topics from this area indicate, however, that 
the largest percentage of respondent participation was found in the common 
Church and state celebrations (11.5 %) and the activities of priests in the public 
space (10.1 %). This allows us to assume that in the case of Wiadomości TVP1, 
the media agenda rewards Church and state events that take place together. We 
can read it as the endorsed Church’s intuition, where media coverage treats the 
presence of representatives of the Catholic Church as a stable element of public 
order.
By setting this order, we now want to refer to the religious and national 
symbols that function in the public space, creating clear associations between 
what is religious and secular. According to Fig. 5.42, we particularly use the rep-
resentation of the cross in the group of symbols (81 %). In the background, the 
frequency of other symbols does not play a significant role. However, if we look 
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Wawel Royal Castle in Cracow (5.9 %), we must keep in mind the agency linking 
them. These three are based on the unbreakable entanglement of the religious 
and secular spheres.
The third perspective we have announced earlier concerns the Church-state 
relationship controversy. At this stage of the analysis, we have to simply point out 
the frequency of the appearance of particular issues in the analyzed media. Let 
us draw the reader’s attention to the fact that in the literature on the subject of 
the meeting point between the Church and the public sphere, in Poland we can 
find important issues in the media debate, among others abortion and in-vitro 
(Budnik, 2016; Desperak, 2003; Laska-Formejster, 2013).
As we can see from the data in Fig.  5.43, references to controversies con-
cern three issues: permitting abortion (32.1 %), the Catholic Church’s finances 
(25.5  %), and the specific issue of the state financing the Church (23.1  %). 
Poland has the most restrictive anti-abortion laws in Europe. A  large number 
of references to the subject of abortion mainly result from the vitality of this 
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Fig. 5.43: Controversies in general (%)
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subjects on in-vitro and abortion appear with a 5.2  % frequency. Thus, these 
occur much less frequently than the burning issues of the Church’s finances and 
state co-financing. The main results, therefore, lead us to assume that the per-
spective of abortion itself and the state financing the Church remains an impor-
tant place for negotiating the type of secular state in Poland.
In the case of Gazeta Wyborcza, the distribution of references to contro-
versies basically seems similar to the general results of the analysis. However, 
after a closer look, we can notice a difference. Fig.  5.44 points to Gazeta 
Wyborcza as having the highest number of references to abortion among the 
studied media (43.2 %). As a result, looking at the controversial issues, we 
can see two basic clusters of topics. The first concerns the management of 
life and quality of life, with the problems of abortion and in-vitro taking up 
49.5  %. The second involves the Catholic Church’s property and finances, 
taking up 43.2 %. Thus, Gazeta Wyborcza focuses on moral and economic 
controversies.
Fig. 5.45 shows that the Rzeczpospolita daily contains the most references to 
finances and Church property (60.8 %). Moral issues occupy the next positions 
with the following frequency: abortion at 21.7 %, in-vitro at 4.3 %, and moral 
support for free Tibet at 3.3 %. This newspaper puts emphasis on the Church 





















Fig. 5.44: Controversies in Gazeta Wyborcza (%)
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Materials from Wiadomości TVP1 allow us to basically see three controver-
sial areas from the perspective of Church-state relations. Fig. 5.46 points to the 
dominance of the concerns about the Catholic Church’s finances and the state 
helping finance the Church. Such a high frequency of 88.9 % confirms that we 
cannot remain indifferent to the question of the material situation of owning a 
Church and to what extent the state helps in the Church building’s expansion. 
Besides, the wide presence of categories joining religion, politics, and economics 
indicates the interconnection between the Church and the political sphere. This 
opens the field for analyzing to what extent the previously presented endorsed 
Church model is in comparison to the declaration of an impartial worldview by 
the state.
When it comes to summarizing this part of the book, we face the question 
of what can we learn from this contents analysis? We will answer this question 
on two levels. The first concerns the usefulness of this method in a project such 
as mine. When we think about contents analysis, we see its results as a set of 
data on the frequency and tone of the analyzed media materials. In this study, 
we omitted the assumption that contents frequency are an important reference 
in the grounded theory process. The results of such a narrow contents analysis 
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the subsequent qualitative analysis. The second level boils down to describing 
the patterns emerging from the contents analysis. They appeared in each of the 
paragraphs of this chapter. We will recapitulate a few that explain the further part 
of the analysis in a more general way.
First of all, the basis for building the theory on the development of the 
idea of a secular state concerns the agency of political and religious actors. 
The activity of political and religious individuals and institutions leads to 
the second conclusion. Over the years, there has been a transition from cov-
erage of individuals to coverage of institutions. This prompted us to concen-
trate heavily on individuals from the beginning of the analysis, a time when 
the political foundations of Church-state relations are being built and the 
institutions are being stressed. Third, wanting to know how the idea of the 
secular state develops and what the dynamics of the Church-state relation-
ship consist in, we look at the collected material as a media representation 
where each of the parties builds its autonomy. Fourth, we take into account 
that postulates about the secular state sound like in the context of the contro-
versy surrounding the activity of the Churches in two fundamentally distant 
domains:  finance and moral order. Fifth, we take into account the current 
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6  On the way to the secular state
Everything that has been presented to the reader about this research on media 
so far comes down to the frequency of the set categories. We will now refer to 
the grounded theory and “go beyond previously established categories” (Tucker-
McLaughlin & Campbell, 2012: 7) to take an in-depth look at media contents in 
order to give it meaning. The analysis allows us to more dynamically view the 
process of the mediatization of a secular state.
6.1  The secular state and Church-state 
relationship: A qualitative overview
When we take a look at the Church-state relationship in media coverage, 
frequency itself does not reflect its complexity. It is worth supporting the ear-
lier quantitative content analysis with qualitative data from the media content, 
supplemented with the analysis of denominational law and electoral documents 
of various political parties.
We also used the Atlas.ti software in this part of the media analysis, starting 
with pre-coding the results of 214 codes and 268 notes supplementing the codes. 
Then, in the course of concentrated and selective coding, we worked through 
the initial codes. From material integrated with the results of quantitative media 
analysis, legal documents, and electoral programs, we selected some conceptual 
themes, meaning ten axial categories, to which we attributed a primary role in 
the process under investigation. They need a brief description.
(I)  Actions regarding the concordat. The basic place of revealing the representa-
tion of the secular state and the Church-state relationship is a long-standing 
debate concerning the concordat. From the beginning of the country’s polit-
ical changes, the idea of normalizing relations with the Vatican appeared. 
Over time, it took on the form of a debate about the shape of a common 
treaty, and later the consequences of its renegotiation or possible termination. 
The research material includes eight clusters that organize this category.
When we look at the matter from the procedural perspective, the first five 
clusters are revealed: (1) works on the treaty, (2) signing the treaty, (3) disputes 
over ratification and the ratification, (4) examining the treaty’s constitutionality, 
proposals for its renegotiation or termination, and (5) observing the treaty. The 
contents of these clusters indicate that the concordat became the litmus test 
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of the Church-state relationship. First of all, the dynamics of its creation, rat-
ification, and functioning boil down to multi-stage and strategic negotiations 
between political and religious actors. Second, the concordat and related denom-
inational laws determine the privileged position of Catholicism in Poland as the 
endorsed Church and limit the state’s ability to decide about the religious life 
of its citizens. Third, the chance to break with the contract or fear of breaking 
it becomes essential arguments for each of the parties. This is illustrated by the 
following example (“SLD chce przeanalizować konkordat [The SLD Wants to 
Reanalyze the Concordat],” 2008: 1):
“SLD wants to check whether the concordat records were broken and lead to their strict 
adherence. According to SLD politicians, this is necessary, because 10 years have passed 
since Poland ratified the concordat.”
When we look at this issue from the symbolic side, three more clusters ap-
pear: (6) the meaning of the concordat for the Catholic Church and the state, 
(7) the meaning of the concordat for other religions, and (8) public support for 
this treaty. It turns out that the agreement between the Church and the state 
is connected with an extensive system of meanings revealed by political and 
religious actors. The concordat functions in social discourse in a bipolar way. 
For some, it proves the Church’s independence from the arbitrary shaping of 
religious law by the state. It authenticates the changes that have taken place in 
the country since its transformation. It also provides social stability. For others, 
the concordat means permitting a religious state. Two examples illustrate these 
positions:
“ ‘The Holy See has been in existence for two millennia and the Polish State for one mil-
lennium, and they are again associated in this old and tried legal form of a concordat. 
We bind what has been broken. But first and foremost, this paves the way we will take’ 
said Minister [Krzysztof] Skubiszewski yesterday just after the signing of the concordat” 
(“Mamy konkordat [We Have a Concordat],” 1993: 3).
“From the beginning, the concordat aroused great controversies. ‘The lack of ratifica-
tion of the concordat put into question the credibility of our country,’ said Minister 
Olechowski in June. The opponents of the quick ratification of the concordat, however, 
consider that it is the first step towards a denominational state. They do not want to 
strengthen the position of the Church in Poland.” (“Nie czekać z konkordatem [Do not 
Delay the Concordat],” 1994: 1).
In the background of the dispute over the concordat, there is the issue of its 
importance for non-Catholic denominations. For them, the treaty functions as 
a specific point of reference. The concordat provides them with an argument for 
the equal rights of religion, and since the Catholic Church has certain rights, 
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other Churches advocate granting them these same rights. What is more, its 
provisions contain solutions that later reproduce further acts on the relationship 
between the Polish nation and specific Churches and religious associations.
(II)  Religious and state events. The basic element that functions in media messages, 
but is missing in the supplementary material, concerns events involving reli-
gious and political actors. A joint event carries a significant symbolic charge. 
There are many factors that determine the association in the Church-state 
relationship:  which party dominates, where the event takes place, whose 
agency reveals this event, and what kind of agency it has. A joint political 
and religious event belongs to the significant components of this theory.
There are seven clusters in the media that organize this category. Speaking of 
religious actors, we see three clusters here:  (1) spiritual leaders in the parlia-
ment, (2)  spiritual leaders for the president, and (3) clergymen in the secular 
public space. There are several regularities in this group. First, spiritual leaders 
operate efficiently in a secular or important political environment. Figures such 
as Pope John Paul II, Orthodox Patriarchs Bartholomew I, and Kirill I, or the 
Dalai Lama, the spiritual and political leader of the Tibetans, visit presidents and 
appear before particular chambers of the Polish parliament. This is part of the 
regular practices of Polish authorities, consisting of hosting world leaders and 
making the parliamentary tribune available to them.
In the case of clergy in the public space, meanwhile, it is about realizing their 
civic right to freedom of expression rather than speaking on behalf of their reli-
gious institutions. The problem concerns the attitude of their Churches or polit-
ical actors towards the public activities of these clergymen. This is well illustrated 
by the example of Fr. Tadeusz Rydzyk from Radio Maryja:
“The government – we read in the communiqué of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs – 
‘decided to protest against this harmful image of Poland’s statements.’ Poland asked the 
Holy See ‘to undertake actions leading to the cessation of frustrations by Father Tadeusz 
Rydzyk, affecting the good name of Poland and harming the Church in Poland.’ The 
head of Poland’s diplomacy, Radosław Sikorski, also talked about this with the Primate 
of Poland, Archbishop Józef Kowalczyk, and the apostolic nuncio in Poland, Archbishop 
Celestino Migliore” (Szacki, 2011: 4).
Two clusters emerge from the perspectives of political actors:  (4) politicians 
at the audience in the Vatican and (5)  politicians participating in religious 
celebrations. The first of the clusters presents the efforts of politicians to obtain 
an audience with John Paul II. In the nineties, this was problematic for the left-
wing politicians, particularly including President Aleksander Kwaśniewski. The 
situation improved after the ratification of the concordat. When it comes to 
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politicians participating in religious rituals, this especially concerns their partic-
ipation in the mass. The physical presence of a political representative at mass is 
their symbolic recognition of the Church’s social significance.
The third group is clustered referring to (6) religious and political events and 
(7) occasional discussions and meetings of representatives of the religious and 
political parties. The dynamics of this group indicates a balance between the 
parties. Especially after the Smolensk crash in 2010, there was a smooth transi-
tion towards friendly cooperation. The reason for this state may be the extraor-
dinary circumstances of this event.
(III)  The Church participating in the process of creating law. This category reveals 
the key areas in which the Catholic Church exerts indirect and direct influ-
ence on the law-making process. It includes three clusters that concern the 
Church’s involvement (1) in the constitutional process, (2) in the creation 
of ordinary statutes and administrative reform, and (3) in enforcing prac-
tical solutions in the field of moral-social issues (family, sexual education, 
in-vitro). Another cluster (4)  concerns the agency of political actors. It 
points out that, for fear of the Church, some political actors refrain from 
specific decisions regarding the liberalization of abortion.
(IV)  Ties regarding the finance and property of Churches. Religious institutions can 
count on numerous conveniences in Poland. Their legal status also allows 
them to function as a separate type of company, so-called legal Church 
person. In addition, their activities in various areas are co-financed by the 
state. In this category, it is clearly evident that such a state gives grounds for 
public debate about the position and privileging of Churches and unions, 
especially for the Catholic Church.
Within this category, there are three clusters related to the discussion about the 
finances and property of religious institutions. The first two concern all Churches 
and emphasize (1) that the state repay for Church property looted during com-
munism, and (2)  proposes changes in the co-financing of Churches from the 
state budget. Their contents show the clear actions of particular religions in order 
to regain the stolen property. They also concern lobbying by Churches to rec-
ognize some of their activities as public activities, for example running health 
centers.
These clusters also include discourses around the liquidating the Church fund, 
the elimination of concessions for religious associations, and the taxation of cler-
ical activities. The third cluster points out the generosity of the state towards the 
Catholic Church and the lack of transparency of these subsidies. Clear rewards 
for the initiatives of the Church are revealed here. The sphere of the endorsed 
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Church, therefore, takes the form of financial support for selected activities by 
the Church, especially charitable and educational works.
(V)  Religion in school. Essentially, two clusters function in this category: the status 
of religion as a school subject and the nature of school education. They point 
to the tension resulting from the introduction of religion to schools and the 
slow change in status as an optional subject requiring extra hours. It is within 
this category that the question about the secular nature of the school system 
arises. On the one hand, the bishops express their opposition to the atheist 
school. On the other hand, some politicians articulate their statements to the 
media and party programs and demand to withdraw religion from schools 
or provide a choice between religion and ethics. This is illustrated by the fol-
lowing example (“Hall: Etyka w szkołach od 1 września 2009 [Hall: Ethics in 
Schools as of September 1, 2009],” 2007: 4):
“Minister Hall reminded us that participation in religion classes is the free choice of chil-
dren and their parents. She also announced that as of September 1, 2009, the Ministry 
of Education will try to give students in all schools the practical opportunity to attend 
ethics. ‘I think it should be a student’s right,’ she said.”
(VI)  Religious symbols in public space and social awareness. The complexity of 
the secular state in the Polish context is revealed in the category devoted to 
religious symbols in public space. Three clusters build its foundations. The 
cluster (1) devoted to the self-agency of the cross dominates. Politicians 
and citizens give the cross a clear agency. The Catholic side uses it to 
emphasize that the country functions as a Catholic society. Thus, the cross 
is not only a religious symbol but also a symbol of the political domination 
of Christianity. On the other side of the barricade are political actors for 
whom the exemplary cross in the plenary hall of the Sejm confirms the 
unjustified entry of religion into the public sphere. They define the public 
space as a non-religious space.
Another cluster (2) points to giving Catholicism and the Catholic Church the 
status of a national symbol. This is especially so in the speeches of leading 
politicians, who show respect and attention to this Church as the foundation 
of Polish identity. Politicians of various options, not only right-wing, apply the 
strategy of accenting the nation’s Catholic tradition. Catholicism itself limits the 
space of discussion about the secular state.
The last of the clusters (3) concerns declarations and postulates regarding var-
ious religious symbols. It illustrates the agency of political actors regarding the 
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presence of these symbols in the public sphere. It shows the instrumental attitude 
of political parties, for example, to denominational invocation in the constitu-
tion or the postulate of the enthronement of Christ as the King of Poland.
(VII)  Negotiating the Church’s position in the state. The postulates regarding the 
secular state and a specific form of Church-state relations simply reflect 
the long-term process of negotiations between the political authority and 
religions, in particular negotiations on the position of the Catholic Church. 
It essentially consists of four large thematic clusters: (1) postulates on the 
model of Church-state relations, (2)  characteristics of the relationship 
between the Catholic Church and the state, (3) discussion on the rights of 
non-believers, and (4) discussion on the inequality of religions.
In this category, we leave the discussion on the shape of the Church-state rela-
tionship. Further years show the development of the model of the state’s impar-
tiality towards Churches. The dynamics of negotiations go from the postulates 
on neutrality to impartiality. At the same time, the analysis proves that in the 
media and programs of political parties, the secular state is identified with the 
separation model. To a great extent, this is due to the context in which the state 
made efforts to develop a common path along with the Catholic Church. By the 
same token, the Church has gained a number of actual and symbolic privileges. 
Over time, they became problematic from the position of the question about the 
deepening religious diversity of society.
This is why diversity reveals two other strong threads: other denominations 
and non-believers. Media messages indicate doubts about the equality of 
denominations. They reveal the privileges of the Catholic Church at the expense 
of other denominations. The dynamics of media coverage on atheists is even 
more specific. First, the researched titles point to the growing presence of atheists 
in society. Next, in Gazeta Wyborcza, atheists are presented as victims of the 
system that rewards the dominant Catholicism. Postulates are made to protect 
them and fight against their discrimination.
(VIII)  Criticism of the Church’s agency. Another category concerns public criticism of 
the activities of the Catholic Church. Two variants of this criticism appear: (1) 
attacks and disapproval on the part of the public, especially politicians not 
related to the authorities, and (2)  attacks by the state. The first concerns 
increasing media coverage of anticlerical voices over time. However, this is 
not a constructive critique, but depreciation of the Church’s public action.
The matter turns out to be more complex in the case of state attacks against the 
Church. The leftist governments in the early nineties revealed clear antagonism 
The secular state and Church-state relationship: A qualitative overview 173
towards the Catholic Church and its governmental rulings related to the “man-
agement of Catholic society.” This did not translate directly onto the regulations 
in force at that time, but to suspending work on the concordat. In addition, 
media coverage proves that the Church responds to this strategy by publicly 
dramatizing its situation. On the other hand, the left uses rationalization tac-
tics. Two examples of this are given below (“Ostre słowa Kościoła [The Church’s 
Strong Words],” 1994: 2):
“Pope John Paul II called it ‘rejecting your best friend’s hand’ when the Sejm postponed 
the ratification of the Concordat by the Primate of Poland, Cardinal Józef Glemp. Bishop 
Alojzy Orszulik of Łowicz states that this is a ‘frontal attack on the Church.’ ”
“Szmajdzinski writes:  ‘Bishop Tadeusz Pieronek accuses supporters of the resolution 
adopted by the Sejm of low-motivation and undemocratic behavior. He practices clear 
political agitation by revealing the great difficulty of the Catholic Church in democratic 
Poland, which consists in the lack of ability to treat the will of voters with peace and 
respect.’ ”
(IX)  The Church’s agency. The Church’s tactics based on playing the role of the 
victim should be supplemented with the significant category of the Church’s 
agency. It is evident how inconclusive the position of the Catholic Church 
turns out to be. This category is essentially formed by clusters such as (1) the 
agency of minority Churches, (2) the agency of the Catholic Church regarding 
the moral sphere, (3) the Catholic Church interfering in the field of politics, 
and (4) antagonism of the Catholic Church towards political authorities.
In the case of the first cluster, we see that not only the Catholic Church plays an 
active role in the environment of the process of denominational law. Minority 
Churches are also negotiating their social position. Depending on the case, 
they postulate being treated on equal terms with the Catholic Church, or at 
least be distinguished because of their minority character. Such an agency 
always appears as a consequence of the postulates of new religious rights. In the 
case of the Catholic Church, the situation differs. The Church itself articulates 
its unambiguous position on social issues, especially moral ones. It uses rad-
ical comparisons. The prohibition on abortion illustrates this example (“Życie 
zagrożone bardziej niż w totalitaryzmie [Life is More Threatened Now than 
During Totalitarianism],” 1996):
“A ‘national drama’ and ‘a greater threat to human life than legal regulations from the 
period of the totalitarian state,’ said the bishops assembled at their plenary meeting in 
Rzeszów to amend the law on protecting life, which allows, among others, a so-called 
abortion for social reasons. In their statements, the hierarchs postulate that the new law 
should basically refer to God and protect life.”
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Finally, the Catholic Church shows political agency. It supports and depreciates 
parties and politicians, cooperating with the “Solidarity” trade union. Its various 
agencies, such as Radio Maryja, clearly interfere in current political activity. In 
this category, we should look at the Catholic Church as a clear player on the 
political scene.
(X)  The agency of the state and political actors. The last of the analyzed catego-
ries answers the issue of the Church’s agency. It points out that in the area of 
relations with religions, the state and politicians refer primarily to matters 
related to the Catholic Church. The next four major clusters refer to: (1) state 
interventions in the affairs of the Catholic Church, (2) the place of the state 
and politicians in relations with the Catholic Church, (3) showing a nega-
tive attitude towards the Catholic Church, and (4) exclusive/anti-exclusive 
discourses.
There are also a few moments of state involvement in the internal life of the 
Church. As the crisis connected with the vetting of Archbishop Stanisław 
Wielgus – a candidate for the post of Metropolitan of Warsaw – shows, the state 
can use its constitutional right to an impartial intervention against the Church. 
It was then that President Lech Kaczyński intervened in the Vatican to remove 
a bishop accused of collaborating with the communist security services. At 
the same time, it acts in situations of explicit violation of symbolic interests of 
the state.
In this category, we also learn about the process of negotiating the state’s 
position towards the Catholic Church and justifying the public position on this 
matter. This refers to the situation of the counter-rule of left-wing governments 
towards the Catholic Church and the explanation that the secular state is not 
identical with atheism. The Church often responds with accusations of their 
so-called bad agency, namely discrimination against Catholics, allergy towards 
Catholicism, or treating Church representatives as politicians.
6.2  The incoherent debate over the secular state
The ten categories presented above function based on a certain dynamics for 
modeling the Church-state relationship. Going deeper into the process of these 
dynamics, let’s now refer to part of Art. 34. established in 1936 and the binding – 
until now minor – amendments to the law on the relationship between the State 
and the Muslim Religious Association in the Republic of Poland:
“During the service every Friday and on the day of solemn feasts, Muslim imams will say 
prayers for the prosperity of the Republic and its President, and during public holidays 
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they will celebrate a solemn devotion for the intentions of the Republic, its President, 
Government and Army” (Act on April 21, 1936 On the State relations to the Muslim 
Religious Association in the Republic of Poland, 1936, Art. 34).
This peculiar fragment illustrates the basis of our theory of the development 
of the studied representation of the secular state. It leads to the intuition about 
the inconsistency of the state of social awareness, political declarations, and the 
actual legal status.
In 1989, in one of the first laws regarding religious matters, a statement 
appeared that “the Republic of Poland is a secular state, neutral in matters of reli-
gion and beliefs” (Act on May 17, 1989 On Guaranteeing Freedom of Conscience 
and Confession, 1989, Art. 10.1). In later legislation, this wording clearly mutated 
towards an impartial state and a specific form of the endorsed Church model. 
Therefore, after the legislative process of 1989–2015, the statement that we are 
dealing with a secular state should be treated as insufficient or even as a truism. 
The complexity of this matter requires a clarification about the way this secularity 
is revealed. Analyzing this phenomenon in the research material, we see that it 
is built on three separate but to varying degrees corresponding processes of the 
evolution of the law, postulates of political parties, and media representation.
The first of the processes refers to a specific change in the sense of secularity. 
The record from the mentioned law was modified over time by successive laws, 
more favorable to religion. We are moving from a formula about a secular state 
that remains neutral towards religions and religious associations to a state that 
promotes Catholicism in a symbolic way. At the same time, the state maintains a 
general impartiality in its actions towards all religions, but it is not neutral.
The second of the processes indicates a change in understanding Church-state 
relations in the media and the dominating model in media messages. Before 
the Constitution of 1997 and the concordat come into force, the basis of media 
representation was determined by discussions on the right formula for the coex-
istence of religion and the state. Disputes concern whether Poland is to be based 
on laïcité, secularism, neutrality, or impartiality. As a result, this impartiality 
becomes the obligatory note. Nonetheless, over time, the media mainly focuses 
on discussions of the model of secularity as causing division.
The third process, parallel to the media trends but not always consistent 
with them, reveals two successive stages. Before the Constitution and concordat 
entered into force, the matter concerned wide interest in religious issues in the 
declarations and election programs of some political parties. With the com-
mencement of the validity of both acts, a stronger articulation of the postulate to 
separate the Church and the state and the revision of the existing arrangements 
began among the left.
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When we focus on the first of these processes, we return to the entry on 
freedom of conscience and religion on May 17, 1989, which defines Poland as 
a secular state, neutral in matters of religion and beliefs. This shows that even 
before the elections to the Contract Sejm (June 4, 1989), the Polish People’s 
Republic accepted a neutral attitude toward religion, pointing to its secularity 
and religious neutrality. As we remember from the first chapter, separation and 
neutrality rely on the state’s distance towards particular religions and worldviews. 
It is not gradable, meaning that it practically functions or it simply does not exist.
This property, over time, is perpetuated as a certainty in social imagination. 
However, this seems wrong. The decisions of this law turned out to be excep-
tionally vivid for later norms, which first remove the radical separation and 
neutrality, and later make it even more difficult to think about secularity. The 
term “separation” appears in Art. 9 § 2.1 of the Act of May 17, 1989. It denotes a 
separation of the Churches and religious associations from the state. However, 
this separation remains inconsistent in reducing Churches to private initiatives. 
Art. 19 § 3 of the Act entitles Churches to conduct public worship.
The record of the possibility of celebrating public worship also appeared in 
another law (Act on May 17, 1989 on the State Relations to the Catholic Church 
in the Republic of Poland, 1989). Art. 15 § 2.2 of this Act refers to the possi-
bility of conducting religious celebrations on roads, public squares and in public 
buildings after obtaining agreement from the relevant governing body of the 
place of celebration. The same applies to laws regarding other Churches and reli-
gious communities. The positive attitude of the state towards religious worship 
in public space is also confirmed later on by the Law on Assemblies on July 5, 
1990, where the legislator states in Art. 4 point 2 that the provisions regarding 
assemblies do not apply to the Catholic Church and other religious associations. 
As we can see, at the beginning of the post-communist system, legal provisions 
preclude the possibility of laïcité.
The state also gives a hand to other religions in terms of non-working days 
granted to their followers. In statutes on the relationship between the state and 
individual Churches and religious associations, catalogs of non-working days 
for the followers of particular religions appear (Act of February 20, 1997 On the 
State relations to the Mariavite Catholic Church in the Republic of Poland, 1997, 
Art. 9; Act on May 13, 1994 On the State relations to the Evangelical-Augsburg 
Church in the Republic of Poland, 1994, Art. 14; Act on February 20, 1997 On 
the State relations to Jewish Communities in the Republic of Poland, 1997, 
Art. 11; Act on April 21, 1936 On the State relations to the Karaim Religious 
Association of the Republic of Poland, 1936, Art. 27.2; Act on April 21, 1936 
On the State relations to the Muslim Religious Association in the Republic of 
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Poland, 1936, Art. 34.2; Act on February 20, 1997 On the State relations to the 
Pentecostal Church in the Republic of Poland, 1997, Art. 12; Act on February 
20, 1997 On the State relations with the Mariavite Old-Catholic Church in the 
Republic of Poland, 1997, Art. 9; Act on July 4, 1991 on the State’s Relations 
with the Polish Autocephalous Orthodox Church, 1991, Art. 14; Act on June 30, 
1995 On the State relations with the Baptist Church in the Republic of Poland, 
1995, Art. 11; Act on June 30, 1995 On the State relations with the Evangelical-
Methodist Church in the Republic of Poland, 1995, Art.  12; Act on June 30, 
1995 On the State relations with the Seventh Day Adventist Church in the 
Republic of Poland, 1995, Art. 11; Act on May 17, 1989 on the State Relations 
to the Catholic Church in the Republic of Poland, 1989, Art. 17). This accom-
modation of religion within the legal system also indicates the positive attitude 
of the state toward religion. It also shows that what is religious is not treated as 
foreign to whatever is public.
A state characterized in this way does not fit into several points in the model 
of the ideal secular state discussed by Małajny in the first chapter. Małajny 
notices (1) the distinct separation of the state apparatus from the Church appa-
ratus in Poland. However, religious institutions do not function as (2) private 
associations. The concordat and analogous laws with Churches and religious 
associations establish a legal Church entity, a type of legal person reserved for 
religious institutions. Of course, the state does not care what religion its citizens 
adhere to. However, when they confess a certain faith, the state also secures their 
right to religious practices in the public sphere.
Art. 53 of the Constitution and the international conventions in force in Poland 
guarantee citizens (3) the freedom of conscience and religion. The accommoda-
tion of the context of cooperating with religion results in regulating the position 
of particular denominations by registering in the proper court. Religions with 
a regulated status have the right to their own catechesis classes in school. More 
importantly, violation of the freedom of conscience and religion of other people 
limits this law.
(4) Laïcité, or the last element of the secular state mentioned by Małajny, does 
not function in Poland. Along with the development of denominational law, the 
transition from neutrality to impartiality takes place. The Constitution clearly 
leaves the gate open to state interference in matters related to religion and world-
view, but this must be an impartial intervention:
“Public authorities in the Republic of Poland shall be impartial in matters of personal 
conviction, whether religious or philosophical, or in relation to outlooks on life, and 
shall ensure their freedom of expression within public life” (“The Constitution of the 
Republic of Poland,” 1997, Art. 25 § 2).
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In the next paragraph of the Art.  25  §  3 of the Constitution appears a refer-
ence to respect for the autonomy and independence of the Church and the state. 
However, this indicates that such interference is extraordinary. We can see, 
therefore, that Małajny’s model does not correspond to the legal regulations in 
force in the country.
Of course, the provision on impartiality does not exclude intervention in 
the life of a religion. However, there is no detailed regulation about such inter-
vention. In turn, political practice indicates a few moments of tension in which 
the state interferes in the life of the Catholic Church. The specificity of this 
mechanism will be presented in the next part referring to the contents of the 
media. Meanwhile, we now move away from legal documents to political party 
documents.
A party’s approach to the model of Church-state relations is based on elec-
toral programs in three characteristics. First of all, a clear part of political parties 
and formations seeking seats in the parliament does not refer to the issue of 
secularism and the denominations in Poland. Their postulates boil down to eco-
nomic issues and the way of shaping democracy. Second, from the perspective 
of time, it can be seen that the leftist parties consistently maintain postulates for 
the separation of state and religion. The basics of this identification, however, 
changes over time. Third, problems in the area of secularity and denominations 
are revealed in electoral programs, especially in the years of shaping the consti-
tutional order. After the adoption of the constitution and the ratification of the 
concordat, they are disappearing from the perspective of the leading slogans of 
the right and the center.
In justifying the petrification of the postulates of the secular state in the 
leftist documents, let’s turn to the parliamentary elections of 1991 and 1993. The 
National Electoral Committee of the SLD, composed of the SdRP, PPS, trade 
unions, and several associations, supports the secular state and neutral world-
view based on separation (Słodkowska, 2001b). The SLD maintained its course 
on the secular and neutral state in the 1997 election. In the program of another 
leftist party, the UP, there appears an element closer to the formula laïcité:
“The Polish state should preserve its secular character, but not avoid cooperation with 
Churches. The religious mission of Churches cannot be supported by means of coercion 
from state institutions” (Słodkowska & Dołbakowska, 2004: 27).
The postulate of preserving the secular nature of Poland does not fit the law 
from 1997. There is no mention of secularity. At this point, however, we can 
see a trace of the later radicalization of the leftist postulates. The 2001 elections 
already showed that the SLD and UP continued to sustain their efforts in favor of 
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a secular state. In addition, these parties attached to this postulate the themes of 
the right to conscious motherhood, which seek the liberalization of anti-abortion 
laws (Słodkowska, 2002). The significant agency of the Catholic Church in the 
protection of life, manifesting itself in pressuring politicians, means that from 
now on, conscious motherhood should be treated as belonging to the topics of 
secularity and denominationalism. This approach also confirms the clear pres-
ence at the initial stage of coding of a large number of materials in which abor-
tion and the concordat are connected.
During the elections in 2003 and 2005, the SLD’s postulates consistently 
returned to the idea of a secular state characterized by worldview neutrality. 
In addition to the postulates related to the right to conscious motherhood, a 
new postulate appeared in the program, which assumed “equal property and tax 
rights for partnerships” (Słodkowska & Dołbakowska, 2006a: 153). However, the 
SDPL was in favor of liberating anti-abortion laws (Słodkowska & Dołbakowska, 
2006c). The accelerated elections of 2007 confirmed the strong tendencies of 
leftist parties to support the idea of a secular state. Meanwhile, LiD (consisting of 
SLD, UP, SDPL, PD) upheld the postulate of the secular state and the separation 
of the apparatus of political power from institutional religions.
During these elections, this repeated postulate became the identifying mark of 
the ideology of the Polish leftists. However, in the 2011 elections, it appeared as 
the basic element identifying the SLD on the political scene. Yet, a fundamental 
change appeared in the party’s discourse. The SLD invoked the constitutional 
principle of impartiality instead of the old postulate of neutrality. At the same 
time, the demands put forward by the party headed towards a radical separation, 
meaning the liquidation of traces of religious symbolism in national symbols, a 
reduction in the number of chaplains, etc. (Słodkowska & Dołbakowska, 2013a).
In addition to the role the SLD played, the 2011 elections were largely devoted 
to Church-state relations thanks to the radical postulates created by the Palikot 
Movement. This new liberal-leftist group’s program assumes the implemen-
tation of a secular state in its electoral program. The party also makes a spe-
cific diagnosis of the then state of the Church-state relationship (Słodkowska & 
Dołbakowska, 2013b, pp. 333–334):
“The [Palikot] Support Movement is not hostile towards the Church; it does not fight 
against it, nor even fight against religion, faith and people of faith. However, in our 
opinion, in the relations between the state and the Church in Poland, there is an incom-
prehensible and radical privilege of the Church at the expense of the secularity of the 
state. This applies to the many ways of financing the Church, incompatible with the con-
stitution, religion lessons in schools, the renovations of temples, but also the everyday 
functioning of the state and life of the country, where almost everything is related with 
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the Church. This is because the Polish state after 1989 did not attempt to create secular 
forms of functioning in the most important institutions. Both political elections, the 
swearing in of political authorities, the transfer of power after the elections, the funeral 
ceremonies, and the usual small investments such as in ‘Orlik’ buildings are appropri-
ated by religious symbolism.”
What can be seen in this passage refers to the discourse that the Palikot 
Movement founded in the space of political communication. This cannot be 
treated as a general formula in the form of “we are striving for a secular state.” 
In turn, the Palikot Movement pointed to areas in which the Church-state re-
lations departed from the idea of separation and impartiality. For the develop-
ment of the idea of a secular state, this means a milestone in the new narrative. 
Henceforth, speaking about the merger of the Church and the state was based 
on an argument that included cases of violating the principles of constitutional 
impartiality and neutrality.
The Palikot Movement also created the idea of performing secular equivalents 
of religious rituals. It was to be a new form that will replace the existing Roman 
Catholicism and function as a civil religion. In this way, the secular state begins 
to live not only in terms of preventing the role of the Church as dominating 
the public sphere. The secular state becomes a postulate for a new quality of 
public life.
Let’s contrast this view of the secular state with Grzymała-Busse’s (2015) 
previous views on the fusion of religion and the nation. By looking at her 
observations, we see that the Palikot Movement’s proposal seems utopian. It 
assumes that the historical relations between the nation and Catholicism can be 
overcome in Poland by establishing substitute rituals. The Palikot Movement is 
probably thinking about a format of civic religion typical of the United States.
In the 2015 elections, when the SLD presented its electoral postulates, it placed 
the issue of a secular state in a clear counter position to the Church. The SLD 
program no longer postulated preserving state impartiality towards religion, but 
the secular state was to be based on separation. In the party’s program appears a 
quote from the Act that guarantees freedom of conscience and religion from 1989, 
which indicates secularity. As we can see, this trace of the change in discourse 
made earlier by the Palikot Movement is reflected in the SLD program. The party 
postulates solutions thanks to which “Poles should on a daily basis feel that the 
Republic of Poland is a secular state” (“Program Wyborczy Zjednoczona Lewica 
SLD, TR, PPS, UP, Zieloni [Electoral Programs of the United Left, SLD, TR, PPS, 
UP, and Greens],” 2015: 33). At the same time, the SLD in a negative way defines 
the areas of struggle against the Church’s domination. This can be illustrated by 
the phrases from the SLD’s program such as the struggle for schools being free of 
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“religious indoctrination” or the postulate of reliable knowledge about sex edu-
cation and not “religious prejudices” (“Program Wyborczy Zjednoczona Lewica 
SLD, TR, PPS, UP, Zieloni [Electoral Programs of the United Left, SLD, TR, PPS, 
UP, and Greens],” 2015, pp. 8, 10).
Not only does the left wing undertake postulates regarding the Church-state 
relations in the analyzed period, but the question of denomination appears also 
in the right and in the center, especially in the first years of transformation. 
After the adoption of the constitution and the ratification of the concordat, reli-
gious issues disappear from their leading slogans. In order to illustrate this topic 
better, let’s go back to the first elections after 1989. The Polish Catholic-Social 
Association proposed following the instructions of the Episcopate (Słodkowska, 
1995). Such radical ideas of the lack of separation did not take place in the case 
of other election committees. Instead, the parties tend to work together and 
cooperate.
In the 1991 elections, both the Catholic Election Action (Wyborcza Akcja 
Katolicka – WAK) and the Civic Center Agreement (Porozumienie Obywatelskie 
Centrum), composed, inter alia, of the Kaczyński brothers PC, postulated the 
autonomy and cooperation of the Church and the state (Słodkowska, 2001a, 
2001c). A much more diverse approach appeared in the program of the PChD. 
It postulated having reservations as to accommodating religion in public life. 
The PChD is opposed to the privileged role of the Church in Poland, but 
wants to cooperate with two autonomous institutions of religion and the state 
(Słodkowska & Dołbakowska, 2001). A similar position to PChD is held by the 
UD. It professes Christian values and at the same time postulates the indepen-
dence of cooperation between the Church and the state (Słodkowska, 2001d).
In the 1993 elections, the KPN mentioned that autonomy and cooperation 
should characterize Church-state relations. Individual right-wing parties as part 
of the “Fatherland” postulated so in the context of the concordat in the form of 
autonomy, cooperation, and independence. The ZChN assumes the implemen-
tation of the autonomy of the Church and the state. The Conservative Party PK 
insists on cooperation, which is based on the autonomy of both entities. However, 
the PChD postulates all three at once: cooperation between the Church and the 
state, their autonomy concerning action, and independence.
The next elections in 1997 were characterized by the lack of reference of 
right-wing parties to shaping the relations between the Church and the state. 
The denominational theme disappeared from the demands of the right-wing 
parties. We could see their satisfaction with the situation that developed in the 
law and social practice. Traces of its presence can be seen in 2005 in the program 
of the LPR in connection with the issue of protecting life and opposing same-sex 
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unions (Słodkowska & Dołbakowska, 2006b). The last trace of the religious issue 
in the electoral programs of the right wing and the center is also the postulate of 
the PO in 2015 to revise the principles of the Church fund (“Polska przyszłość. 
Program Platformy Obywatelskiej [Poland’s Future. The Civil Platform’s 
Program],” 2015). Indirectly, the party touches upon the privileged position of 
religious associations in tax matters. This postulate, however, means a break-
through in the right-wing and center approach to forming relations with various 
Churches, particularly with the Catholic Church.
As we can see, the party’s programs in the field of the secular state and re-
lations between the Church and the state go far beyond the current state of 
legislation. The leftist parties postulate a secular state or its maintenance. Over 
the years, they also present arguments that show a clear lack of secularity. For 
the right wing, this subject disappears with the consolidation of the constitu-
tion and the ratification of the concordat. The overall picture of this puzzle is 
therefore uniquely painted. On the one hand, the state is based on impartiality 
and the model of symbolically favoring the Catholic Church. On the other 
hand, leftist parties maintain a revision of this condition on their banners. They 
want secularism in a more radical form. This sketch now serves to relate the 
media’s practices in the area of covering the secular state and the Church-state 
relationship.
The portrait of a secular state in the image of the media boils down to extreme 
dynamics. Returning to the quantitative data from Fig. 5.9, we can see that a sec-
ular state, separation, and autonomy are inferior in terms of frequency. The qual-
itative material, however, leads us to a more nuanced image, in which a dynamic 
change starting from neutrality through impartiality to secularity takes place.
Actions regarding the concordat, or the basic axial category of the introduced 
theory, cover the issues of Church-state relations. Here we work out ways to 
understand this relationship. The foundations of thinking about the shape of the 
Church-state relationship in the new post-communist Poland appear in Jacek 
Kuroń’s agency. According to Gazeta Wyborcza in the December 12, 1991 edi-
tion, this leader of the UD proposed an idea in the presence of the then President 
Lech Wałęsa and Prime Minister Bronisław Geremek, seeking to form a govern-
ment independent of the Church but based on Christian ethics (“Sojusz trzech? 
[Alliance of Three?],” 1991).
Therefore, there exists a characteristic tension between the arguments of the 
followers of the secular state and propagators of the denominational state. This 
is revealed when we ask the question of whether the Catholic foundations of 
Polish culture can be a sufficient argument for granting this religion primacy. 
In response, the idea of a secular state became popular. However, it occurs in 
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association with the legalization of abortion and the separation of the state from 
the Church.
On September 15, 1993, a report from the symposium of canonists at the 
Catholic University of Lublin appeared in the Gazeta Wyborcza, during which the 
participants discussed cooperation as proposed by Pope John Paul II (“Kościół nie 
zagraża [The Church is not a Threat],” 1993). This marked a new stage. The debate 
over the secular state, negatively set towards religion and its demands for the defense 
of life, moved for a debate on the meaning of state cooperating with the Church.
In further transmissions, the media examined the term “cooperation,” espe-
cially in the information from 1994. We learn from these that the representatives 
of the Catholic Church understand cooperation as an independent activity, as a 
good alternative for separating both institutions. The analysis of these threads 
shows that the framework for cooperation is to primarily be a concordat. The 
arguments of the opponents of this formula come down to financial matters. 
Opponents show that establishing co-operation means huge costs on the part of 
the state.
However, cooperation is not the supreme concept when it comes to media 
coverage shaping the relations of the Church and the state. We see it more as a 
starting concept that provides the basis for the debate over the secular state. First, 
cooperation is quickly built into the nation’s enforced law. This illustrates the 
preamble of the recently signed but not yet ratified concordat of July 28, 1993, 
indicating the pursuit of the Catholic Church and the Polish state for “permanent 
and harmonious regulation of mutual relations” (The Concordat between the 
Holy See and the Republic of Poland, 1993, no. 1) due to the fact that Catholicism 
remains the dominant religion of Polish society.
Second, the concordat becomes the reference point of the emerging postulates 
of the chapter. In Gazeta Wyborcza, on March 3, 1994, there appeared a general and 
non-argument accusation that the concordat gives grounds for the development 
of an ideological state (“Alergia na Kościół [Church Allegies],” 1994). However, 
the separation itself is interpreted in different ways. For example, Cardinal Józef 
Glemp understands this potential separation as dependence on the state. He 
argues that the separation of the Church and state does not automatically mean 
a separation of the state from the Church (“Biskupi o postawach Polaków [The 
Bishop on Poles’ Attitudes],” 1995). Aleksander Kwaśniewski, the then SLD pres-
idential candidate, who saw the separation in modern terms, including liberal-
izing abortion laws and renegotiating the concordat (Nowakowska, 1995), had a 
different position.
At the same time, concern over the separation brings the postulate of 
Catholic and Orthodox Church experts to talk about the mutual autonomy and 
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independence of Churches and the state. Discussions on such a concept soften 
the idea of separation that bombards the Catholic side. However, these also bring 
confusion. The terms are so ambiguous that some of the actors in the dispute 
decided to understand them directly as a separation and lack of Church presence 
in the public space. Barbara Labuda’s agency from the Association for Rights and 
Freedoms illustrates this (“Stowarzyszenie Labudy na rzecz praw i wolności [The 
Labuda Association for Rights and Freedoms],” 1993: 1):
“ ‘We do not intend to interfere in the internal affairs of the Church,’ said Barbara Labuda 
at the Tuesday press conference. ‘We are interested in its activity when it concerns all 
citizens. That is why we want to create a group that will oppose the growing influence of 
the Church on public life.’ ”
Autonomy and independence are clearly dominated by the term neutrality. In the 
period of 1994–1995, contemporary left-wing leaders Aleksander Kwaśniewski 
and Józef Oleksy treat the tactics of taking the side of the neutral state world-
view as the ability to come out with a constructive solution in disputes with the 
Catholic Church. In Józef Oleksy’s exposition of February 3, 1995, neutrality 
became a top priority. After this, the term began to clearly appear in the media 
debate. Traces of this can already be seen in Gazeta Wyborcza on March 25, 1995, 
where Arkadiusz Foerster (1995) reported that the SdRP excluded compromises 
towards the postulate of state worldview neutrality.
Neutrality, however, turns out to be problematic for the Catholic Church, 
which sees its introduction as sanctioning a secular state. The authorities at 
that time, knowing the importance of the Church, approached the matter con-
cretely. The bill by Włodzimierz Cimoszewicz, based on “impartiality” authored 
by Tadeusz Mazowiecki, was passed very quickly. The solution satisfied both 
the state authorities and the Catholic Church. It also brought three significant 
consequences. (1) The state does not favor indifferent religious attitudes that are 
unequivocally derived from neutrality, which satisfies the Church side. (2) The 
state has the right to intervene wherever its religious interests are threatened. In 
the future, it will also be used in a few cases. (3) The state expresses its attitude 
towards religion by means of a category derived from political negotiations. This 
includes the potential for contestation.
The controversy about the religious character of the state changed in 2004. In 
Gazeta Wyborcza on November 12, the author indicated that the existing legisla-
tive solutions were too burdening for state finances. Poland is defined in terms of 
a “religious denomination” because it supports the Churches in various spheres 
of activity (Szacki, 2011: 4). We could see at this time the announcement of a 
clear trend in the media coverage of the secular state that dominated in the years 
2009–2011 and 2013–2015.
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This trend assumes two parallel and interrelated processes. The first consists 
in using the term “secular state” as the keyword. Second, in the discourses of 
leftist parties (the SLD and the Palikot Movement), the postulates of the secular 
state are not explained. However, their understanding is limited to the form of 
significant separation of the Church from public matters. Western countries are 
examples of such a practice (Gursztyn & Miłosz, 2010: 1):
“‘Constitution, it sounds so proud! There must be a clear border: since the state existed, 
there was also religion,’ said [SLD  – DG] party chairman Grzegorz Napieralski at 
Warsaw’s Constitution Square. So, as politicians assure us, it was the idea of the leader 
himself. ‘We are only concerned that such standards should apply in Poland regarding 
relations between the Church and the state as in Western European countries,’ says 
Rzeczpospolita’s Napieralski.”
The clear border between the Church and the state, mentioned by the then SLD 
leader Grzegorz Napieralski, clearly stands out from the practice of coopera-
tion between the two entities. The dominant Catholic society mentioned in the 
concordat determines the conditions of the game, not a constitutional clause on 
impartiality. This state of affairs calms down after the 2011 election. The SLD lost 
at that time, and it was the main party postulating a secular state, but ceased to 
emphasize the worldview disputes. However, they returned to it in 2013 under 
the leadership of Leszek Miller. The demands he proposed concerned separation.
We know from the current narrative that the law, programs of political parties 
and media coverage differ when it comes to the development of a secular state. 
The title of this section reflects as an incoherency at best. Indeed, we can speak 
of a fairly unambiguous model of a state open to cooperation with Churches and 
interfering in their operation in the case of threats to its interests. At the same 
time, we can notice the postulate of a secular state and a state neutral to religion 
in the postulates of the leftists. Political demands are a proposal to change not 
only the law but also political and social practices. This clearly distinguishes the 
party’s declarations from the legal status. After all, media coverage itself shows 
the complexity of properties attributed to the Church-state relationship. It refers 
to gradually narrowing it down to the form of a secular state and the separation 
of public order from Church order. In this sense, it seems that legal order is dis-
appearing in the media’s representation.
Trying to find a common denominator for these three areas, we therefore 
direct the analysis towards the mechanisms of institutional mediatization. It 
is noticed that when we treat the concept of the Church-state relationship as 
a social institution, there is a fundamental change in this institution. Various 
models of Church-state relations find their place in particular moments of our 
analysis. However, the mechanism of mediatization appears quite later.
On the way to the secular state186
The change in the media coverage of a secular state does not correspond 
strongly with the legal status. Generally, we cannot say that the law imposes 
thinking about a particular model. This happens only as a consequence of the 
introduction of regulations regarding the formation of Church-state relations. At 
the same time, specific regulations and specific actions by politicians are reported 
by Gazeta Wyborcza and Rzeczpospolita. We are talking here about the mecha-
nism of neutral mediation (Mazzoleni, 2008b) of the idea of a secular state.
In the course of the analysis, however, media narratives take a path that is 
not consistent with the law or provoked by applicable laws. Content reporting 
appears based on the actions of politicians and their parties. The agency of a 
party evokes changes in the discourse about the secular state. However, the 
basics of this process are not present in the political parties themselves.
Tuning a party’s strategy to the media logic is illustrated by the example of 
the SLD and the Palikot Movement. We see that the SLD’s programs consistently 
return to a secular state rule. However, this functions as a slogan that does not 
translate into political practice. The Palikot Movement suddenly appears on the 
political scene, with a message clearly tuned to the logic of the media. The secular 
state becomes the subject of a first-class controversy that can be well understood 
both in the perspective of newsworthiness and media logic. Such an adaptation 
caused a reaction in the SLD itself. The party changed to the logic of the media. 
It radicalized its message to voters, pointing to the need to abandon the cler-
ical context and strong separation. The SLD is now directed towards stressing 
the social conflict. Traces of this can be found both in the statements of party 
politicians after 2009 and in its 2015 election program. Such a mechanism brings 
effects in the form of clearly narrowing the debate about the secular state pre-
cisely to the idea of separation.
6.3  Political agents get mediatized
As it was pointed out earlier, the idea of a secular nation in the media results 
from the agency of individual and collective political actors who fine-tune their 
messages to the logic of the media based on the dominance of whatever is con-
troversial. In this section, let’s go much deeper into the agency of political actors 
in the Church-state relationship. This will help us to identify their mediatory 
strategies regarding religion.
Our argument is that individual political actors associated with political 
power and the opposition, as well as their centers of authority, change their strat-
egies in terms of religion and religious content in an evolutionary way. This pro-
cess consists in accommodating a new logic in making matters of religion and 
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state public. At the same time, we argue that this process seriously started to 
take place during Aleksander Kwasniewski’s presidency. In the case of political 
parties, however, it gained momentum in 2008. We are particularly concerned 
about the radicalization of the anti-religious SLD postulates and the clerical ap-
proach of PiS. We justify our theory on several motifs and the phenomena of 
summing up the diversity of the observed processes.
One of the basic axial categories of this analysis concerns actions regarding 
the concordat. The clusters that make it up reflect the tension between polit-
ical and religious actors:  negotiating the concordat, disputes over its ratifica-
tion, attempts to investigate its compliance with the constitution, and finally 
accusations of non-compliance and the need for revision. What is revealed in 
the research material refers to the time-varying capability of political actors to 
read the rules of media logic and political logic.
In 1992, concordat procedures had a very simplified representation in the 
media. Political actors, including representatives of the right-wing authori-
ties, namely Prime Minister Hanna Suchocka and Minister of Foreign Affairs 
Krzysztof Skubiszewski, were responsible for the efficient conduct of the 
procedures. Their agency also depended on publicly justifying the agreement 
with the Vatican. The media content was the framework for the subsequent dis-
pute. The right-wing, founded on the fusion of the Church and the state, articu-
late the interests of the Church as the interests of the state. A fragment illustrates 
this motif (“Mamy konkordat [We Have a Concordat],” 1993: 3):
“Archbishop Kowalczyk expressed the hope that the concordat’s provisions will be 
adopted by the new parliament, regardless of the political system. Skubiszewski added 
that this is a cross-party document that protects the interests of the state, not just any 
one political group.”
The matter of the concordat became complicated as a result of the premature 
elections of September 19, 1993. Political power went to the coalition of the 
leftist SLD and the PSL. An extraordinary parliamentary committee was ap-
pointed to draft a bill on ratification. The process of adapting the internal law to 
the obligations included in the concordat continues. The matter seems to have 
no end.
Subsequent media outlets reveal the lack of communication strategies among 
political actors, especially the ruling political parties. The media regularly 
inform us about the subsequent activities of groups of deputies. The analysis, 
however, indicates that there is more talk about the agency of members of a given 
party than specific political actors. The following example illustrates this (“Unici 
skarżą uchwałę [Uniates Complain about the Resolution],” 1994: 2):
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“UW parliamentarians yesterday complained about the bill needed for the ratification 
of the concordat based on the adoption of a new constitution. BBWR deputies, German 
Minorities and independent members also signed the petition.”
After the central-left power takeover, a clear communication disorder occurred 
among individuals associated with the SLD coalition. It had two dimensions, the 
first of which boiled down to many voices in the party’s position. Individual SLD 
politicians expressed separate opinions and postulates. They often undermined 
the previous interpretation by their party colleagues. The second dimension 
comes down to juggling, depending on the situation, the progress on the work 
of ratifying the concordat, or declaring the inability to overcome differences 
with the Church. In the following excerpt, it is illustrated the first of the cases 
described (“Konkordat tak, ale… [Yes for the Concordat, but…],” 1995: 2):
“ ‘Ratification of the concordat requires changes in only four laws,’ believes Siemiatkowski. 
‘This is not true, we have to change 20–30,’ replied Sierakowska, his friend from the SLD.”
This specific ambiguity transformed over the following years. Many voices within 
the ruling party gave way to the two voices at the presidential center and the par-
liamentary majority. President Kwaśniewski himself and deputy Szmajdzinski 
from the ruling party presented this matter in the example below (Nowakowska, 
1995: 3):
“The Secretary-General of the SDRP, Jerzy Szmajdziński, confirmed that the position of 
the party towards the concordat had not changed, despite Kwaśniewski’s announcement 
of the possibility of its quick ratification. ‘First the constitution, then the concordat,’ said 
the SDRP politician.”
The state of the two voices did not last long. Even in the initial phase of 
Aleksander Kwaśniewski’s presidency, the quality of articulation of postulates of 
political power towards the Church changed. The SLD then referred to the argu-
ment of social transparency in relations with the Church. Longin Pastusiak, an 
SLD deputy, silenced the dispute over the concordat revealing the basis of antag-
onism on the part of his party. He stated that the SLD questions the treaty since 
it was signed without consulting the Sejm and society.
President Kwaśniewski’s agency was changing. When we need to refer to 
work on the concordat, Kwaśniewski himself began to be visible in the media. 
Simultaneously, the presidential camp took up behind the scenes actions 
(“Widziane z loży [Viewed from the Lodge],” 1996). As a result, already in 1998, 
President Kwaśniewski functioned in media coverage as the father of agreement 
with the Church. His visibility in media came to a new coherent agency. The 
president ratified the concordat, giving it meaning in the area of peace and rec-
onciliation (“To wydarzenie niesie pokój i pojednanie [This Event Brings Peace 
Political agents get mediatized 189
and Reconciliation,” 1998). Then he regularly went to the Vatican to meet with 
John Paul II. He was even involved in preparing the Pope’s visit during the 1997 
Eucharistic Congress in Poland (“Prezydent za reprezentatywnym Sejmem [The 
President is for the Representative Sejm],” 1996).
Why does Aleksander Kwaśniewski’s agency seem so important? In Fig. 5.17 
from the previous chapter, we pointed out that among political actors, Aleksander 
Kwaśniewski was most often present in media coverage. In the course of the the-
oretical grounding, we gained the conviction that Aleksander Kwaśniewski was a 
typical figure, a model for later examples of accommodating media logic.
Back in 1994 when Kwaśniewski became the first actor in the media coverage 
of the Church-state relationship, his agency fit in with the communications and 
strategic disorder of the SLD party. He was the leader of the party and tried to 
articulate that the SLD did not give consent to accept the concordat in its present 
form (“Kwaśniewski o konkordacie [Kwaśniewski on the Concordat],” 1994). In 
1996, Kwaśniewski, as the President of Poland, tried unsuccessfully to have an 
audience with John Paul II. He was also unable to resolve the disputed issue 
of the concordat. Kwaśniewski blurred the social memory of these failures by 
applying strategies of media presence. In a short time, he started to function in 
the media as the voice of reason. He spoke about subsequent meetings with the 
Church and calmed moods regarding the concordat and his visit to John Paul II. 
He emphasized his goodwill and steps towards reaching an understanding with 
the Church.
After the ratification of the concordat on February 23, 1998, Kwaśniewski’s 
agency covered by the media definitively ceased to function based on prob-
lematic issues, meaning the concordat and the lack of sympathy by the Pope. 
On the basis of the media contents, we can see that the president assumed 
the position of a mediator between the left and the Church. In addition, his 
agency was implemented in the area of the intentional entanglement of the 
political and religious spheres. This action seemed completely untypical of 
a leftist representative because it became the most effective strategy of the 
then head of state. As a result of the two terms of his presidency, media cov-
erage provided evidence that Kwaśniewski also received the Church’s recogni-
tion (“Prezydent zaświadczy o świętości [The President Attests to Holiness],” 
2005: 1):
“The president testifies to sanctity. Aleksander Kwaśniewski was invited to appear before 
the beatification tribunal. It is not known yet when and where this meeting will be held 
[…]. Aleksander Kwaśniewski met John Paul II several times. He was valued in the 
Vatican, not only because he is the head of state, a state that is the Pope’s homeland, but 
for his professionalism and style of representing Poland. He was the only politician who 
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was invited into the papa mobile along with his wife (in 1999, at the end of the Holy 
Father’s pilgrimage to Poland), and the only president who spoke at St. Peter’s Square.”
Comparing Kwaśniewski with other political actors, we see that his success 
is determined by three elements to accommodate to media logic. First of all, 
Kwaśniewski reached the media with his position on the merger of religion and 
nation, appropriate for those times. It silenced the anti-clerical discourse of 
his party and focused on promoting patriotic values while respecting religious 
values. Second, the president represented a policy that was close and unam-
biguous. The messages that he gave were interesting to the media. They eased 
tensions and disputes between the participants of the Church-state relationship, 
easing uncertainty in moments of doubt. Third, he promoted itself as a model 
leader, a strong individual who fit well into the media’s narrative.
Finally, Kwaśniewski’s agency serves as a point of support in relation to the 
radicalization of the left wing’s voice towards the Catholic Church in Poland. It 
is noticed that Kwaśniewski’s specific position towards the Church and religion, 
with subsequent elections, is becoming less and less compatible with the anti-
clerical demands of his SLD party. Since 2008, the negative attitude towards the 
current concordat has become a tool for the SLD’s ideological identification led 
by the young leader Grzegorz Napieralski. When it comes to the anti-clerical 
position of the Palikot Movement, we can speak of a clear battle against the 
concordat.
The position of Grzegorz Napieralski in relation to the Church-state relation-
ship is the opposite of Aleksander Kwaśniewski’s long-term approach. When 
Napieralski appeared on the political scene in the role of the SLD leader, he 
immediately attracted media attention with the catchy postulate of liquidating 
the concordat (“SLD idzie w górę [The SLD is Rising],” 2008: 9):
“In the latest poll by Gazeta Wyborcza, the SLD received 10 percent. This is the best 
result for the Alliance since LiD fell apart in April. Since then, the SLD has doubled its 
support, but only 4 percentage points were gained in the last two weeks. At that time, 
the party leader changed. Wojciech Olejniczak replaced Grzegorz Napieralski, consid-
ered to be a more radical politician who managed to say, among other things, that the 
concordat is unnecessary in Poland.”
Napieralski’s agency outlined in this section is characterized by the radicalization 
of views and articulations on the abolition of the concordat. Subsequent media 
materials confirm this fairly precise strategy based on several premises. First, 
this young and energetic leader embodied the criticism of his party towards the 
Church in public space. He justified the need to liquidate the concordat due to 
the financial savings of the state and greater freedom for citizens. His narrative, 
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however, did not present a distinctive project to replace the current formula. 
Instead, the section on the Church and state discussed earlier is summed up in 
the slogan (“Wypowiedzieć konkordat [Terminating the Concordat],” 2008: 6):
“The concordat must be completely changed, and it would be best if it did not exist at 
all. Throughout its duration, the Roman Catholic Church has increased its influence and 
interferes in politics. In reality, the state budget has money to only finance a single reli-
gion. I am against our tax money going to retirement and disability pensions for priests, 
paying for catechists who teach religion or chaplains assigned to all uniformed services. 
The latter is my opinion and seems almost unconstitutional.”
Due to the lack of a complex program of changes, we are far from the view of 
political logic domination in Napieralski’s covered agency. As it is shown above, 
we can see Napieralski fits into the criteria of media logic.
Two basic motifs in his accommodation to media logic dominate. First, it 
passes from Kwaśniewski’s conciliatory narrative to his own confrontational nar-
rative. The tactics of ease towards the Church brought Kwaśniewski a long-lasting 
effect at the price of diluting his earlier radical religious postulates. In the case of 
Napieralski, radical postulates in the sphere of the privatization of religion gave 
him immediate visibility in the media.
Second, such a transition means that Napieralski’s agency is in contravention 
to the SLD’s past strategy towards the Catholic Church. This was summarized 
by the PO’s deputy, Jarosław Gowin (“Religia w szkołach [Religion in Schools],” 
2010: 1):
“The left is always very much against the Church when it is in opposition. When it 
comes to power, it is more helpful to the Church than we, moderate right-wing people.”
Gowin’s view is worth referring to in the media’s visibility and negotiating the 
position of individual actors in the face of the merger of religion and the nation. 
The material from the media shows that the new leader of the SLD clearly relies 
on the visibility of his party in the media. This is why the SLD returns to anti-
clerical postulates, which over the years the party managed to hide. Napieralski’s 
position against the fusion of the nation and religion, however, is risky. On the 
one hand, the move seems useful from the perspective of media logic. On the 
other hand, it does not take into account the political context of Poland, which is 
duly conducive to Catholicism. In the longer term, the technique does not gain 
the support of voters, and in 2015, the SLD disappeared from the parliament.
Radical anti-clericalism without cooperation with the Church did not work 
as well in the case of another party that contested the concordat. In 2013, the 
Palikot Movement exacerbated the debate about the secularity of the state 
and the relations of the Church and the state by fighting against the cross and 
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contesting against the deputy members’ Christmas Eve meeting in the parlia-
ment. The agency of this party in favor of the secular state and the separation 
of the religious realm from the public realm took on the dimension of a per-
formance. The Palikot Movement took legal steps to remove the cross from the 
plenary hall of the Sejm. They demanded the dissolution of the Sejm’s Christmas 
Eve vigil meeting.
The media message proves that the Palikot Movement is credited with arti-
ficially voicing a problem. The electoral demands of this party, however, con-
firmed their radical attitude towards combating traces of religion in the public 
space and transferring it to the domain of one’s private life. No other party’s 
program had such an extensive counter-religious narrative as the proposals of 
the Palikot Movement. It remained consistent with the public show of this party. 
Both the media coverage and electoral postulates can be easily read as being 
sewn into the needs of media visibility and increased popularity among people 
sympathizing with the secular state.
By opting to counter the union of the nation and religion, the Palikot 
Movement became an object of the media’s interest. In addition, it resonated 
with other parties on the political scene. Their performance against the cross 
evoked the immediate reaction of the right-wing PiS party. Its chairman Jarosław 
Kaczyński stated that “it is such an expansion of savagery, that is, undermining 
our national and social functioning” (“Ruch Palikota [The Palikot Movement],” 
2011: 1). This fragment of the PiS leader’s statement shows the different attitude 
of the right wing towards the Church-state relation. We want to discuss its spec-
ificity by presenting the example of the constitutionally and legally acceptable 
impartial state intervention in matters of religion.
We can clearly perceive the state agency regarding the Catholic Church in the 
case of Archbishop Stanisław Wielgus at the turn of 2006 and 2007, the period of 
the presidency of Lech Kaczyński from PiS. After the appointment of Archbishop 
Wielgus to the post of Metropolitan of Warsaw, accusations appeared about his 
cooperation with the communist security services. The archbishop declared 
innocence and strove for his ingress. The solemn ingress and taking over the dio-
cese did not take place. The mass was celebrated, during which Wielgus resigned 
from his function, and Cardinal Józef Glemp, Primate and also the previous head 
of the Archdiocese of Warsaw, explained the situation. Cardinal Glemp also tried 
to put Wielgus in the role of a victim of the communist system.
The event concerned the internal organization of the Catholic Church in 
Poland. For the presidential circle, however, it was a moment to take action. We 
know from the media contents, presented with a delay, that the ingress did not 
take place due to an intervention in connection with President Lech Kaczyński at 
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the Holy See. On the pages of Gazeta Wyborcza on February 1, 2007, fragments 
of the open letter were published, later shared by the then Polish Europe deputy 
of the LPR (Wiśniewska, 2012: 7):
“We are astonished and deeply concerned about the interference of the highest state 
authorities in the internal affairs of the Church in Poland, and even in the Vatican, 
which, if it actually took place, resembles the period of deep communism in which 
attempts were made to interfere in the personal decisions of the Catholic Church. We 
demand the vetting of journalists and the authorities of this media campaign. The activ-
ities of media circles are causing divisions in the nation.”
This case illustrates the practice of the principle of state impartiality in relation 
to the faith and institutions of the Catholic Church. The agency of President 
Kaczyński illustrated to what extent the state interfered in the internal affairs of 
religion. This applies to the common symbolic space, as a rule administered by 
the Church. In other words, the position of the Archbishop of Warsaw is a suf-
ficiently important symbol for right-wing political authorities that it makes it 
possible for them to give it to a person suspected of cooperating with the security 
services.
On the second level, we point to the hidden agency of the president, which 
is revealed only incompletely after the Archbishop’s resignation. This is not just 
about diplomatic cuisine. We can see here the expression of the adjustment of 
political actors to the tension-laden events involving the Church. The matter of 
Archbishop Wielgus is so delicate that the direct intervention of the state would 
immediately bring negative media coverage to political power. The experiences 
of interference in the life of the Church are media transmissions. They meet all 
the more important criteria of newsworthiness. The effects of such coverage 
are difficult to predict. The state therefore adopts tactics of pressure without 
involving the media. Combining political logic and media logic proves this.
The third level of analysis concerns the relations between the logics of the 
described event. When we talk about political actors in this dispute, we cannot 
separate one logic from the other. The combination of legal circumstances and 
the strong anti-communist feature of the presidential center indicate a clear par-
ticipation of political logic. Meanwhile, hiding the social indignation due to state 
pressure on the Catholic Church clearly takes into account the logic of the media.
The element that brings together both orders turns out to be a symbolic basis 
for intervention. The fusion of religious and national values does not allow the 
president to refrain from doing something. Awareness of media logic, however, 
causes his agency to be based on discretion. In this context, images from the 
unsuccessful ingress emitted by Wiadomości TVP gained importance. In the 
material from January 7, 2007, the president was covered together with his wife 
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during a mass in the Warsaw cathedral. He only functioned as an uninvolved wit-
ness of a Church theater play (“Jak do tego doszło [How It Got to This],” 2007). 
This clearly stood out from President Kwaśniewski’s earlier active participation 
in disputes over the concordat, when the audience saw growing tension between 
the Catholic Church and the state. When we compare this moment of interest to 
friction due to the concordat, we see growing awareness of right-wing political 
actors concerning the rules of both the logic of the media and political logic.
Another element that characterizes this section refers to the right-wing 
politicians’ agency on the discourse that sustains the fusion of religion and the 
state. The professionalization of political communication, progressing in recent 
decades, also translates into the party’s ideological identification. So far, we 
have shown that left-wing groups clearly build their ideological identity based 
on their attitude towards the concordat. Religious identification has a different 
dimension in the case of the right wing.
The elections of the nineties abounded in parties with unambiguously 
Catholic roots that embraced the social doctrine of the Catholic Church as the 
basis for shaping the social order. Over the years, the programs of Christian 
parties were limited to the inspirational role of Church teaching. An example of 
this practice is the activity of the Kaczyński brothers’ new party: first is the exclu-
sively PC, and then there is the inclusive PiS. Instead of the postulates of social 
teaching directly copied from the Church, there are arguments for maintaining 
the nation’s Catholic heritage.
The transition from one position to another has an evolutionary character. 
However, the clericalization of the PiS party does not result from a desire to 
respond to the radical postulates of the leftists made since 2008. They were moti-
vated due to competition with the PO, governing the nation for two terms in 
2007–2015 and showing a vague attitude towards the Church. First of all, both 
parties to a greater or less visible way allowed religion to creep into the public 
sphere. This is shown in the leftist statement published in the information for 
Gazeta Wyborcza on August 10, 2010:
“ ‘PO and PiS drew the world of religion into the area of public life. Today, they are ac-
cusing each other of who is more guilty of the fact that there is a cross in Poland,’ said the 
Vice-Speaker of the House Jerzy Wenderlich at the press conference yesterday” (Szacki, 
2010: 6).
When we think about the differentiating strategies of both parties, however, we see 
that in the final moment of the analysis before the 2015 elections, both try to have 
a distinguished program and image. The PO and its government articulate the 
postulate of the revision of financing the Church, oppose religion being a topic at 
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high school final exams, and oppose regulations for in-vitro procedures, which are 
not allowed by the Church. The PO is not concerned with rebuilding all areas of 
the Church-state relationship. However, they touch upon issues that remain sen-
sitive to Polish Catholicism (“PiS da Kościołowi egzamin z religii na maturze [PiS 
Gives the Church the Religion Exam for High School Matriculation],” 2015: 6):
“The Church has long wanted religion to be a subject in secondary education as an 
additional subject to choose from. It was said that the issue of religion in secondary 
school’s final exams will become another topic of debate between the Church and the 
PO government, apart from the Church Fund and in-vitro. However, the bishops did 
not put the matter in the fore, although this topic returned at the meetings of the joint 
government committee and the Episcopate.”
The PiS opposition at that time presented a separate position. It decided to even 
more strongly confirm the important ties between the state and the Church. 
They observed the status quo concerning in-vitro and the Church fund. They 
promised, however, that religion would be part of the high school graduation 
exam. This is illustrated in the following fragment (“PiS da Kościołowi egzamin 
z religii na maturze [PiS Gives the Church the Religion Exam for High School 
Matriculation],” 2015: 6):
“As we have learned, the Episcopate is already planning intensive action so that religion 
can be a subject on the high school graduation exam. This did not happen during the 
PO’s government. The bishops’ hope in this matter is that PiS wins in the upcoming 
elections. […] Our information indicates that PiS is ready to meet the Church’s request 
if it wins the election.”
In this media auction, we can see certain unpredictability in the election 
promises. PiS used the media to submit another declaration on Church matters, 
which shows its good preparation for the final campaign. Of course, a sudden 
volta in one of the postulates cannot be read as political inconsistency. In this 
case, however, it proves that the party learned a lesson regarding the nature of 
media operation and accommodating media logic.
Let’s return to Fig. 5.21 from the previous chapter to remember that the Sejm, 
its deputies, and the government were most often the political actors covered by 
the media. The agency of these institutions appears as a result of media coverage 
going from the agency of individuals to the agency of institutions. Here, too, 
we can talk about professionalization and mediatization. From the beginning, 
governments and parliamentary clubs have their own representatives who are 
responsible for media advocacy. In the last decade, however, our analysis shows 
a change in the media from the regular coverage of politicians’ voices to the stan-
dard presence of the press spokesmen of political institutions in the media.
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Professional communication forced by the media urges institutions such 
as the government and the Sejm as well as political parties to have their own 
spokespersons. In the case of media content from the area of the state-religion 
relations, the spokespersons primarily communicate negative matters that are 
controversial or sensitive issues for the religious side. A  commentary about 
hanging crosses in Polish schools illustrates this mechanism (“Senyszyn: zdjąć 
krzyże [Senyszyn: Remove the Crosses],” 2009: 1):
“A dispute arose over the commemoration of the victims of the Smolensk tragedy and 
the cross in front of the Presidential Palace in Warsaw. […] Joanna Senyszyn announced 
that she would ask the government to issue a regulation that will instruct public school 
directors to remove crosses from classrooms. The government does not approach this 
idea seriously and does not consider issuing such a regulation. ‘I do not comment on 
nonsensical ideas,’ says Rzeczpospolita’s government spokesman Paweł Graś.”
The spokesman here appears in a communication situation over which there is 
no dominion or which may evoke negative connotations. In contrast to the early 
nineties, political actors do not risk their unexpected loss of reputation. This 
matter is about providing a mechanism to protect certain institutions and their 
leaders from communication crises.
When we consider the agency of political individuals and institutions in the 
area of the secular state and the Church-state relationship, a certain mechanism 
appears. Political actors make efforts to adapt to changing social conditions and 
re-read the context of the merger of the nation and the state in different periods. 
Sometimes they take the position of gentle collaborators with a Church website, 
yet at other times, they assume a fight for the expressive place of religion in the 
public space or the struggle to bring it to the private space. The process is a com-
bination of political and media logic. Their mutual relationship varies depending 
on the period and context. Media logic is dominant. Due to the fusion of religion 
and the nation, we cannot confirm this type of logic as the only one present.
6.4  Religious agents get mediatized
The political actors’ approach to the issue of the secular state and relations with 
religions clearly stands out from the perspective of religion. We are dealing with 
two worlds, different in terms of their motivation for functioning in the public 
sphere. Their media-engaging practices also differ.
The first association about the mediation of religious actors often comes down 
to the coverage of events on world religions leaders. Following this intuition, let’s 
now consider the cases of the visits of John Paul II, the Dalai Lama, Bartholomew 
I, and Kirill I to the Polish parliament and the president of the Republic of Poland.
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Each of the analyzed events would fit well into the literature on the theory of 
media events (Dayan & Katz, 1994). Referring to the theory grounded in the ana-
lyzed material, however, we focus on the difference between the media mediation 
of religious leaders and the relations between their agency and the mediatization 
process. The first case that we examine in this way comes from June 11, 1999 and 
concerns John Paul II’s speech in front of the combined chambers of the Polish 
parliament. The Pope appeared in the typical role of an honorary guest. The media 
reported this event in a conventional way. They fit it into a carefully supported 
scheme of media coverage (leader, celebration, majesty, etc.). As a result, they 
show the recipients the Pope’s agency in Church-state cooperation.
Generally speaking, John Paul II works in all of the collected material in three 
ways. The first way assumes more or less the same pattern as the papal speech 
before the Polish parliament. The second, only pointed out in the media content, 
indicates the Pope’s active agency in negotiating the concordat and shaping a 
general opinion on the Church’s relationship with the state. The following pas-
sage shows this. The third view makes the Pope the reference, which defines 
the context of the statement, and especially the Church’s negotiations with the 
political authority. An example of the dispute over the concordat illustrates this 
(“Ostre słowa Kościoła [The Church’s Strong Words],” 1994: 2):
“ ‘The Sejm’s refusal to ratify the concordat was like rejecting Pope John Paul II, our best 
friend’s hand, said the Primate of Poland, Cardinal Józef Glemp. Bishop Alojzy Orszulik 
of Łowicz thinks that this is a ‘frontal attack on the Church.’ ”
Such a description lacks space for mediatization. Pope John Paul II appears in 
media contents based on the terms set by the report from the media event or the 
principle of shaping a press release. His religious visibility flows from the style 
in which he holds office. However, there is a lack of indication that the Pope 
undertakes action based on media logic.
The Pope’s visits are analogous to the media coverage of other spiritual leaders 
to the Polish parliament. Of course, we see the proper style and characteristic 
elements of the religion that is being reported at the moment. Two different 
examples illustrate this. The first concerns several visits to Poland by the Dalai 
Lama, the spiritual guide for Buddhists and the political leader of Tibet. The 
Dalai Lama’s simple lifestyle and conversations embellish the media coverage 
of his official meetings with parliamentarians and the president. This leads to 
the belief in the dominance of the personalization tactics in the messages of the 
leader’s visit (“Dalajlama [Dalai Lama],” 2008: 1):
“The Dalai Lama, leader of Tibet, climbs the stairs to the Sejm at a press confer-
ence: ‘wherever I was at in Poland, I saw enormous joy and huge enthusiasm, and I think 
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this is the result of the freedom regained by your country, which is why I support the 
idea of a Free Tibet so strongly […]. I do not care for protocol, it does not matter, since 
meeting face to face is most important.’”
The second example concerns the analogous visits by Bartholomew I, Patriarch of 
Constantinople. Media coverage accentuates the political and religious dimension 
of the patriarch’s presence. Politicians accept Bartholomew as the head of state. 
However, they note differences between him and Pope John Paul II (“Bartłomiej 
I wystąpi w parlmencie [Bartholomew I Speaks to Parliament],” 2000: 1):
“This is the second visit of the Patriarch of Constantinople to our country. The previous 
one, in 1998, was made at the invitation of Polish Orthodox faithful. The current visit 
is of a national character and is a response to the invitation of the Speaker of the Sejm, 
Maciej Płażyński. The most important point of the visit will be Bartholomew I’s mes-
sage to the deputies and senators with whom he will meet in the Sejm’s column hall. 
Therefore, it will not be like John Paul II’s visit to the Sejm with a solemn meeting of the 
joint chambers of parliament. The patriarch will talk about the attitude of the Orthodox 
Church towards the processes of European integration and the relationship between 
morality and politics.”
We see that regardless of whether the individualization or emphasis of the maj-
esty framed during the visits of religious leaders to the Polish authorities, the 
agency of leaders of great religions does not change according to the needs of 
media messages. Rather, the media is trying to adequately mediate their pres-
ence. Visits by the leaders of world religions, however, reveal the specific agency 
of the representatives of Poland’s authorities, which we have so far avoided.
The political power plays the role of hosting religious representatives. This 
provides a space of activity for religious actors and their postulates regarding 
peace, shaping the social order, and religious tolerance. Here we can perceive 
a significant mechanism for mediatization. In order to explain its specifics, let 
us refer to the material from the Rzeczpospolita on Patriarch Bartholomew I’s 
visit to the Sejm on January 26, 2000 (“Nie narzucać prawnie dekalogu [Do not 
Legally Impose the Decalogue],” 2000: 1):
“The speaker of the Sejm, Maciej Płażyński, announced that other representatives of 
monotheistic religions will be invited to the Sejm and that they will present their views 
on international problems.”
Three important issues stem from this comment by the Marshal. First of all, 
political actors work for the fusion of religion and politics in the parliamentary 
space. We must keep in mind, however, that the unusually ceremonial character 
of the meeting of Pope John Paul II with both joint Chambers of the Parliament 
confirms the symbolic privileged status of Catholicism.
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Second, the initiative of the executive branch in giving the leaders of mono-
theistic religions a place to speak in the Sejm points to a new, specific, and regular 
practice of state authorities towards religion. This shows traces of impartiality 
and respect for religion as such. Third, this procedure, which is established by 
regular practice, belongs to events meeting the criterion of newsworthiness. It 
allows for a greater presence in the media. We suggest looking at Patriarch Kirill 
of Moscow’s visit to Poland in August 2012 in this way.
This analysis of the media content in connection with Kirill’s visit to Poland 
leads to believe that we are dealing with a new approach to the presence of reli-
gious leaders in the media. We perceive the efficiency of this change (1) in the 
joint preparation of the visit by the Orthodox Churches in Poland and Russia, the 
Catholic Church in Poland, and representatives of Polish authorities and (2) in 
the explicit attitude of these entities to publicizing the event. The Patriarch’s visit 
concerns a joint declaration between the Polish Episcopate and the Orthodox 
Church of Russia on the subject of intercession between the nations of Poland 
and Russia. It illustrates an example of popular reconciliation gestures, which 
include frequent manifestations of reconciliation policies in recent decades 
(Wigura, 2011).
Unlike the foremost religious leaders, we read Kirill’s agency as tailor-made 
media. First of all, Kirill plays the role of the leader of the Orthodox Church, 
extending his hand to make friends (spectacular news). His discourse departs 
from the stiff and official language of other Christian leaders (a simplification). 
He seems closer to the easy style of the Dalai Lama. Kirill, however, includes 
the expressive majesty of his body language and social interaction (exclusivity). 
Second, Kirill refers to religious symbols that associate the fusion of nations and 
religions: Russia and its Orthodox Church as well as Poland and its Catholicism 
(in context). He gave the Polish Bishops’ Conference a copy of the icon of the 
Mother of God of Smolensk, venerated in Russia. He announced that he will 
place the icon of Jasna Góra, Our Lady of Częstochowa, given to him in the new 
Church in Katyn, the place of the martyrdom of the Polish intelligentsia in the 
Soviet Union (Wiśniewska, 2012: 1).
The visit, although based on reconciliation, also evokes emotions in people 
who are not interested in religious matters. This is due to the controversy in 
the Church-state area. Kirill represents the Orthodox Church, whose history is 
based on a close relationship with political authorities. However, he himself calls 
for a sober chapter on the state realm and the realm of religion in Poland. The 
situation is ignited by the fact that Kirill signed an agreement with the Polish 
Episcopate in the marble hall of the Royal Castle in Warsaw, meaning a secular 
space. Here we can see the confusion of religious and political motives and the 
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discordant discourses regarding the Church-state relationship. In other words, 
representatives of Churches with different approaches to cooperation with the 
political authority signed the declaration on behalf of their people. However, they 
do so in the company of Polish authorities and in a secular public building. Such 
a strategy received a counter-attack on the part of the left (Czaczkowska, 2012).
Let’s go beyond the visits of world religious leaders to Poland’s authorities 
to get closer to another characteristic of the agency of religious individuals and 
institutions. When we combine their narratives with the axial categories about 
the participation of the Church in the process of shaping the law and negotiating 
its position in the state, we can refer to the argument of professionalization. In 
practice, the dynamics of religious agents in relation to shaping the place of reli-
gion in the state works on three interrelated and parallel processes that occur in 
relation to the country’s dominant religion.
The first of these processes concerns the professionalization of the Catholic 
Church’s communication. It involves the transition from the many uncoordi-
nated voices of individual bishops to the balanced tone of several spokesmen and 
representatives of the Bishops’ Conference presidium. The second process means 
changing the language of the actors representing the Catholic Church. They 
reformulate the arguments for the interests of the Church in the state. The third 
leads to a growth in the media visibility of the agency of religious institutions and 
groups of non-religious in the place of religious individuals.
Professionalism in the case of the Church has clear marks of institutional 
mediatization. Its dynamics, however, differs from what I have shown till now 
in the case of political actors. Fig.  5.24 from the previous chapter indicates 
the frequency domination of two individual religious leaders in media cov-
erage: Bishop Pieronek and Cardinal Glemp. Tadeusz Pieronek’s work in the years 
1992–1998, when he was the Bishop’s Conference secretary, reveals certain com-
plexity. Pieronek is responsible for communicating on the course of the dialogue 
between the Church and the mainly leftist government. He clearly proposes a pos-
tulate of coming to an agreement, and the Church supported his line of thinking 
even after he resigned (“Stróż konkordatu [Guardian of the Concordat],” 1998: 4):
“I am glad because the Pope accepts the line of thinking of the former secretary of the 
Episcopate. This should not surprise anyone. Everyone who has recently observed the 
papal line of thinking, during last year’s pilgrimage and later, sees that this is in line with 
Bishop Pieronek: an apolitical Church, which does not mean hidden in the sacristy, but 
present in public life, but not in a political party.”
Our analysis points to the agency characteristic of Bishop Pieronek, which reflects 
one of two types of religious actor approaches to religious issues in the state. It is 
about ambiguity in Bishop Pieronek’s discourse. First of all, this actor can be seen 
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as a reliable source of information about the Church’s position towards political 
power in disputes over the religious dimension of the state. He efficiently moves 
from the current state of dialogue with the state to possible forms of cooperation 
or future difficulties. This is illustrated in the following example (“Konstytucja 
niezgody [Constitution of Disagreement],” 1995: 1):
“The Episcopate twice presented its postulates for the constitution […]. Bishop’s Tadeusz 
Pieronek secretary of the Bishop’s Conference said that the Church is satisfied and ‘let’s 
keep it so.’ According to the bishop, after the commission ‘cleared up’ any doubts in the 
text that the Church had, ‘there will be space in the state for believers.’ ”
In addition to this approach, Pieronek interweaved realism and hope in the dif-
ficult dialogue with the government during moments of strong tensions. At the 
time, he revealed that the Episcopate underwent antagonism and took a pow-
erful position against the center of political authority. This is well illustrated by 
the following excerpt (“Traktować Kościół przyjaźnie [Treating the Church in a 
Friendly Way],” 1994: 1):
“‘The Constitution should contain a record of independence and cooperation between 
the Church and the state, not a record of the separation between them,’ said Bishop 
Tadeusz Pieronek, the Secretary-General of the Episcopate. He pointed out that 
if the Church in Poland is not to be ‘an element of anxiety, it should be treated in a 
friendly way.’”
Cardinal Józef Glemp, the then Primate, showed another type of agency. It 
represented discourse that depreciated political power in the first place. He 
appealed to the rhetoric that established the Church as a victim of the state. 
The state attributed him bad agency in their fight against the Church (“Ostre 
słowa Kościoła [The Church’s Strong Words],” 1994) by making Polish culture 
(Nowakowska, 1996a) and the continuation of the Polish People’s Republic athe-
istic (“Szersze perspektywy Kościoła w Polsce [Wider Perspectives of the Church 
in Poland],” 1995). Glemp’s sermons preached at grand ceremonies depreci-
ated those who exercised political power. He also often recalled the context of 
the suffering that the Church experienced during the communist period. At 
the time when cooperation between the Church and the post-communist gov-
ernment began to bring tangible results, the cardinal blurred his earlier theses 
(Nowakowska, 1996a: 2):
“Aleksander Kwaśniewski and Józef Glemp, the Primate of Poland, talked with each 
other yesterday. Both left the meeting satisfied. The Primate suggested that no particular 
grouping was to blame for the atheization of the life of society.”
It is difficult to compare the agency of Bishop Pieronek and Cardinal Glemp. 
Both, however, can be described as misunderstanding the nature of shaping the 
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public sphere and the role of the media in this process. Cardinal Glemp particu-
larly stands on the side of the old way of thinking, which is clearly shown in the 
following fragment (Nowakowska, 1996b: 2):
“Yesterday Cardinal Józef Glemp revealed the state of negotiations regarding the ratifica-
tion of the concordat between the Polish government and the Vatican. He stated that the 
mass media should once again publish the full text of the concordat so that everyone in 
society can become familiar with it. Primate Glemp added that ‘politicians should reach 
such a level of maturity that if they want to do something good for Poland, they must 
be in greater unity.’ ”
This opinion confirms that Glemp treats the media as an instrument influencing 
society. He does not see, however, that they are independent institutions based 
on their own logic.
As we can see, the primacy of religious individuals, dominant in the nineties, 
does not show the signs of the mediatization process. Indeed, the number of rep-
resentatives of the Church undertaking public debate boils down to expressive 
personalities. However, these leading religious actors show a lack of deep under-
standing of how we can shape and stimulate media visibility by accommodating 
to media logic. They are guided by a clear strategy regarding the Church’s first-
class place in the public space. At the same time, they lack knowledge of how to 
make a narrative about the Church newsworthy.
In 2005, after the death of John Paul II, Stanisław Dziwisz, the Pope’s long-
time secretary, become the Archbishop of Cracow, and a clear change in the 
media coverage of the Church-state relationship took place. Bishop Pieronek, the 
leading Episcopal man, failed to replace the person with equally frequent media 
coverage. In turn, the visibility of the Episcopate increased, and its “lips” became 
spokesman Rev. Józef Kloch. In 2006, Cardinal Glemp retired. The central voice 
of the Church seemed to transfer from Warsaw to Cracow, where at that time 
Cardinal Stanisław Dziwisz was already present. Over time, however, it turned 
out that in various parts of Poland in the circle of individual bishops there was 
professionalism in the approach to the media and a simultaneous intensification 
of behind-the-scenes activities.
The discourses of individual bishops and their spokespersons reveal the 
strong expression of this phenomenon, as well as the statements of the board 
and the Polish Bishops’ Conference spokesperson. Their public presence does 
not have to concentrate on the struggle for the concordat and the Catholic shape 
of the state. The basis of the Church’s agenda in its relationship with the polit-
ical authority is the issue of expanding the sphere of the Church’s influence on 
society or at least maintaining its current state of ownership. Let’s look at this 
on the basis of Gazeta Wyborcza’s passage from February 6, 2013 regarding the 
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report of the Institute of Public Affairs on the problems of observing the con-
cordat (Wiśniewska, 2013: 1):
“Why is the concordat not fully respected? According to the author, this is the effect of 
‘procrastination on the part of the judiciary and the government administration appa-
ratus, afraid of enforcing treaty obligations for the state.’ As we read, the problem is 
mainly about enforcing the independence of the state party, because ‘the independence 
and autonomy of the Church is guaranteed by many provisions of the treaty’ but ‘secu-
rity is not provided for in the same degree in relation to the state.’ What do the clergy 
say about this? ‘Is the article about respecting the mutual autonomy of the state and 
the Church respected?’ we asked Rev. Robert Nęcek, spokesman for the Archdiocese of 
Cracow. ‘Yes, I think that the concordat is respected in this respect,’ replied Rev. Nęcek. 
Dr. Borecki said something else [author of the report – DG]: ‘by frequent letters and ap-
peals to parliamentarians (e.g. threatening deputies who supporter in-vitro with excom-
munication), the Episcopate seeks to constantly supervise the actions of state authorities 
in matters unilaterally recognized by the Polish Episcopate as being in the sphere of 
interests or the powers of the Church’ and ‘this takes place with the real acceptance of 
the Holy See.’ ”
Let’s compare the statement of Cracow Curia’s press spokesman with previous 
statements by Bishop Pieronek and Cardinal Glemp. This demonstrates the 
Church’s professionalism in dealing with the media. In a matter that is sensi-
tive to the Church, the Curia spokesman only focuses on handing over his 
institution’s position. He avoids expressing his own emotions. Another fragment 
related to the activity of another Church spokesperson adds an extra element of 
professionalization (“Śledztwo w sprawie katastrofy smoleńskiej [Investigation 
Regarding the Smolensk Crash],” 2010: 1):
“Monsignor Rafał Markowski, spokesman for the Warsaw Curia, in a telephone conver-
sation says: ‘at this moment, this cross and its place in the courtyard of the presidential 
palace places the initiative primarily in the office of the president and the city author-
ities. For me, it would not be strange if this cross remained in front of the presidential 
palace. It seems to me that this is only a matter of agreement.’ ”
This passage illustrates the tendency that the professionalism of Church commu-
nication based on the press spokesmen leads to the establishment of the Church’s 
image as an institution that avoids extremes. This style of Church communica-
tion was seen in the nineties and was a significant change. It was based on an 
attempt to understand the principles of media logic by the institutional Church.
After discussing the dynamics of the professionalism of religious agents’ staff 
members, it’s time to show the change in the area of the language used by the 
Church. When we return to Bp. Pieronek’s agency, we easily find discourses and 
metaphors used by many hierarchs, especially in the first half of the nineties. 
Here are two examples:
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“ ‘If the Sejm has any doubts, it has the right to add something…’ Bishop Pieronek 
replied” (Domosławski, 1994: 4).
“Bishop Pieronek blamed Oleksy’s government for delaying the ratification of the con-
cordat. He added that the SLD’s postponing the ratification was playing cat and mouse 
with the Church” (Domosławski, 1995: 1).
I characterize this kind of expression as the emotional depreciation of the left-
wing power by the Church, which did not yet accept the fact that it is doomed to 
engage in dialogue with the post-communist camp. The dynamics of negotiations 
around the concordat and the denominational law favor articulating such 
sentences by Church people. Political power turns out to be unpredictable in dia-
logue with the Church. At the same time, these discourses show that the Church 
is not blameless either. He maintains an overly demanding position towards the 
ruling party and the president. He refers to the thousand-year Christian heritage 
in Poland, but also to the depreciation of other values, cultures, and contexts, 
as in the following example (“Niech modlitwa złagodzi [Let Prayer Calm Us],” 
1996: 3):
“Archbishop Michalik commented on the meeting with the marshal: ‘If African nations, 
like South Africa, two years after gaining independence obtain a constitution which 
preserves their tradition and culture, then over 1000 years of Christianity has the right 
to find in the constitution a reference to the Lord God.’ ”
The following years show that this language does not disappear from the 
statements of the bishops. The example of Archbishop Michalik points to its 
flourishing somewhere on the margin of the general professionalization of the 
voices of the Church and silencing the language of depreciation in the statements 
of Church personnel. So what do we get in return? It turns out that the argument 
of the majority is reformulated. In contrast to the nineties, the Church is no 
longer the administrator of Polish souls. It shapes its narration more delicately, 
referring to the fact that most Poles share the Catholic faith and want to keep it 
present in the public sphere. The following two fragments from before and after 
the changes refer to this type of strategy change:
“The archbishop warned that Poland is trying to return to the model of an atheist state. 
He mentioned abortion, social demoralization, problems with the ratification of the 
concordat, and the constitution ‘which would erase any trace of Christianity from public 
life. It is not acceptable for a Catholic to disregard these matters, or supporting them by 
voting for those who are far away from us’ he said” (“Model państwa ateistycznego [The 
Model of an Atheist State],” 1996: 2).
“Deputy Archbishop Stanisław Gądecki repeated him: ‘The strategy of secularization is 
to support minority rights, but by excluding the rights of the majority’ ” (Wiśniewska & 
Nowakowska, 2011: 6).
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As we mentioned, the third process, which consists of changes in the agency of 
religious actors, results in an increase in the media coverage of religious institu-
tion. At the same time, together with the growth of religious institutions, there 
is a growing interest in non-religious groups in the media. Let’s explain the first 
of these cases. Until the death of Pope John Paul II, the agency of the Holy See 
boiled down to media coverage of the Pope’s agency rather than the Vatican 
state. The pontificate of Benedict XVI shows a change from the importance of 
the Pope’s agency to the domination of the Holy See. The same applies to the 
Polish Bishops’ Conference.
In the nineties, when considering the Polish Episcopate, we saw the media 
coverage of Primate Cardinal Glemp and the secretary of the Episcopate, Bishop 
Pieronek. After the era of John Paul II in media coverage, the agency of the Polish 
Bishops’ Conference as a collective grew. The spokesman, the secretary, and the 
chairman spoke on behalf of this collective, but in close communication with the 
whole group. We can see this in the following excerpt, in which the chairman of 
the Episcopate speaks out (“Czy biskupi naprawdę wsparli LPR w walce o zmiany 
w konstytucji? [Did the Bishops Really Support the LPR in the Fight for Changes 
in the Constitution?],” 2007: 6):
“ ‘The constitution should include a record to completely protect life,’ declared 
Archbishop Józef Michalik on Wednesday. He presented the first joint voice of the 
bishops in the debate on changes in the constitution. The bishops supported constitu-
tionally strengthening the protection of life starting from its conception, but they cut 
themselves off from political disputes over the constitution and opposed the decision 
for this to be resolved by the referendum. The voice of the Episcopate was enthusiasti-
cally received by LPR’s politicians yesterday. Is supporting the authority of the Church 
by politicians seeking to change the constitution legitimate?”
In the case of bishops, we are dealing with their independent agency. This situ-
ation is illustrated by, for example, Archbishop Sławoj Leszek Głódź’s pastoral 
sermon (“Lustracja na pasterkach [Lustration on Christmas Eve],” 2006: 6):
“The bishops did not protect politicians either. ‘Much harm is caused by the constant 
struggle for power and endless accusations during campaigns, which weakens the 
authority of the state and its institutions both in the internal dimension and in relation 
to other countries. In the circles of the media, culture and politics, many things require 
amending,’ said Archbishop Głódź.”
Among the themes related to the growth of religious institutions, we consider one 
to be particularly important from the perspective of shaping the idea of a secular 
state. It concerns a clear increase in the coverage of nones, or non-believers, in 
the transmissions of some of the analyzed media. In Fig. 5.34 from the previous 
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chapter, it can be seen that non-believers are given more than a quarter of the 
frequency in the category of religious and non-religious groups. Yet according to 
the grounding theory, it turned out that nones functioned in the research mate-
rial in a more complex way. First of all, media coverage of nones increased with 
subsequent years of analysis, especially in Gazeta Wyborcza. This increase, how-
ever, is connected with an increased coverage of the institutional Church.
In this context, it can be seen that nones rarely function with their own agency. 
They appear more often as a reported victim of the consequences of dominance 
or the Catholic Church being privileged. This is illustrated by the following 
example (Chyż & Deryłko, 2015: 5):
“The report emphasizes that discrimination against atheists is not related to willingness 
to harm them, but is expressed in supporting one of the religious groups. Privileges for 
religion mean that atheists are not treated equally.”
In this specific case, newspapers promote a new concept of nones as victims. 
This type of presentation primarily concerns Gazeta Wyborcza. As the con-
tent analysis from the previous chapter also shows (Fig. 5.35), this newspaper 
over-represents nones.
Considering that nones are still a marginal group in Polish society, we look at 
their over-representation as Gazeta Wyborcza’s clear agency for promoting the 
idea of a secular state. The narration of the newspaper assumes that the dom-
ination of the Catholic Church’s institutions causes significant discrimination 
against nones in the state. This clearly proves a lack of the state’s impartial world-
view. In turn, it also shows that the endorsed Church model implemented in 
Poland brings further consequences in the form of discriminating against nones.
We can summarize the current view of the agency of religious actors by refer-
ring to the process of professionalizing the communication of the Church’s 
religious institutions. It is accompanied by moving the accents from the cov-
erage of individual actors to the entire institution’s coverage. When we think 
about the individual actors themselves, it is noticed that the mediation of their 
agency occurs only in the second decade of this analysis. As mentioned, Kirill 
I of Moscow functions in the media as part of the format and logic developed by 
them. These late years of analysis show, therefore, that religious actors also follow 
the path of mediatization.
6.5  Covering the fusion of religion and state
We have devoted much attention so far to changes in the media’s approach to 
the secular state and the transformation of the agency of political and religious 
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actors. Let’s go to the crème de la crème of the Church-state relationship in 
this analysis. We would like the reader to look at the endorsed Church model 
implemented in Poland through the prism of changes in selected mechanisms 
of its representation in the media. The basic undertaking in this section makes 
references to finding the key to changes in the coverage of fusion over religious 
and state matters.
Let’s return to the contents of the axial categories outlined at the beginning 
of this chapter. It turns out that the presented changes in the representation of 
the model of Church-state relations and changes in the agency of religious and 
political actors do not exhaust in a satisfactory way the foundations of the theory 
we have set. Whatever remains in individual parts is read in the key of the fusion 
of religious and state matters. Two main sides of this fusion emerge from the 
analysis. We can call them symbolic and practical.
The symbolic perspective in the analyzed material particularly refers to two 
threads: the symbolism of the cross in public space and the status of religion as a 
school subject. The symbol of disagreement, as we should define the cross in this 
analysis, characterizes the mutual mixing of the state’s domain with the domain 
of religion and the nation. Let’s, therefore, analyze their possible meeting points 
to properly interpret the understanding of the cross present in this environment.
First of all, the creators of Poland’s laws do not give the cross a privileged 
status. Both the current constitution and the amended Act of January 31, 1980, 
on the theme of the state emblem, state colors, national anthem, and seals do not 
bear a trace of reference to religious symbolism, including the cross. Social prac-
tice proves, however, that crosses hang in public buildings, yet for most Poles 
they remain unnoticed. For the significant and present minority in media cov-
erage, they express the Church’s domination and break the principles of state 
secularism.
Three key moments refer to the social transformation of the understanding 
of this symbol. The first is when on October 19, 1997, Piotr Krutul and Tomasz 
Wójcik, two members of the Solidarity Electoral Action, hung a cross over the 
door of the Sejm’s Plenary Hall. A debate began on justifying its presence in the 
parliament. Among the commentators, the dominant belief was that the cross 
was more than just a religious symbol. As a result, the cross remained in the 
Sejm. It also functioned as having two levels of meaning: a religious symbol and 
a symbol of society winning the battle against the communist regime.
The second appearance of a cross was revealed in the context of the Smolensk 
crash on April 10, 2010. Among the spontaneous reactions of Poles after the 
disaster, Warsaw’s scouts brought a simple wooden cross to the courtyard of the 
deserted presidential palace. It became the center of prayer and commemoration 
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of the victims of the presidential plane crash. After a few months and the stag-
nation of the nation’s trauma, people raised the problem of removing the cross, 
spontaneously installed and without appropriate permission. City authorities 
identified with the PO party wanted to remove it. A group of defenders of the 
cross formed among the radical right-wing and PiS members. Political parties 
were in favor of or against the Smolensk cross standing opposite the presidential 
palace. The Church distanced itself from the matter. The cross itself become the 
center of a months-long dispute.
When looking at the previous results of the content analysis (Fig.  5.42 in 
chapter five), we admit that the vast majority of the 81 % devoted to the cross 
as such concerns the Smolensk cross. This peculiar – and strongly covered by 
media – case changes the media’s perception of this object in general. It becomes 
a personification of a dispute over religious and secular values. It functions as 
an artifact of many social scenes: a symbol commemorating the Smolensk crash 
victims; a symbol of political struggle; and a religious symbol that began to be 
mocked by radical opponents of the presence of religion in public space.
The last of the moments of the great dispute over the cross concerns November 
21, 2011, when the Palikot Movement’s parliamentary group appealed to the 
Sejm authorities with a request to remove the cross installed in 1997 from the 
Plenary Hall. The first reports on this event already reflected the specifics of the 
third edition of the dispute (“Pytanie o krzyż w Sejmie [A Question about the 
Cross in the Sejm],” 2011: 4):
“The Palikot Movement petitioned for the removal of the cross. The decision to con-
sult the Sejm’s analysis office in this matter was made at the meeting of the Seniors’ 
Convention. The RP’s application read that the cross in the Sejm’s hall was placed 
‘against the law’ without a debate and at night. The presence of a religious symbol in 
this place is incompatible with the Constitution, the Convention for the Protection of 
Human Rights and the Concordat.”
The narrative here indicates the illegal nature of the symbol in question in the 
parliament’s space. We can see, therefore, how it’s social meaning changes.
The three main issues of the dispute show how the media report individual 
cases of using the cross. This emerges from radicalizing the narrative on this 
symbol. Of course, the cross keeps its deep religious connotations throughout 
the case. At the same time, it is banalized at the social level. The cross goes from 
being a symbol of victory over communism to a symbol illegally pushed into 
public space. In this complicated matter, two interrelated threads are revealed. 
When we want to talk about the presence of a fusion of religion and the state, 
we must see the process of separating the two orders in the media. Second, 
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this process takes place in a typical media way, i.e. based on the correctness of 
media logic.
Media logic established the depreciation of the cross worth publishing. 
A  scandal due to a religious symbol guarantees high recipient interest. The 
language of depreciating the cross makes it emerge from the standard role. It 
becomes a banal instrument that illustrates the dominance of Catholicism, which 
breaks the state’s rule of law. Such banalization also causes the new meaning of 
the cross to resonate. Since the cross first of all becomes an affirmation of the 
Church’s social dictatorship, supporting its presence in the Sejm or in front of the 
presidential palace may be read in a simplified way as supporting certain polit-
ical forces. In this way, the cross also becomes the subject of whatever is political.
Religion in school is also banalized in media coverage. Here, as in the case of 
the cross, we do not want to enumerate subsequent moments of the dynamics of 
the dispute over the denominational character of school. Therefore, let’s directly 
refer to the two points on the time continuum that prove this banalization. The 
first takes place under the government of Tadeusz Mazowiecki. Religion appears 
in schools as an optional subject. It raises justified educational hopes (“Religia w 
szkołach [Religion in Schools],” 2010: 1):
“Catechesis, being the carrier of basic and universal values, enriches a person’s whole 
educational process. (…) It is impossible to fully educate a person without considering 
their religious sphere as well.”
In the meantime, the concordat and analogous laws on the relationship of the 
state to Churches and religious associations established the integral place of reli-
gion in the space of the lesson plan. Catechists gained full-time jobs and the 
possibility of career advancement as part of the promotion path typical of all 
teachers. Religion over time has become a part of the grade point average on the 
final report card. However, it did not obtain the status of a matriculation subject.
The outlined process is accompanied by a clear depreciation of catechesis in 
media coverage. The topic of religion in school loses the status of the subject 
of education and upbringing in the media’s coverage. In an increasing number 
of statements by left-wing politicians and the increasingly frequent coverage of 
highly anti-religious and anti-clerical events, it becomes banal. Two examples 
below show the specificity of this mechanism:
“ ‘School catechesis rooms are to become IT rooms. Instead of spending money on reli-
gious education, it is better to spend it on computers or for learning foreign languages,’ 
proposed the SLD. The Alliance proposes a public debate on the elimination of reli-
gion lessons in schools and believes that the ruling parties are ready for it” (“Religia w 
szkołach [Religion in Schools],” 2010: 1).
On the way to the secular state210
“One of the biggest problems of religion in school has long been the dilemma about 
what students are actually assessed on: their knowledge or faith. In extreme situations, 
Friday in Polish schools was the day set for going to Mass” (Wiśniewska, 2015: 4)
Teaching religion according to this type of argument means less money for the 
development of students’ computer and language skills. We can clearly see that 
we are moving from an educational issue to economics. In the case of the second 
fragment, even the cloudy educational basis of teaching religion is indicated. 
Students are to receive grades for participating in the Mass, not for their knowl-
edge. Both narratives cause that the meaning of religion in the media changes 
from the subject to shaping values and to the subject of wasting money and the 
talents of students. This depreciation has the strong potential to create stories 
about wasting opportunities for the youngest students. Therefore, it meets the 
requirements of media logic.
The praxis of the fusion of religious and state matters is much more complex 
than simply a reference to the symbolic sphere. It arises from constant dialogue 
and negotiating positions between religions and the state in the area of common 
rituals, the creation of denominational law, determining privileges, and state 
of ownership of Churches. Let’s trace each of these spaces separately to draw a 
number of broad conclusions from the area of mediatization.
Both the state and the Church function in the social space thanks to the agency 
of the institutions representing them. We spoke earlier about the specificity of 
changes in the agency realm of religion and the realm of politics. However, We 
have not touched on the space in which they interact most strongly with one 
another, meaning the space of joint religious and state rituals. Poland as a reli-
giously impartial country enters into daily dialogues with religions. In addition, 
the public activity of a middle-class citizen does not mean hiding one’s faith 
within the walls of their private rooms. In practice, meetings gathering what is 
private and public result in the meeting of equally embedded religions and state 
matters. This situation is especially illustrated by the religious and state funerals 
of recognized citizens covered by media, as in the case of the farewell celebration 
of Bronisław Geremek (Czaczkowska, 2008: 1):
“The prime minister undertakes the decision whether the funeral is performed as a state 
ceremony. The fact that it takes place in the cathedral is due to the bishop. The main 
organizer of the funeral was the Chancellery of the Prime Minister. Based on the 1990 
regulation, the prime minister decided whether the funeral would have a state character. 
This happened when the deceased was particularly honored by the country.”
The situation outlined above illustrates how the state respects the religious affil-
iation of its members and the right of the deceased and his family to a religious 
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burial. This passage shows that neither the Church nor the state imposes their 
own narrative about the event. It is different when the ritual at the meeting point 
of religion and the state functions only in public space. The collected material 
leads us to believe that two paths are possible: either the balance or the domina-
tion of one of the parties.
When we think about this balance, an interesting story from Aleksander 
Kwaśniewski’s speech on November 1995 comes to mind, that is, before his 
swearing into the office of the president of the Republic of Poland (“Polska 
neopogańska? [Neo-Pagan Poland?],” 1995: 3):
“The president-elect believes that the participation of the highest state authorities in cer-
tain religious ceremonies is necessary ‘in the name of shared values and shared responsi-
bility.’ The Italian newspaper La Stampa said that ‘he would be very honored if he could 
meet with the Pope, the greatest Pole in history: I am seeking permission in Poland and 
would like to ask the Pope to help me as a moral authority, recognized by all politicians.’ ”
The president-elect showed his approach to religious issues, which is missing 
from the earlier leftist narratives. It is about cooperation in order to realize 
common values. Kwaśniewski’s practice is later taken over by successive presi-
dents. The way in which this fusion appears in the media coverage also illustrates 
the mechanism that we have already seen at private and public events. Balance is 
born here from the state’s need to discreetly enter the religious space in order to 
confirm common values.
Such an approach differs from the situation in which the media reports that 
the Church is entering the state’s domain. Following the media coverage, this 
topic should be called the mixing of Churches, especially the Catholic Church, in 
the law-making process. Two basic stages should be specified here.
The first stage refers to the period before the adoption of the constitution. In 
1994, information about the direct involvement of some bishops in supporting 
a specific constitutional project appeared in the media. The bishops themselves 
tried to find a balance between direct involvement in politics and the expression 
of moral opinions. They introduced a strange division at that time. They claimed 
that they support the “ethical” but not the “political” constitutional design 
authored by Solidarity. Then they suggested a meeting with deputies to convince 
them of the Catholic reasons for protecting life. Already in 1995, the bishops 
clearly opposed the constitution’s draft procedure. They thought it was bad.
In this specific battle in shaping the law, the Conference of Polish Bishops 
clearly has no strategy of action. However, from the media contents, we learn 
about the strong confidence the bishops have that their voice in the political 
debate will be taken into account. Such coverage indicates the Church’s claims 
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for the right to shape the social and moral order of Poles in the state. The bishops 
seemed not to respect the then binding law that presupposed the full secularity 
of the state and its neutrality in matters of religion and beliefs.
The second part of the dispute boils down to the debate on in-vitro. It 
clearly differs from the former by another type of argument postulated by the 
bishops. Some of the hierarchs are imposing on politicians using old methods. 
For example, Archbishop Henryk Hoser will not allow the following (Stróżyk & 
Czaczkowska, 2010: 1):
“Archbishop Hoser, when asked whether Catholic deputies who will vote for in-vitro 
fertilization, freezing and selecting embryos, must reckon with excommunication, 
replied: ‘If they are aware of what they are doing, and they want this situation to arise, 
if they do not act in the direction of limiting the harm proposed by such a law, in my 
opinion, they are automatically outside of the Church community.’ ”
Against the background of such voices, Cardinal Stanisław Dziwisz is distin-
guished, who suggests normalizing this procedure in order to respect morality 
and human rights. He points out that the initiative belongs to the state, as can be 
seen in the following excerpt (Pezda, 2008: 6):
“Cardinal Dziwisz points out that this is about the rights of the human person. This 
means that this discussion cannot be reduced to a dispute between a religious and 
secular worldview. This is because human rights belong to the universal category, not 
being religious or secular. Of course, the cardinal also wants the Church’s teachings to 
be included. At the same time, he admits that, according to the principle of state and 
Church autonomy, legislation is entitled to the state, he explained.”
The controversy over the role of the Church in the law-making process will 
strongly expose the SLD’s opposition headed by Grzegorz Napieralski. In 
numerous discourses on the dominant role of the Church in Poland, Napieralski 
reflects his attitude towards the agency of the Church (Pezda, 2008: 6):
“The Catholic Church cannot be a subject of political life in the country, influencing the 
decisions of governments, for example by enforcing its position on in-vitro fertilization. 
Instead of convincing the faithful to its position, it puts pressure on the government. The 
Church’s interference in problems of family life is incomprehensible to me. What kind of 
experience in family matters can a priest have? Does he get up at two in the morning to 
feed a child or change a diaper?”
On the basis of the presented themes, the image of the Church emerges as a 
source of dispute with the political authority, which does not take into account its 
postulates. Are we therefore able to talk about a fusion between religious and state 
matters? The answer is definitely negative. When the state enters into a relation-
ship with the Church, it does it in a sublime way. It treats Church representatives 
Covering the fusion of religion and state 213
rather as leaders of a ceremony. Media coverage, which accompanies this topic, 
appeals to gentle cooperation between both entities.
The opposite situation was the media coverage focusing on the Church’s 
demands that violate applicable laws. We see this fundamental imbalance as 
founded on two elements. First, in the system of impartial worldview, the state 
plays the role of a leading operating entity, and religion remains the object of the 
possible operations of the state entity. Second, as the previous analysis indicates, 
political actors are much better at adapting to the logic of the media than repre-
sentatives of religion.
There is one element of the above-mentioned imbalance, which essentially 
imposes an increase in negatively viewing religious actors. It comes down to the 
possessions and privileges granted to the Church. This issue starts from the mo-
ment Churches and religious associations obtained the right to regain the prop-
erty stolen from them by the People’s Republic of Poland. It passed through the 
period of securing the possession of institutional religions through paying taxes 
by priests teaching religion. It ended at the moment of attempting to review this 
state through the postulate of the PO at the 2015 parliamentary elections. At that 
time, the ruling PO party wanted to liquidate the Church fund, which ensures 
paying health insurance for priests.
Coverage of the Catholic Church’s funds, but not for all other religious com-
munities, causes the most ambiguity and prejudice against this community. 
What causes this reluctance? We perceived the basis of such activity starting in 
the period of the parliamentary election campaign in 2015. The PO was looking 
for a way to distinguish itself from PiS and attract the anti-clerical SLD elec-
torate. However, the whole matter covered up a deeper content. This one case 
illustrates the general regularity in Church-state relations. The economic factor 
was the basis for antagonizing parties and Churches, proving that on the part of 
political actors, the fusion of what is religious and the state’s does not belong to 
primary values. However, religion as such remains a tool they use in practicing 
the electoral game.
The symbolic and practical themes we have been talking about prove that 
the dynamics of media coverage of the fusion of religious and state matters 
takes place in the space of three important themes: reification, banalization, and 
demonization. When talking about reification, we mean “the process by which 
people come to treat other people and human actions as if they were things” 
(Billig, 2013: 103). In this study, the media and electoral materials of the party 
indicate that political power reifies religion in a direct and indirect way. In the 
case of joint religious and state celebrations, the observable balance of both 
kingdoms in the long run serves to achieve the particularism of power. The 
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religious agency during these ceremonies is part of a wider plan to achieve the 
state’s goals (indirect reification). In the case of political activity, the authority 
refers to the arguments of limiting religion in order to achieve electoral support 
(direct reification).
The second mechanism consists in changing the meaning of important 
symbols associated with religion at the moment when they enter the field of pol-
itics. The agency of politicians, religious representatives and the media brings 
about their new understanding. Deep and extensive narratives about their reli-
gious and social functioning are partially or completely transformed. Religious 
symbols, therefore, narrow down their original understanding. Sometimes they 
completely lose their original meaning and gain a new symbolism, less signifi-
cant but more catchy for the media.
The last of the themes we see here is connected with the demonization of 
religious entities within the media representation of Church-state relations. 
The mechanism of the media here leads to silencing the state’s controversial 
statements and focusing on the bad agency of the Church and its institutions. 
Bad agency presented as such has quite complex grounds based on the lack of 
ability of some religious actors to look at their agency in the key of media logic.
When we gather what has been presented so far, it is clear that the process 
of shaping the idea of a secular state is subject to varying degrees of accommo-
dating to media logic. Four basic elements should be emphasized here: profes-
sionalization of the party taking into account the perspective of media logic, 
mediatization of political actors, mediatization of religious actors, and the exis-
tence of banal religion.
Parties professionalize their discourses on the subject of the secular state and 
the Church-state relationship. This means that over time, they add more pressure 
to be more visible. They accomplish this by tuning into individual components 
of media logic. Analogous accommodation takes place in the case of religious 
actors. However, this process is much easier for political leaders than represent-
atives of institutional religions.
Media transmission uses the process of two ways to banalize religion. First, the 
cross functions both as a religious symbol and as a symbol of a political dispute. 
In contrast, in the case of religion classes in schools, its banalization is connected 
with reification and demonization. The original meaning of religion in school is 
put aside. In its place enters the understanding of religion as the object of propa-
ganda and the basis for fears about the nature of teaching children.
7  In search of the mediatization effect
By analyzing media contents, legal and party documents, we tried to show the 
mechanisms that mediatize the idea of a secular state. The last element of the 
communication process, meaning the content reception, was clearly missing in 
all of this. As it was pointed out, the mediatization effect cannot be identified 
with the media effect as such. The first mechanism points to a number of changes 
both in social institutions and among individual actors. From the perspective of 
the communication process, however, it also takes into account the mechanisms 
typical of the media effect. In this final chapter of the book, let’s search for traces 
of the mediatization effect in society.
7.1  Sources of knowledge about a secular state
In the methodological part, it was mentioned that the last element of this 
analysis on the mediatization of the secular-state idea and the Church-state rela-
tionship applies to audience reception. Indeed, the analyzed media belong to 
the basic and uninterrupted sources of information about the secular state and 
the joint exercises between the Church and state, but can we find links between 
their contents and the audience’s awareness? Let’s face this issue by analyzing the 
sources of social information about the secular state.
The simplest answer about where to locate these sources leads us to the media. 
In Matthew Engelke’s (2010) previously quoted essay, there even appears a sug-
gestion that we view the social functioning of religion today mostly through 
the religion and media turn. We follow this perspective, taking into account the 
results of the reception study, which confirms the media’s advantage among the 
declared sources of information about the secular state.
When we look at the data from Fig.  7.1 showing which communication 
channel provides basic knowledge about the secular state, we can see that more 
than half of the respondents point to TV (63.2 %) and the internet (54.8 %). The 
third source of information concerns the press (44.1 %). Interpersonal commu-
nication, which does not need media, takes fourth place (42.3 %). Thus, our intu-
ition is not wrong. The media determines Polish society’s knowledge about the 
meeting point of the realm of religion and the realm of the state.
In this case, however, geographical differences take on significance. Members 
of the public acquire knowledge about the secular state differently depending on 
where they live. We suggest to look at the diversity in village and a big city of over 
500,000 residents. In the case of metropolitan residents, their knowledge about 
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the secular state comes primarily from the internet (67.7 %), followed by televi-
sion (56.3 %) and interpersonal communication (55.7 %). Although there is a 
lack of printed media in the top three, its share in sources of information about 
the secular state still remains significant (51.4 %). Based on this, it is argued that 
current knowledge on the secular state is shaped here in the process of receiving 
and reading traditional media together with the use of new media. Thus, this ap-
proach sets the foundations for further research in the field of the hybrid media 
environment representing the secular state.
When we look at the same problem from a rural perspective, different types 
of media dominate over interpersonal communication. The space of knowledge 
about the secular state is primarily shaped on the basis of information from tele-
vision (65.7 %). The internet is a much less popular but also quite present source 
of such knowledge (48.2 %). Other sources of information are the press (41.5 %) 
and radio (40.6  %). Interpersonal communication ranks fifth (38.7  %). This 
shows that the approach of rural residents to a secular state is shaped to a great 
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Television 65.7 66.9 60.6 64.0 56.3 63.2
Internet 48.2 51.6 54.4 60.5 67.6 54.8
Press 41.5 42.1 43.4 45.1 51.4 44.1
Talks with other 
people
38.7 32.5 42.4 46.3 55.7 42.3
Radio 40.6 43.8 36.7 34.5 44.0 40.0





33.9 25.7 24.8 20.7 20.2 26.8
Other 4.4 3.7 1.8 5.0 7.1 4.4
None 2.6 1.7 6.8 2.3 4.4 3.4
Difficult to say 3.2 0.8 3.7 2.9 3.4 2.9
Multi-choice questions, percentages do not add up to 100
Fig. 7.1: The sources of information on the topic of a secular state according to place of 
residence (%). Source: Own research
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In the analyzed material, the role of parish announcements seems to reflect the 
specific stereotype of religious villages and non-religious big cities. The highest 
point of this source of information about the secular state concerns villages 
(33.9 %), and the lowest includes cities of over 500,000 residents (20.2 %). This 
allows us to assume that the informational function of parish churches still 
belongs to the landscape of a large part of Poland.
When we complete the geographical perspective according to the division of 
the age of respondents seen in Fig. 7.2, we can see that following the age group; 
there appears a change in the basic source of information on the topic of the sec-
ular state. Young people declare that they mostly obtain such knowledge from 
the internet (77.3 %). The remaining groups get their information mostly from 
television (61.2 % aged 34–54; 67 % aged 55 and over).
The Church has a centuries-old tradition of communicating information 
from the pulpit. The results show that in the case of a secular state, this channel of 
communication also refers to the significant sources of information. In addition, 
there is a clear disproportion between the respondents aged 18–34 (22.7 %) and 
those aged 35–54 (31.8 %). This shows that the generation of parents and child 
are searching for answers at the meeting point of the Church-state relationship 
in other places. The fact that the internet decidedly dominates among the youth 
(77.3 %) strengthens this observation.
Sources of information 






Over 55 years  
of age
Total
Television 59.4 62.1 67.0 63.2
Internet 77.3 59.1 34.6 54.8
Press 43.5 46.7 42.2 44.1
Talks with other people 47.4 44.6 36.5 42.3
Radio 40.1 46.6 34.0 40.0
Social Media 39.9 37.2 22.3 32.3
Church – sermons and  
parish announcements
22.7 31.8 25.2 26.8
Other 5.2 2.1 5.8 4.4
None 1.7 4.8 3.4 3.4
Difficult to say 1.6 3.5 3.2 2.9
Multi-choice questions, percentages do not add up to 100
Fig. 7.2: Sources of information about a secular state according to age (%). Source: Own 
research
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Also, the division for religious faith reveals a number of regularities (Fig. 7.3). 
First of all, nones declare that they obtain information about the secular state 
primarily from the internet (46.5  %). The second but definitely less preferred 
source of information about the secular state’s issues remains the printed press 
(20.4 %). They are also distinguished from the general public by the fact that 
by far they almost do not acquire this knowledge from television (5.2 %). This 
suggests the image of nones as being representatives of the culture of reading and 
clicking, not just the receptive viewing of messages through electronic media.
People who declare they have a stable or strong faith differ. Television provides 
them with basic knowledge about the secular state, and then the internet. 
Believers (36.2 %) watch TV, and the internet takes second place (26.5 %). In the 
case of deeply religious people, television gains 26.5 % and the internet 23 %. The 
primary role of television also coincides with the fact that the majority of society 
still remains mainly Catholic.
Here, we can see two interesting regularities that are worth noticing. First 
of all, with the increase of religious faith, the percentage of declarations related 
to acquiring knowledge from the internet is decreasing. The internet is being 
replaced by television, with the biggest increase among believers (36.2  %). 
Second, deeply religious people most often reach for the contents offered to them 
Main source of 
information about 
the secular state










Talks with other 
people
11.1 10.0 5.4 8.1 6.1 6.5
Press 20.4 16.7 6.7 7.1 6.2 8.3
Internet 46.5 39.9 26.5 23.0 25.7 28.3
Social Media 6.2 3.7 4.5 3.7 0.0 4.3




1.0 0.0 5.1 9.7 0.0 4.9
Television 5.2 15.1 36.2 26.5 21.7 30.9
Other 1.9 0.0 2.9 1.6 18.4 2.9
Difficult to say 7.7 6.0 8.9 13.5 5.3 9.3
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
Fig. 7.3: The main source of information about the secular state in relation to religious 
faith (%). Source: Own research
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in Church during sermons and parish announcements (9.7 %). However, Church 
influence is only slightly higher than interpersonal communication (8.1 %) and 
the printed press (7.1 %). We see, therefore, that the pulpit has long ago lost the 
status of the primary place of religious knowledge even among believers.
Respondents declare that the sources of their information about the secular 
state refer to the media. This confirms our assumption at the beginning of the 
book to analyze the contents of mainstream media in the last two decades. It also 
co-operates with the available studies on the preferred sources of information 
in the local environment (Gierula & Jachimowski, 2000). Whereas in previous 
studies the significant participation of interpersonal communication was dem-
onstrated (Gierula, 2005), here its role definitely declines.
The internet appears in the results of reception studies, which raises cer-
tain challenges. It seems that such a result indicates a very narrow design of 
the study. We took into account the possibility of such a limitation when we 
started this research. Therefore, we carried out a content analysis regarding the 
secular state and atheism in the dominant information platforms of the Polish-
language internet. The results we presented during the Polish Communication 
Association congress in 2015 suggest some reservations towards this approach 
of the respondents. The contents from which respondents declared that they 
gained knowledge about the secular state were slight. They are lost in the thicket 
of information provided by mainstream news services on the internet (Guzek, 
2016b). Keeping in mind Lövheim’s (2014) current findings in the context of 
high modernity countries, we can expect to see the internet’s real growth as the 
primary source of information on religion.
7.2  Not very attractive Church-state issues
While in the previous section we referred to sources of knowledge about the sec-
ular state, let’s now see if there is a basis for postulating the connection between 
the products of the media and the state of public knowledge about the secular 
state. We will omit the mechanism of transposing media images into mental 
pictures. Rather, we focus on identifying the traces of the media debate and its 
characteristics in respondents’ views on the three issues that mostly resonate in 
recent years on the subject of state secularism. This concerns narratives about 
the concordat, state interference in the activities of the Catholic Church and the 
interference of the Catholic Church in state politics.
In the previous two chapters, it is placed strong emphasis on the importance of 
the concordat treaty on the development of the media’s idea of a secular state and 
the Church-state relationship. The presented grounded theory proves that the 
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negative attitude towards the Church is growing in media coverage. Moreover, 
the SLD and the Palikot Movement publicize the postulates for withdrawing 
the concordat. Following this theme, it is possible to check how media viewers 
see the issue of the concordat and where they find their sources of knowledge 
about it.
The category of answers includes suggestions repeatedly postulated by 
politicians and their various options in reference to the concordat (Fig.  7.4). 
These postulates, however, characterize different periods of the public debate. 
They commenced with the statement by Krzysztof Skubiszewski, Minister of 
Foreign Affairs in 1989–1993, who stated that the treaty is the restoration of 
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on the topic of 
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11.6 19.7 7.9 20.9 20.2 15.1
None of the 
above






12.3 8.0 14.5 13.4 6.5 11.2
The concordat 
protects the state 
from excessive 
Church influence
7.2 5.9 10.1 4.4 8.3 7.2
Other 5.4 2.0 5.2 11.1 8.4 6.2
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
Fig. 7.4: Most often heard opinions about the concordat in relation to place of residence 
(%). Source: Own research
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broken ties between the state and the Church (“Mamy konkordat [We Have a 
Concordat],” 1993). It concludes with a strong postulate by the leftist party that 
the concordat practically admits the denominational state (“Z pięciu zostały trzy 
[Three Remain out of Five],” 1997).
Taking into account the place of residence, 23.8 % of respondents are not able 
to identify the most popular opinion they hear about this treaty. Earlier, we tried 
to convince the reader that the nature of the debate around the concordat is 
changing. In practice, the concordat functions in media narratives after 2008 as 
a treaty which some politicians promise to revise or terminate. The representa-
tives of the left wing see it as the main tool for building a religious state. Their 
views, however, do not translate into the declarations of respondents. While only 
15.1 % of survey participants identify this view as the main concordat narrative, 
22.2 % repeat what dominated the media coverage after signing the treaty on 
July 28, 1993.
Respondents tend to think that the concordat denotes a renewal of the rela-
tionship between the Church and the state. The problem is that this type of nar-
rative appeared in the media and disappeared in 1993. Keeping this in mind, we 
cannot establish a connection between the contents of the media and the opinions 
of respondents. There is a clearly short time span in both discourses. The situation 
becomes more and more specific in the light of the results of Fig. 7.5.
Most often heard opinions on the 









Don’t know, difficult to say 19.4 27.4 23.8 23.8
The concordat restores Church-state 
relations
20.4 22.7 23.0 22.2
The concordat introduces a 
denominational state
14.4 15.6 15. 15.
None of the above 19.3 16.4 8.7 14.3
The concordat protects the Church 
from excessive state influence
8.3 9.4 15.0 11.2
The concordat protects the state from 
excessive Church influence
12.1 3.1 7.4 7.2
Other 6.2 5.4 7.0 6.2
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
Fig. 7.5: Most often heard opinions on the topic of the concordat according to age (%). 
Source: Own research
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This illustrates the lack of awareness about the discussed topic and the pre-
tended knowledge in the case of the youngest group of respondents. People aged 
18–34 refer to the short-term interpretation of the 1993 concordat as the most 
frequently heard opinion on the topic (20.4 %). At the same time, the dominant 
argument for the revision or rejection of the concordat, meaning that it creates a 
denominational state, takes up only 8.3 %.
Fig. 7.6 shows that the leftist postulate, which heavily uses media messages to 
present the concordat, does not penetrate social awareness. As many as 49.7 % 
of the respondents are ignorant of the media-quoted postulates of terminating 
the concordat. From the perspective of the place of residence, the highest per-
centage of this group fall on village residents (51.9 %) and people from largest 
cities (51.1 %). When we mention the media, all of them together reach 37.2 % of 
respondents. What does this matter look like from the perspective of age? Details 
are provided in Fig. 7.7.
This category has a significant percentage of people aged 18–34 who do 
not have any knowledge about the postulates about liquidating the concordat 
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concordat
Place of residence (%)















None 51.9 47.5 47.5 47.8 51.1 49.7
Television 16.4 20.3 18.9 16.3 10.0 16.4
Internet 10.0 13.7 8.2 14.0 11.9 11.2
Difficult to say 6.9 3.8 12.8 5.9 10.9 7.9
Press 3.3 3.5 3.2 7.4 5.5 4.3
Social media 3.2 4.1 2.2 1.7 4.3 3.1
Radio 4.2 0.9 0.4 2.9 0,4 2.2
Talks with other 
people




1.0 1.7 1.7 1.3 2.7 1.6
Other 1.7 1.8 0.9 0.5 1.9 1.4
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
Fig. 7.6: The main sources of knowledge on the postulate to break with the concordat in 
relation to place of residence (%). Source: Own research
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(61.2 %). On the other hand, respondents who have specific knowledge in this 
area declared that it particularly came from the television. In the case of the 
35–54 age group, the internet provides them with information (15.2 %).
The results presented so far lead to several basic conclusions. First of all, the 
theme of the concordat is unattractive for readers and media users. The presented 
reports clearly indicate that respondents do not think about this treaty. Wherever 
they try to relate to it, they are more likely to suggest cafeteria talk presented to 
them rather than factual knowledge. This state as a rule precludes the possibility 
of a deeper analysis of how the debate over the concordat is taking place and its 
reception in Polish society.
The question that can be asked here concerns society’s general approach 
towards top Church and state-related topics. In other words, does the secular 
state also function on the basis of guesses rather than knowledge? To answer this 
problem, let’s look at the next two important themes that result from the data. 
They are limited to the state’s interference in the activities of the Catholic Church 
and also the Church’s interference in state practices and law-making processes.
We have to refer to the part of the grounded theory where it was analyzed a spe-
cific case of state interference and problems during the ingress, when Archbishop 
Stanisław Wielgus was accused of collaborating with the former security serv-
ices. This spectacular example of the interference of political authorities in the 
The main sources of knowledge 










None 61.2 48.0 42.8 49.7
Television 10.6 12.9 23.7 16.4
Internet 12.8 15.2 6.4 11.2
Difficult to say 4.0 9.0 9.8 7.9
Press 3.1 4.4 5.1 4.3
Social media 3.7 2.5 3.2 3.1
Radio 2.1 2.7 2.0 2.2
Talks with other people 1.6 2.0 2.9 2.2
Church – homilies and parish 
announcements
0.4 2.0 2.0 1.6
Other 0.5 1.4 2.1 1.4
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
Fig. 7.7: The main sources of knowledge on the postulate to break with the concordat in 
relation to age (%). Source: Own research
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activities of a religious institution belongs to the few exceptions presented in 
the media’s material. It also has the advantage of universality for interventions 
within the framework of impartial state involvement in the life of religion.
In asking questions about such interventions, we deliberately used the descrip-
tive adjective “multiple” (Fig. 7.8). The results indicate that 49.5 % of respondents 
express negative opinions to different degrees about the proposal. At the same 
time, 32 % of respondents, or every third respondent, express the general con-
viction that after 1989, political authorities repeatedly interfered in the organi-
zation and life of the Catholic Church. This view is shared by almost half of the 
respondents from cities with up to 20,000 residents (43.8 %).
When we add the age variable to this (Fig. 7.9), it turns out that as many as 
13.5 % of respondents aged 55 and over have a strong conviction about the state’s 
repeated interference in the life of the Catholic Church. Such a distribution of 
respondent beliefs allows us to confirm that their image of the world is shaped 
far differently from the dominant influence of media contents. Therefore, non-
media factors are involved, which cannot be predicted solely on the basis of the 
data available here.
It was mentioned the opposite situation, meaning the significant interference 
of the Catholic Church in politics and legislative issues, in the previous chapter. 
It dealt with the fusion of religion and the state. We also illustrated clear traces 
of the Catholic Church’s pressure on the state with the help of formal and less 
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Decidedly yes 10.5 17.1 14.8 7.6 5.2 11.0
Rather yes 24.6 26.7 14.9 18.1 16.5 21.0
Difficult to say 20.1 17.3 19.5 20.2 13.8 18.6
Rather not 31.3 27.1 32.7 33.9 38.3 32.4
Decidedly not 13.5 11.9 18.2 20.1 26.2 17.1
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
Fig. 7.8: The attitude of respondents to the opinion that after 1989 the state repeatedly 
interfered with the organization and life of the Catholic Church based on the place of 
residence (%). Source: Own research
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formal means of influence. There were also threats made by prominent hierarchs. 
What does this look like in the case of audience reception?
Two additional figures, 7.10 and 7.11, indicate that 65 % of respondents see 
the significant interference of the Catholic Church in state affairs. Only 21.7 % of 
respondents are of the opposite opinion. Data from Fig. 7.10 prove, however, that 
this opinion is especially dominant among the inhabitants of the largest cities 
(46.8 %). At the same time, the most and strongest opponents of such a view, 
6.1 %, come from towns of up to 20,000 residents. When we look at this division 
The attitude of respondents to the opinion 
that after 1989 the state repeatedly 
interfered with the organization and  









Decidedly yes 8.3 10.7 13.1 11.0
Rather yes 25.7 19.0 19.3 21.0
Difficult to say 20.3 19.4 16.6 18.6
Rather not 31.2 33.4 32.4 32.4
Decidedly not 14.6 17.5 18.6 17.1
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
Fig. 7.9: The attitude of respondents to the opinion that after 1989 the state repeatedly 
interfered with the organization and life of the Catholic Church based on age (%). 
Source: Own research
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Decidedly yes 32.8 38.5 42.0 41.7 46.8 38,9
Rather yes 25.3 31.8 26.1 25.5 25.0 26,4
Difficult to say 18.3 10.7 9.9 9.6 10.2 13,0
Rather not 16.3 12.9 16.1 15.4 11.9 14,9
Decidedly not 7.3 6.1 6.0 7.7 6.0 6,8
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
Fig. 7.10: The attitude of respondents to the opinion that after 1989, the Catholic 
Church repeatedly interfered in politics and legislative issues based on place of residence 
(%). Source: Own research
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from the perspective of respondent age (Fig. 7.11), another interesting charac-
teristic appears.
The oldest respondents aged 55 and over more often than others opposed the 
thesis about the significant interference of the Catholic Church in the political 
sphere and the legislative process. This group included as many as 25.1  % of 
respondents. This shows that the media do not provide them with a basic nar-
rative about the subsequent zones of influence in the state appropriated by the 
Catholic Church.
The audience study gives us some insight into the area of the selected topics 
on the secular state. Looking at the inconsistent results of media analysis and 
respondents’ opinions, we can immediately move away from combining the 
dynamic shaping of the concordat and Church-state relations in the media and 
their dynamics in the results of audience reception. Two fundamental reasons 
led us to make such a decision. It is about the lack of high interest among 
respondents on this subject matter and their arbitrary relation towards indi-
vidual entities of Church-state relations visible in the material.
First of all, respondents unanimously identify the media as their primary 
source of knowledge about a secular state. Their knowledge on the strongly 
reported Church-state events, however, turns out to be negligible. They look 
for the basis of this process in the insufficient reception of media coverage 
in their audience. Second, some respondents are quite arbitrary about being 
able to comment on the mutual pressure of the Catholic Church and the state. 
We can search for the basics of this process in their ignorance and misun-
derstanding seen in the regularities associated with negotiating the concordat. 
Such easy predications on pressure from every side result from the fact that 
The attitude of respondents to the 
opinion that after 1989 the Catholic 
Church repeatedly interfered in  









Decidedly yes 35.2 40.8 39.9 38.9
Rather yes 33.1 25.8 22.1 26.4
Difficult to say 15.7 11.0 12.9 13.0
Rather not 10.7 14.9 17.9 14.9
Decidedly not 5.3 7.5 7.2 6.8
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
Fig. 7.11: The attitude of respondents to the opinion that after 1989 the Catholic Church 
repeatedly interfered in politics and legislative issues based on age (%). Source: Own 
research
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the Church and the state have the status of institutions that to a certain extent 
oppress rather than keep to the actual dynamics of this process. The dynamics 
reported in the results of the grounded theory stand out from the unanimous 
assessments of respondents.
7.3  “Where’s the cross?”
Sacrilegious and scoffing material on YouTube entitled Where is the cross? has 
presently obtained over six million views. It boils down to a remix of the words 
of the defenders of the Smolensk cross accompanied by electronic music. This 
material has been imprinted in the minds of young Poles, and the slogan “where 
is the cross” for a while became something out of the Polish urban dictionary. 
Hurtful feelings in the religious remix are a strong and visible way of banalizing 
religion in the public space.
We can wonder when considering this matter if whether before the internet 
dominated the minds of the younger generation did banal representations break 
through into the social imaginarium? In this section, we will touch upon this 
problem regarding the matter disseminated in the book. However, we should ask 
a more general question about the visibility of symbols and events that stand out 
in the analyzed media. To this end, we will use references to representatives of 
world religions in the Polish parliament and the symbol of the cross.
As we showed in the previous chapter, the presence of religious leaders in 
the Polish parliament has always had strong coverage, thus revealing the strong 
agency of political and religious actors. These carefully planned events show the 
positive attitude of the state towards religion and religious values. As in the cases 
of the Dalai Lama and Patriarch Kirill, representatives of political power will not 
fail to care to meet with the media, during which they touch upon important 
matters of peace and moral order. How much of this, however, remains in the 
minds of recipients and media readers?
Based on the results in Fig. 7.12, we can note that among the respondents 
prevails general knowledge about Pope John Paul II’s visit to the Polish par-
liament (79.3 %). The media repeatedly turned to this fact. However, it should 
be remembered that the event took place in June of 1999. The vast majority of 
respondents managed to blur his image. Associating the Pope with a visit to the 
Plenary Hall of the Sejm may therefore result from the ordinary mechanism of 
imposing this type of agency on Pope Wojtyła. This would clearly correspond to 
the style of his pontificate. It should also be remembered that John Paul II in the 
Polish parliament has become a frequent snapshot in short materials published 
and issued on the occasion of various papal anniversaries.
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The last visit of a religious leader to the Polish parliament took place in August 
2012. As we have learned, the main actor of this event, Kirill I of Moscow, shows 
a new type of media agency. Media recipients, however, did not see this visit. 
Data from Fig. 7.12 indicate that only 4.6 % of respondents remember Kirill’s 
presence in the Polish parliament. When we look at the breakdown due to the 
place of residence, the number of respondents increases slightly, up to 9.6  %. 
Respondents find it easier to remember the Dalai Lama. Although the meetings 
of this Buddhist authority with representatives of Poland’s government were 
not as strongly implemented as Kirill’s, many more respondents mentioned the 
Dalai Lama (27.5 %), and disproportionately many of these were residents of the 
largest cities (40.6 %).
The division according to the place of residence provides us with more impor-
tant information. Among village inhabitants, it is difficult to find knowledge 
about visits to the parliament by leaders other than John Paul II. Only 19.8 % of 
them mentioned the Dalai Lama. Meanwhile, in the largest cities, the awareness 
of visits by the leaders of Orthodoxy and Buddhism remains at the highest level.
Bartholomew I, Patriarch of Constantinople and the spiritual leader of the 
world Orthodox Church, came to Poland several times. However, no trace about 
his visit to the Polish parliament in the respondents’ declarations can be found. 
People from towns of up to 20,000 inhabitants do not identify Bartholomew’s 








Place of residence (%)















John Paul II 78.4 82.2 78.8 80.4 77.8 79.3
Dalai Lama XIV 19.8 27.5 26.1 33.0 40.6 27.5
Kirill I 4.0 2.7 2.2 5.2 9.6 4.6
None 4.2 0.0 2.2 1.6 3.1 2.6
Bartholomew I 1.0 0.0 3.0 0.9 3.5 1.6
I do not know 14.4 11.7 12.6 13.3 12.7 13.2
Multi-choice questions, percentages do not add up to 100
Fig. 7.12: Respondents’ knowledge about the visits of religious leaders to Poland’s 
parliament based on place of residence (%). Source: Own research
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When we take into account the age of respondents (Fig. 7.13), the first obser-
vation concerns the advantage of people aged 55 and over and their knowledge 
about the visit of spiritual leaders to the Polish parliament. Only in the cases 
of Kirill (7.4  %) and Bartholomew I  (2.1  %) do they show less awareness of 
the issue discussed. On the other side are young people aged 18–34 who dem-
onstrate the highest degree of knowledge about the parliamentary agency of 
these Orthodox leaders. Kirill appears among 24.3 % of respondents in this age 
group, and Bartholomew I takes 4.4 %. We can explain this in a prosaic way. The 
agency of these two religious leaders perfectly reflects the effect of novelty. For 
respondents, it is easier to remember John Paul II and the Dalai Lama than the 
leaders of the Orthodox Church. The presence of the Orthodox patriarchs in the 
media must therefore resonate due to the unknown and at the same time inter-
esting nature of Orthodoxy.
The data clearly shows that the youngest age group (7.7 %) also cannot answer 
the question about the presence of religious leaders in the Polish parliament. 
What does such information give us? First of all, we learn that the perception 
of religious issues in the Church-state relationship is clearly weaker among the 
younger generation. Let’s take into account that in this group’s minds there are 
remixes such as Where is the cross? This age group also remains least interested 
in the contents associated with religion and the state. In this area, therefore, it 
seems most easy to banalize religious symbols, understood as depriving them of 
their original meaning and imposing a new understanding.
Such an approach brings us closer to examining the cause of the cross. Let’s 
start with the prosaic question of how respondents understand this symbol. The 
Respondents’ knowledge about 










John Paul II 68.2 81.5 85.3 79.3
Dalai Lama XIV 25.5 26.3 30.2 27.5
Kirill I 24.3 10.8 7.4 13.2
None 7.7 2.1 4.6 4.6
Bartholomew I 4.4 1.8 2.1 2.6
I do not know 2.1 1.3 1.4 1.6
Multi-choice questions, percentages do not add up to 100
Fig. 7.13: Respondents’ knowledge about the visits of religious leaders to Poland’s 
parliament based on age (%). Source: Own research
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answers they provide in an interesting way highlight the previously presented 
transformation of this symbol.
The cross, as shown in Fig. 7.14, functions in the respondents’ declarations 
above all as a religious symbol (86.3 %). It works as the object of Christian cult 
with a minimum of 84.7 % in the largest cities and 85.3 % in the countryside. 
When we look at the description of the cross as evidence of the nation’s Catholic 
tradition, we clearly differentiate the similarity of declarations in large cities and 
villages. It turns out that the cross most often functions as a national artifact in 
the countryside (40 %), and least frequently in the largest cities (28.3 %).
We have devoted a lot of space in the analysis so far to the clear change in the 
coverage of the cross, focusing the reader’s attention on the banalization and 
demonization of religious symbols, including the cross. What surprises in the 
respondents’ statements concerns the lack of a trace of these processes. First of 
all, the media are using this symbol both in a general understanding of the cross 
and specifically the Smolensk cross. As a result, when one thinks of the Smolensk 




Place of residence (%)

















85.3 86.7 86.9 89.3 84.7 86.3
A symbol that 
testifies to the 
nation’s Catholic 
tradition
40.0 28.9 32.2 32.7 28.3 33.9
A symbol of 
the Smolensk 
tragedy
3.3 3.5 4.0 4.7 2.4 3.5
A symbol of 
opposition to the 
PRL system
2.6 2.7 4.0 5.3 3.6 3.4
Other 2.3 2.1 1.5 1.5 6.7 2.7
Hard to say 2.4 .4 3.8 3.0 1.8 2.3
Multi-choice questions, percentages do not add up to 100
Fig. 7.14: The way of understanding the cross according to place of residence (%). 
Source: Own research
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Where is the cross? Meanwhile, in studying people’s reception, there is no trace of 
this order. The cross remains an element of the Smolensk crash context for only a 
few people, because 3.5 % of respondents now primarily see it as a symbol of the 
tragedy. Even fewer so, because 2.7 % of respondents assign it a different kind of 
meaning, or have a problem with assigning it such a meaning (2.3 %). Therefore, 
we can speak of the failure to postpone the many-month-long dispute over the 
Smolensk cross in the minds of the media recipients.
When we take into account the change in age (Fig. 7.15), it turns out that the 
respondents express a similar position in understanding the cross. In this situa-
tion, we can ask if the cross is a neutral symbol for them. Treated first as a reli-
gious sign and next as a national sign, it expresses the fusion of Catholicism and 
Polishness. This merger in a specific way translates into the respondents’ attitude 
towards the cross in public spaces.
There are several interesting themes present in Fig.  7.16. First of all, the 
majority of respondents (79.7 %) do not see a problem with the cross being pre-
sent in public buildings, such as a school or town hall. As much as 94.7 % of 
believers obtain information about the secular state from homilies. When the 
source of knowledge about the secular state remains the media, several regular-
ities appear. Television viewer expresses a neutral attitude (85.7 %). The lowest, 
though still high, the percentage of respondents with no objection to the cross in 
public places is articulated by those for whom the press remains the basic source 
of knowledge about the secular state (67.2 %). We can see the negative impact of 
the press agency, especially Gazeta Wyborcza.
Let’s look at the results presented in this section according to the media effect. 
Our present analysis of the mediatization of religion as an accommodation of 





Over 55  
years of age
Total
A religious symbol 86.1 87.6 85.3 86.3
A symbol that testifies to the  
nation’s Catholic tradition
31.4 34.2 35.4 33.9
A symbol of the Smolensk tragedy 2.3 2.9 4.9 3.5
A symbol of opposition to the PRL 
system
4.2 3.4 2.8 3.4
Other 2.2 2.6 3.3 2.7
Hard to say 2.0 2.9 2.0 2.3
Fig. 7.15: The way of understanding the cross according to age (%). Source: Own 
research
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religious and political actors to media logic has been supplemented with the 
reception of visible religious events and symbols. The data show, however, that 
the respondents and the recipients of the media do not reveal awareness about 
the discussed religious issues. Media coverage and accompanying accommoda-
tion processes to media logic go in one direction, but respondents’ declarations 
go in another.
In the case of the leaders of great religions visiting the Polish parliament 
as well as the banalization of the cross, it seems impossible to talk about the 
media effect. The subject of the secular state and the Church-state relationship 
clearly cannot provide this element, which at the micro level will normally be 
complemented by a multi-factor mediatization process. With this in mind, we 
keep clear of the perspective of banalizing the cross by media recipients. The 
extensive banalizing process visible in the media’s content leaves no traces in the 
audience’s reception. Consequently, when we refer to Schulz’s (2004) viewpoint, 
who claims that mediatization concurrently includes and exceeds the media 
effect, it is difficult to confirm the results of mediatization in their audience.
7.4  Between secularity and state impartiality
This book mainly moves between the postulates of state secularism and the prac-
tice of state impartiality. Moving from one perspective to the other occurs quite 
freely. There is a lack of tension on both sides. Does something similar happen 
in the material obtained from the respondents? The answer given in this section 
is significant. It complements our current misguided search for the media effect 
in the collected material. Let us begin with a praxis, meaning a few issues taken 
from the respondents’ declarations on the practical implementation of the legal 
provisions of the state’s impartial worldview. Only then will we move on to the 
postulates for implementing the secular state.
Exploring the results from Fig. 7.17, we see the polarization of the respondents 
in relation to the way they perceive the practices of state impartiality in matters 
of religion and worldview. In the opinion of 43.3 % of respondents, Poland does 
not implement the principle of impartiality. A definitely more radical statement 
is voiced by 21.5 % of respondents on this topic. On the other hand, 42.7 % of the 
surveyed population remain proponents of the thesis regarding the implementa-
tion of the principle of impartiality, of which 16.7 % are radical supporters of this 
thesis. Quite a small number of respondents indicate the lack of a unanimous 
opinion on this issue (14 %). Earlier analyzes have shown that religious topics 
present in the media in an average way enter into the awareness of respondents. 
The difference revealed by Fig. 7.17 cannot therefore primarily arise from the 
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media. The fact that it occurs proves the presence of other factors affecting the 
respondents.
The characteristic of this division is revealed in several facts that we notice 
when the respondents are divided based on place of residence. First, there is 
discord between the inhabitants of villages, 30.1 % of whom moderately confirm 
the impartiality of state worldview, and the inhabitants of the largest cities. The 
latter recognize that the state really does not function (34.3 %) or that it defi-
nitely does not function (31.1 %) in an impartial way towards religion. Second, 
the most balanced opinions in this matter are revealed by city residents with 20 
to 100 thousand inhabitants. It can be seen here that radically separate models of 
life are connected with the types of antagonized views. Meanwhile, people func-
tioning in the realities of small cities have a less antagonistic approach.
If we take into account the division into age, as in Fig. 7.18, it will become 
clear that half of the surveyed respondents in the 18–34 age group (50.4 %) dis-
agree with the opinion that Poland implements the constitutional principle of 
impartiality and religious beliefs. As a comparison, among respondents aged 
35–44, the proportion of such people is 39.4 %, and among the oldest people it 
is 41.5 %. This leads us to a surprising conclusion. Based on the collected data, 
we previously attributed the least interest and knowledge about the secular state 
and the Church-state relation to the 18–34 age group. Now we find that the same 
group of respondents sees a problem with the implementation of state worldview 
Place of residence (%)
Poland as a 
country in which 
the constitutional 
principle of state 
impartiality is 
implemented 
in matters of 
religious beliefs















Decidedly yes 17.4 13.6 19.3 22.5 10.0 16.7
Rather yes 30.1 31.5 22.9 26.4 14.7 26.0
Difficult to say 17.1 15.9 12.9 10.2 9.9 14.0
Rather not 18.6 16.3 23.9 19.4 34.3 21.8
Decidedly not 16.7 22.6 21.0 21.5 31.1 21.5
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
Fig. 7.17: The relationship to the state’s implementation of worldview impartiality based 
on place of residence (%). Source: Own research
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impartiality. In this situation, we raise the question:  what did they base their 
declarations on? The only answer that we can see is the result of working with 
bits of information and building favorable narratives. Such a supposition, how-
ever, requires deeper justification.
A factor that naturally strengthens people’s opinions on the implementation of 
state impartiality is the attitude of respondents towards religious faith (Fig. 7.19). 
The research shows that people who believe much more often than non-believers 
express the opinion that this principle is implemented in the country. Against the 
background of the results, a very high 52 % of non-believers hold the conviction 
that Poland definitely does not implement religious and ideological impartiality 
Age (%)
Poland as a country in which the constitutional 
principle of state impartiality is implemented in 









Decidedly yes 11.2 18.1 19.5 16.7
Rather yes 28.0 29.3 21.7 26.0
Difficult to say 10.4 13.2 17.3 14.0
Rather not 28.3 18.0 20.5 21.8
Decidedly not 22.1 21.4 21.0 21.5
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
Fig. 7.18: The relationship to the state’s implementation of worldview impartiality based 
on age (%). Source: Own research
Attitude towards religious faith (%)
Poland is a country that 
achieves the constitutional 
principle of state 













Decidedly yes 1.8 4.3 17.5 28.8 2.2 16.7
Rather yes 16.3 3.5 27.6 32.5 29.9 26.0
Difficult to say 5.5 8.8 14.4 16.3 23.2 14.0
Rather not 39.0 31.5 21.3 14.3 8.7 21.8
Decidedly not 37.3 52.0 19.2 8.2 36.0 21.5
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
Fig. 7.19: The attitude towards the state realizing an impartial worldview according to 
one’s attitude towards religious faith (%). Source: Own research
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written in the law of impartiality. This small group of respondents primarily 
bases their stance on their daily practices.
Exploring the theme of religious faith, we can ask whether there exists a 
relationship between one’s attitude towards it and being convinced about the 
implementation of the constitutional principle of state impartiality in matters of 
religious beliefs (Fig. 7.20). In this research study, it is not possible to carry out the 
Pearson correlation (variables are not measured on a quotient or interval scale, 
and for other tests the assumptions of the distribution of norms are not met). 
Instead, let’s look at the potential relationship from the perspective of Spearman’s 
rho. Our analysis of the relationship between one’s attitude towards faith 
(operationalization: 1 – decided unbeliever, 2 – rather non-believer, 3 – believer, 
4 – deeply religious), and one’s relation to the implementation of the constitu-
tional principle of state impartiality in religious matters (operationalization: 1 – 
definitely yes, 2 – rather yes, 3 – hard to say, 4 – rather not, 5 – definitely not) 
indicates that there is a significant correlation (p ≤ 0.01), and the correlation 
coefficient is -0.3. We can therefore conclude that the more a person believes, the 
more she or he is convinced of the impartiality of the state in religious matters.
How do these matters concern a secular state? We researched this issue based 
on respondent attitude towards postulates which are strongly active in media 
coverage. Essentially, in the opinion of respondents (Fig.  7.21), the idea of a 
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Fig. 7.20: Correlation of attitude to religious faith with one’s conviction about the 
implementation of the constitutional principle of state impartiality in matters of 
religious beliefs. Source: Own research
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secular state means withdrawing religion from schools (35.8 % of responses), 
liquidating the Church fund (35.1 %), removing religious symbols from public 
places (34.2 %), liberating abortion laws (32.9 %), and breaking the concordat 
(26 %). Differences depend on individual groups and the analyzed variables.
When we look at the postulates about a secular state from the perspective of 
the respondents’ place of residence, three regularities appear. First of all, all of 
the described postulates are more often mentioned by people from cities with 
over 500,000 residents. Second, the inhabitants of the largest cities remain most 
critical about the presence of religious symbols in public places (48.9 %). Third, 
in the countryside, the secular state is primarily associated with the reduction of 
Church financing (30.3 %) and the liberalization of abortion laws (28.2 %).
In the fifth chapter, our presentation already pointed out the moral and eco-
nomic issues in media coverage. The qualitative grounded theory based on the 
research material in the sixth chapter did not significantly focus on these two 
topics. The fact that the respondents refer to this issue must therefore bring 
us closer to what we have already suggested, meaning combining fragments 




of the postulate of a 
secular state
Place of residence (%)
















The withdrawal of 
religion from schools
26.8 30.0 39.3 48.8 44.9 35.8
Liquidation of the 
Church fund
30.3 32.9 33.7 39.6 44.9 35.1
Removal of religious 
symbols from public 
places
25.2 33.8 37.5 36.2 48.9 34.2
Liberalization of the 
abortion law
28.2 34.9 31.9 33.8 41.6 32.9
Breaking the  
concordat
21.5 23.3 28.5 24.8 37.1 26.0
Hard to say 27.3 26.0 18.7 16.5 11.8 21.4
Nothing 22.0 17.0 18.4 17.1 11.6 18.2
Fig. 7.21: Theses expressing the idea of a secular state according to place of residence 
(%). Source: Own research
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Fig. 7.22 proves that age does not significantly differentiate people’s opinions 
on the implementation of the postulate of a secular state. However, there are 
minor differences among several groups of respondents. People aged 18–34 most 
often indicate the liquidation of the Church fund as an expression of the imple-
mentation of the secular state (39 %). In contrast, liberalizing abortion laws re-
mains similar in all groups. This shows that the younger the group of respondents, 
the more they link the secular state with minimizing the Church’s possessions.
One more area of the respondents’ opinions about the secular state is worth 
taking into account and concerns the views the respondents most often hear 
about the secular state. Based on the slogans from the media material (Fig. 7.23), 
we notice that respondents’ opinions resonate the postulate defending the sec-
ular state, especially repeated by the SLD (26.3 % of opinions). A different state-
ment (22.8 %) is made by the Palikot Movement’s agency. However, the rightist 
views and fears of secularism remain unjustified and only reach 12.5 %. We can 
interpret this situation in two ways. The first approach assumes that the radical 
narratives of the leftists operate in the imaginations of recipients. The second 
indicates that the left’s slogans are constructed on the basis of intuitive, simple, 
and controversial issues that can easily be recalled without any context.
From the perspective of the place of residence, this subject comes down to one 
basic regularity. Another polarization takes place, namely that the most radical 
views and the government’s defense of the secular state are present in towns with 
over 500,000 inhabitants (34  %). At the same time, the most gentle approach 
functions in the countryside (20.3 %). This division fits well into the previously 
presented differences between villages and the largest cities.
Theses expressing the implementation  









The withdrawal of religion from schools 33.9 36.3 36.7 35.8
Liquidation of the church fund 39.0 36.0 31.5 35.1
Removal of religious symbols from public 
places
34.9 37.0 31.0 34.2
Liberalization of abortion laws 31.7 33.5 33.4 32.9
Breaking the concordat 28.3 26.7 23.7 26.0
Hard to say 19.2 23.4 21.3 21.4
Nothing 15.7 18.9 19.2 18.2
Fig. 7.22: Theses expressing the idea of a secular state according to age (%). 
Source: Own research
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The age variable also matters. According to Fig. 7.24, the popular thesis about 
the need to defend the secular state prevails (33 %), especially among the youn-
gest respondents aged 18–34. On the other hand, in the group of the oldest 
respondents, the answer “I do not know, it’s hard to say” (24.7 %) was more often 
Most often heard 
ideas on the topic of 
Poland’s secularity
Place of residence (%)















It is necessary 
to defend state 
secularity
20.3 27.1 25.8 31.7 34.0 26.3
The secular state is 
fictional
19.3 24.5 19.5 24.5 30.5 22.8
Don’t know, difficult 
to say
24.0 19.9 21.6 13.7 13.6 19.7
We are not afraid 
about keeping the 
secular state
17.7 12.9 16.5 19.8 12.7 16.3
None 16.1 15.5 13.2 6.9 6.3 12.5
Other 2.6 0.0 3.4 3.4 2.8 2.5
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
Fig. 7.23: Most often heard opinions on the topic of Poland’s secularity according to 
place of residence (%). Source: Own research







Over 55  
years of age
Total
It is necessary to defend state secularity 33.0 24.4 23.1 26.3
The secular state is fictional 23.1 24.2 21.2 22.8
Don’t know, difficult to say 17.8 15.6 24.7 19.7
We are not afraid about keeping the 
secular state
14.5 13.9 19.8 16.3
None 11.0 17.3 9.2 12.5
Other 0.5 4.7 2.0 2.5
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
Fig. 7.24: Most often heard opinion on the topic of Poland’s secularity according to age 
(%). Source: Own research
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stated than in the other groups. This leads us to the conclusion that thinking 
about a secular state cannot be guided by the media and its reception among 
recipients. The mechanism seems much more complex and ambiguous.
Earlier, we mentioned that it’s difficult to see any mutual tension between 
secularity and impartiality in media coverage. Our main point was that both 
terms appear and function in parallel, since they are interrelated. In the leftist 
discourses, sometimes they are treated interchangeably. They rarely function on 
the basis of contrast. Meanwhile, legal and political practice proves that they 
exist far from each other. Poland’s impartial involvement has little to do with 
the previous conception of a secular state. When we look at the respondents’ 
statements, polarization will appear only in opinions about the implementation 
of this impartiality in state practices. What clearly appears in the further material 
is the significant religious factor in shaping the opinions of the respondents. This 
shows us that focusing only on the media variable does not convey the essence 
of this phenomenon.
7.5  Reconsidering the mediatization effect
What does the mediatization effect mean? We pointed out earlier that there are 
two conflicting approaches when it comes to conceptualizing the mediatization 
effect in relation to the media effect. The first approach is dominated by the view 
that the mediatization effect simultaneously contains and exceeds the media 
effect. A competitive approach assumes that mediatization does not concern the 
media effect but the mutual relationship between changes in the media and com-
munication and changes in culture and society (Hepp et al., 2015). Let’s return to 
the first of these approaches.
The reader may have noticed that by analyzing audience reception results, it is 
translated Schulz’s intuition into the perspective of the micro and meso analysis. 
In the second chapter, it is explained why we omit the macro level (Hepp, 2013a). 
When it comes to the micro-level analysis, we adopt several directives. The results 
of the grounded theory serve as a reference point. They show clear patterns in the 
mediatization of the religious and political actors. When we reviewed the audi-
ence reception results, what seemed interesting to us was searching for traces of 
the media effect in the coverage of religious issues. Subsequently, we are inter-
ested in the reflections of the agency of individual and institutional religious 
and political actors, which proves they accommodate to media logic. Next, our 
intention is to identify and analyze the mechanism of “crossing” the media effect 
postulated by Schulz as a result of the mediatization process at the meso level. 
Here we are referring to the discovery of patterns of interaction that appear in 
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the mutual relationships between changes in the media and changes in society. 
However, a problem arises at the moment of searching for the media effect.
The following sections of this chapter indicate that our analysis of audience 
reception applies four important and qualitatively different themes from the 
media content. It is about sources of knowledge on the subject of the secular 
state, the agency of religious and political actors, changes in religious symbols, 
ways of reading the idea of a secular state, and an impartial state in relation to the 
religion and worldview of its citizens. The results of this part of the study clearly 
do not confirm Schulz’s approach to mediatization.
A few key findings from individual sections serve as arguments for this thesis. 
First of all, without a doubt, the media play the role of the primary source of 
information about the secular state. Respondents indicate that television is the 
first place they look for information (63.2 %), then the internet (54.8 %), and 
finally the press (44.1  %). Only in the fourth place do they mention knowl-
edge acquisition in the course of interpersonal communication (42.3  %). The 
results of the reception of the contents of these media about the secular state and 
Church-state relationship, however, contradict the existence of the media effect.
Key results for the Church-state relationship reveal progress in mediatization 
when we look at the results of the grounded theory. However, this is lacking 
when we combine dynamic media coverage for shaping the concordat and 
Church-state relations in the media and its reception among the audience. The 
respondents refer to the media as a source of their orientation on the subject 
of the concordat, state interference in the life of the Catholic Church, and the 
Church interfering in state politics. When it comes to answering basic questions 
in the area of covering these issues, they are not able to so do. The youngest 
group of respondents most often recalls the narrative dominating in the media 
only in the short period after signing the concordat treaty, which leads us to the 
claim about mechanisms hiding ignorance on the subject of the secular state.
In the case of religious symbols, the matter is even more unanimous. Media 
and popular culture exploit the themes of the cross, but clearly trivialize it. We 
see then that the banal representation of the cross means a political represen-
tation. However, the primary symbolism of the cross as a tool of salvation in 
the media’s coverage remains hidden. This looks different in the respondents’ 
declarations. Here, the cross denotes a religious and national symbol. The domi-
nant trace of the merger of the nation and religion, therefore, remains unmoved 
in its original form.
The postulate of the media effect in the case of the symbolic visits of the 
leaders of world religions in the Polish parliament is even weaker. These events, 
which are intensively covered by the media, mainly function, in the opinions 
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of respondents, in connection with the figures of John Paul II and the Dalai 
Lama. Meanwhile, Bartholomew I, the spiritual leader of the world’s Orthodox 
Christians, does not even exist in the imaginarium of some media recipients. 
However, the 18–34 age group of respondents refer to the leaders of the Orthodox 
Church, Bartholomew I and Kirill I, but we can see reasons for this mechanism 
in their interest in an “exotic” denomination rather than their desire to learn 
about the Eastern Churches.
When we look for the basis of the respondents’ orientation towards the topics 
discussed here, the answer is not necessarily found in the media. The results 
which we presented in the section focusing on secularity and impartiality show 
that the religious faith factor plays a significant role in understanding the legal 
context in which the respondents function. We are not talking about media 
effect here. Respondents are rather affected by many factors conditioning their 
life context. In this way, non-believers declare a negative view in meeting world-
view impartiality based on their everyday practices. In the same way, the more 
faithful the respondents, the more they are convinced of state impartiality in 
religious matters.
In the case of this study, Schulz’s postulate fails. It reveals a lack of a clear 
translation of religious content in the media and mediatization processes shaping 
this content into the awareness of media recipients. There is no way to talk about 
the media effect here, and we cannot make an analysis at the meso level related 
to transgressing the media effect. In this situation, it seems important to refer to 
the five dimensions of the mediatization effect proposed by Schrott (2009). This 
puts our previously narrow view of the mediatization effect in a new perspective.
One conclusion appears in the case of Schrott’s first characteristic, known as 
causes and rational criteria. The cases described should become the basis for 
adapting to media logic. The grounded theory actually points to progress in 
accommodating religious and political actors to media logic. This process, how-
ever, appears in the media material, not in the reception study. We put forward 
interesting applications when it comes to the second of Schrott’s characteristics 
of the mediatization effect, meaning the context defining the limits of media 
logic. As the reception study shows, beliefs about the secular state are the result 
of many unequal factors. Two of them were mentioned in the previous section. 
First, the religiosity of the respondents affects their attitude towards the practical 
side of Poland’s impartiality. Second, when it comes to media, their impact is not 
so strong. The results of accommodating religious and political actors, to a small 
extent, translate into respondent knowledge in the field of the secular state.
In the third dimension, we talk about control, which triggers sanctions 
related to mediatization. The fear of not being covered turns out to be clearly 
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exaggerated here. This is not because religious and political actors are covered 
by the media. The knowledge of media recipients does not correspond to a sig-
nificant extent with the contents submitted to them by these media. Neither the 
religious or political actors who are mediatized nor the media outlets are able to 
directly stay in the respondents’ awareness. Therefore, one should forget about 
the need to control the media coverage. The primary task is, first and foremost, 
to search for formats that will make it possible for their recipients to remember 
media contents.
In the fourth dimension, instead of talking about the difference between 
topics subject to media logic and topics going beyond media logic, we should 
look at the contents of the media as a potential, but rarely effective source of 
religious imaginations. In practice, the pieces of these imaginations will remain 
in the minds of media recipients. The mediating potential of a given topic, there-
fore, only gives the possibility of its consolidation in the recipients’ awareness, 
but no guarantee.
The last of Schrott’s dimensions concerns competing institutions. What this 
element brings us concerns our view of religious and political institutions. The 
more such competing and implementing media logic, the easier it is to identify 
with one of these logics. As the grounded theory results showed, this process 
takes place clearly more easily for political actors than for religious actors. From 
the perspective of the reception study, it is still of little importance. Religious 
issue coverage is not so frequent as to have an effect on the audience.
So how do we disclose the mediatization effect? Looking for the right ways 
to understand this phenomenon, the first thing that remains for us to do is to 
confirm our inability to observe the direct media effect. The mediatization effect 
must be incorporated into the non-mediacentric perspective. It does not simply 
concern the possibility of media logic working. On the contrary, media logic 
works in the background of other social logics. However, a detailed description 
of the dependence of these processes requires a study which this time will treat 
the media variable as one of many, not the dominant perspective.

Conclusion: Church-state issues seen through 
the prism of the mediatization theory
“Through history, human beings have used prayer and sacrifice to lay their concerns 
before their gods. Messages have come from the divine, or been presumed to come by 
way of oracles and written texts. Once received, those messages were passed down to 
others. In the West, more than elsewhere, it became religiously obligatory to communi-
cate God’s messages to a wider public. Unlike the religions of antiquity from which they 
emerged, Judaism, Christianity, and Islam made religious knowledge inseparable from 
religious observance” (Silk, 1995, pp. 3–4).
“In response, we added a third strand, the ‘secular sacred’ (with its attendant categories 
and subcategories), in order to reflect changes in the ideological, philosophical, ritual 
and experiential landscape, and to recognize that there is much that is valued in the 
lives of non-religious people and in the secular sphere that is powerfully significant and 
meaningful, deeply-held and non-negotiable, as well as a source of personal and social 
identity” (Knott et al., 2013b: 176).
This paradoxical juxtaposition of two very different fragments of work on the 
subject of media and secularity fundamentally reflects the content of this book. 
We are moving about in the area of massively distributed topics about God 
and religion when touching upon the public side of religion. We also point to 
its mediatization. At the same time, we realize that secularity is hidden some-
where in the nooks and crannies of this analysis, as a value with a clear and rich 
meaning. In this final part of the book, it is time to return to the previous theory 
in the light of the current results.
Poland’s way of creating an endorsed Church
The Butterfly-man mentioned at the beginning does not have an easy task. His 
occasional activity takes place with marked tension. From the legal perspective, 
the Butterfly-man disturbs the social scene and religious worship events. From 
the position of the believer, the Butterfly-man commits blasphemy. He interrupts 
and ridicules the public worship of Corpus Christi. In the eyes of the opponents 
of religion in public space, the Butterfly-man performs an act of heroic disrup-
tion of worship, which should take place in a church.
When we ask why the Butterfly-man represents a bad agency, we must return 
to the first two questions that we set at the beginning of the book: Q1 – Does 
and to what extent does the case of Poland fit into the category of a secular state? 
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Q2 – What does the practice of Church-state relations look like? The answer to 
both questions turns out to be quite complex. Looking at the divisions of coun-
tries in the key of Church-state relationships, we like Neuberger’s (1999) model 
of the endorsed Church. However, the Polish case has its own specific features.
Earlier, we pointed to the transition towards separation outlined in the 1989 
Act to the impartiality of the state’s worldview on religion present in later legis-
lation and the 1997 Constitution. The media’s report on the presidential center 
during the case of Archbishop Wielgus showed the essential element of this 
commitment. The state wants to be in a relationship with religion for symbolic 
purposes. In this way, it maintains control over the society’s deep belief in the 
Catholic Church’s fusion with the nation.
This symbolic value of the relationship between the state and the nation 
turns out to be profitable for both the government and the Church. The analysis 
shows that it was easier for the government, regardless of whether politicians 
represented the right-wing or left-wing option, to implement their programs 
when they cooperated with the Church. Of course, it had a price to pay. The 
left has opened up to working side by side with the Church. At the same time, 
by upholding anti-clerical slogans, it lost its credibility. The material from the 
analysis shows that after 2010, the appeal of any party to the radical postulates of 
secularization caused more losses than gains.
When we return to Casanova’s three levels of public religion, several 
conclusions are drawn. At the state policy level, the accommodation of religion 
and freedom of religion in Poland is characterized by a large kindness of the state 
visible in its care for public worship, free days granted for worshipers of partic-
ular religions during their holidays and ensuring religious education. There is 
no doubt, however, that the constitutional provision on the agreement with the 
Vatican has ensured the symbolic primacy of the Catholic Church in the midst 
of all religions and denominations. This brings the nation considerable profit. In 
many cases, when combining ecclesiastical and state celebrations, the state plays 
the role of a host.
At society’s political level, it can be seen that in the case of clearly reli-
gious events, the state also shows its agency. This is illustrated by Aleksander 
Kwaśniewski’s mentioned involvement in the organization of the Eucharistic 
Congress in Wrocław, or the use of the Royal Castle in Warsaw for the visit 
of Patriarch Kirill of Moscow when signing the contract between the Russian 
Orthodox Church and the Polish Bishops’ Conference. The Polish case proves 
that the endorsed Church model results from the state’s utilitarian attitude 
towards religion. State institutions as well as individual and collective polit-
ical actors implement the assumptions of this model hoping to function in the 
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context of the merger of religion and the nation. Therefore, they are motivated 
by political goals and not by thinking in religious terms.
This also translates onto the level of civil society. Here, social activities take 
place that are aimed at strengthening the position of individual religious agents 
clearly related to politics. Earlier, when discussing the issue of Radio Maryja and 
its director, Fr. Tadeusz Rydzyk, we pointed to the ease with which this figure 
uses the support and connections of right-wing politicians. As can be seen in 
another work (Guzek, 2016a), this results from the wrong but strong conviction 
of politicians that there exists a crowd of voters behind Rydzyk’s station.
The Polish context experienced numerous religious and political events in the 
analyzed twenty-five years. These moments offered evidence of the very clear 
relationship between the realm of religion and the realm of the nation. However, 
the frequency of portraying the secular state in the media has increased in recent 
years. They show the incoherence of signs of a secular state model practically 
implemented in Poland’s endorsement of the Church.
The characteristics of the ideal secular state by Małajny (2013) included 
freedom of worship or the denial of religion. It relies on the fact that the state 
itself does not show signs of being a religious institution, but it does not prevent 
institutional religions from acting in the public sphere. Comparing this feature 
with the discussed case, we can see that the state, despite declaring impartiality, 
is committed to helping those citizens who want to pursue religious practices, 
including their presence in the public sphere. The state pays for their religious 
education in school, provides free days to celebrate holidays, and allows for the 
implementation of important public events connected with religious worship, 
for example, by starting state ceremonies with the Mass. Finally, it makes the 
Sejm’s tribunal available to representatives of world religions.
The next paradox means that in the assumptions of Poland’s state impartiality, 
settling worldview disputes also concerns the treatment of all citizens. Equality 
at the individual level, however, does not translate into institutional equality. 
Everything that we have shown so far proves that the Catholic Church remains 
the basic partner in dialogues with the state. When the state undertakes an inter-
vention concerning religion, it deals with problematic issues on par with this 
Church. Other communities play a secondary role for the state.
What strikes when analyzing the case of Archbishop Wielgus is the clear atti-
tude of the state towards occupying the vacancy of the Archbishop of Warsaw. 
Asking the question about why exactly the state is involved in this results in 
a complex answer. Among the foundations  – according to Grzymała-Busse 
(2015) – that foster the fusion of religion and the nation, she pointed to educa-
tion, comparisons with the past, and national rhetoric in a seemingly religious 
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context. In the analyzed data, it seems difficult to find such a strategy in relation 
to catechetical religious lessons and comparisons with the past. State participa-
tion in religious events, as a whole, permeates the state’s respect for the Catholic 
tradition. This occurs both in our approach to the cross and in approving the 
concordat. As a result, this also appears in audience reception.
In this environment, the dissonance of the position of nones appears. We 
are talking about the context of articulating secular state postulates. Both the 
numerous messages in Gazeta Wyborcza, as well as the statements of the leaders 
of leftist parties, proved that they are interested in the position of non-believers 
in a society dominated by the primacy of Catholicism. Gazeta Wyborcza has 
repeatedly used the argument of discrimination against nones. Is the image of 
Gazeta Wyborcza correct, according to which nones remain in a lost position 
within the endorsed Church? The legal system provides them with freedom of 
belief and freedom in their lack of religious convictions. They cannot, however, 
request accommodating to a similar degree as the institutional religions. For 
example, the state does not recognize humanistic weddings. In the environment 
of the dominant majority of the population that belongs to the Catholic Church, 
their attitude towards the Church in the public sphere is rather a silence matter. 
Therefore, it is impossible to speak here about full freedom for all citizens. The 
majority religion imposes solutions on minorities.
Shaping the concepts
This book did not run out of tiring work on tracing the mediatization of reli-
gion and politics. Looking at how individual theoretical concepts worked in 
this analysis, we come to a series of conclusions in the area of the theory of 
mediatization. When we look at the theory being built from the perspective of the 
mechanisms of institutional mediatization, there will be conclusions about the 
adaptation of political and religious actors to the logic of the media. Specifically, 
the first years of the analysis indicated that political actors do not work according 
to the game plan. Their agency seems to clearly disregard media logic. However, 
this trend is changing.
The mediatization we introduced in terms of Hjarvard’s (2008b) views assumed 
that society would be dependent on the media and its media logic. The media as 
social institutions are integrated into the operations of other social institutions. 
As a result, social institutions “take place via the media” (Hjarvard, 2008b: 113). 
We must remember that the autonomy of media institutions depends on systemic 
conditions. The results of this project show that it boils down to shifting the ac-
cent from the dominance of media logic in society to dominance among the 
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analyzed political and religious actors. While the process of learning the rules of 
media logic by these actors is clearly visible, this is also the reason for the lack of 
transferring their mediated agency onto media recipients. Therefore, if we want 
to identify the modus operandi of the mediatization process, we must look at the 
agencies of individual and collective religious actors.
Mediatization, as Krotz (2009) suggested, boiled down to “the changes in 
how people communicate when constructing their inner and exterior realities 
by referring to media.” In this study, its intuition also finds partial confirmation. 
When we talk about changes, it’s all about how the main actors covered by the 
media work and build their image in relation to the media. Here, we can see the 
fundamental difference between media mediation and media mediatization. The 
former focuses on a more or less independent coverage of interesting issues. In 
the case of mediatization, a clear change takes place in potentially covered ac-
tors. Their reflexive movement is nothing other than adjusting to the logic of the 
media in order to be covered.
When Kent Asp (1990) specifies that this is an adaptation to the various lim-
itations and formats imposed by the media, we ought to specify which of them 
we are dealing with. Analyzing the mediatization of the secular state, we argue 
that depending on whether we are dealing with religious or political actors, the 
instrumentation changes. we will refer to the specifics of the mediation of these 
two groups of agents more broadly in the following section. At this stage, how-
ever, we would like to emphasize that this adaptation has many variants. Within 
one institution exists the possibility of the dominant majority of its actors func-
tioning according to the key of media logic. This does not mean that there is 
no margin in which some of these actors do not include media logic in their 
public agency. We can see it based on the example of the professionalization of 
the Polish Bishops’ Conference and the simultaneous agency of the controversial 
Archbishop Józef Michalik from Lublin.
When we stated that the analyzed issue had to be captured for establishing the 
position of the theory of middle rank, two things became problematic. The first 
concerned the coexistence of many logics. Indeed, this grounded theory points 
to the mixing of media logic and political logic in the case of actors covered by 
the media. In addition, the material from the social reception survey indicates 
the existence of a religious factor in the approach to state secularity. This seems 
to significantly reflect the general trend in Poland (CBOS, 1994a; CBOS, 2013; 
CBOS, 2015a; CBOS, 2015b).
The second problematic issue is concerned with the accuracy of the adopted 
perspective. The question is whether mediatization seen as the middle range 
theory suits the empirical analysis. The answer is enthusiastic and positive. As 
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the study shows, relying on a qualitative analysis of the agency of individual ac-
tors and institutions provides the basis for revealing the mechanisms of institu-
tional mediatization. A  look at media recipients in this perspective also easily 
illustrates that the mediatization effect does not translate into a simple media 
effect. In this case, the change mostly affects religious and political actors rather 
than the media’s audience.
As we mentioned in the first chapter, our view on the logic of the media 
takes into account its entanglement with the political and economic spheres. 
This applies to the media characteristic of semi-independent media institutions, 
which, according to Mark Ørsten (2004), are based on media ideology and media 
logic. In this summary, our attention is particularly drawn to the media ide-
ology argument. In the analyzed media, it slightly emerged in the distanced and 
favoring perspective of the Catholic approach of Rzeczpospolita. In this book, we 
have barely mentioned this theme, focusing the reader’s attention on the more 
explicit agency of Gazeta Wyborcza regarding the coverage of nones.
What conclusions does the analysis of the coverage of nones in Gazeta 
Wyborcza provide us with? First, the ideology of the newspaper translated into its 
editorial policy to expose a small part of society, or the nones, showing how the 
media and political logic get intertwined in social practice. On the one hand, the 
coverage of this marginalized group fits in well with the newsworthiness princi-
ples present in the media logic. On the other hand, the arguments for defending 
nones are a political manifesto in the area of the secular state. We can clearly see 
the political agency of this medium.
As we assumed at the beginning, the analyzed institutional mediatization has 
a clearly non-linear nature. This allows us to supplement the search for the causal 
mechanism of adaptation to the media logic at mediatized moments. Looking 
at the results of the grounded theory, it is easy to see the remains of the adapta-
tion process. Does this happen just as easily with mediatization moments? The 
individual activities of religious and political actors are not able to provide us 
with specific moments in which the approach to media logic suddenly changes. 
When we look at the mechanism of adaptation to the logic of the media, it turns 
out that when referring to Hepp’s (2013b) concept, instead of talking about a 
mediatized moment, it is better to use the term mediatized waves.
Shorter or longer periods of modernization of the approach to media logic ap-
pear on the time continuum of the adaptation process to media logic. An excel-
lent example of such a micro-scale process is the agency of President Aleksander 
Kwaśniewski. In it, we can see the mediatization wave, which relies on a new way 
of accommodating to the media logic, next sets the trend for further individual 
and institutional actors.
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Religious issues get mediatized
What is most characteristic of this study concerns its basic subject of analysis, 
meaning the agency of religious and political actors. Mia Lövheim’s (2011) sugges-
tion to analyze the role played by religious actors turns out to be extremely useful for 
capturing the mechanisms of the mediatization of religion. First of all, it provides us 
with tangible evidence for a change in the field of religion. In fact, this change means 
the action of religious actors. Is Günter Thomas right, however, with his thesis that 
religious institutions act under the influence of the media’s representations of reli-
gion and are not the result of a direct causal mechanism of the media?
The results indicate three issues in the area of this theme. (1) Our study on 
the secular state in Polish legislation, electoral documents, and media transfers 
always refer to the agency of specific people or institutions. Without them, it is not 
worth mentioning the new regulations or strategies of action in relation to reli-
gion in the public sphere. The fact that these agents work for the sake of religious 
visibility in society confirms the earlier assumption that the republicization of 
religion is essentially its mediatization (Lövheim, 2011). (2) Religious institutions 
may or may not act under the influence of the media’s representations of religion. 
When they choose the path of media visibility, adapting to media formats results 
from the professionalization of communicating with the environment. When 
they do not take this path, they appear in the media only as a result of their con-
troversial agency as in the case of Archbishop Michalik. (3) The typical logic of 
the media is mixed up in religious institutions with the primacy of their values, 
possessions, and current political participation.
Hjarvard (2012b) lists the three forms of mediatized religion (religious media, 
journalism on religion, banal religion) that communicate religion differently in 
the public sphere. All of these concepts work in a specific way in this analysis. 
First of all, religious media should be read primarily as religious communica-
tion, which over the years has been professionalized. The Catholic Church deals 
with the media both through its own media but especially through its own 
spokespersons.
In the case of journalism on religion, mediatization of religion boils down to 
portrayals of religious issues, which include several characteristic media logic 
formats. This material is all about (1) personalization interwoven with institu-
tionalization, (2) simplification, (3) delivering exclusivity, (4) contextualization, 
and (5) controversy. The first of the mentioned formats operates on a paradox. 
Concentration on frontmen, individual characters, goes together with empha-
sizing their institutional background. Simplification boils down to a simplified 
description of religious events and rituals and their theological significance.
Conclusion252
Exclusivity means showing religion as the space of the hard-to-find sacred, 
more than an everyday life element. It perfectly reflects the coverage of Kirill of 
Moscow’s visit to Poland. The contextualization is based on the framing of the 
coverage of religious issues in order to take into account a number of meanings 
read by a layman on one level, and on a different level by experts. This illustrates 
the exchange of icons revered between the Russian Orthodox Church and the 
Catholic Church in Poland connected with Kirill I’s visit.
Controversies around the secular state and Church-state relationship defi-
nitely belong to a separate group of media logic formats that should be men-
tioned. This trend is clearly mixed up with the category of banal religion. When 
Hjarvard mentions the mechanism of the trivialization of religious symbols, he 
emphasizes their zero or limited relationship with institutional religions. He also 
claims that the banned forms of religion maintain their religious dimension, but 
they lose their connection with their original symbolism.
This mentioned atmosphere of controversy is characterized by the first of the 
cases of the cross-banalization present in this study. Contrary to what Hjarvard 
claims, here the cross does not lose its original meaning, but begins to function 
in parallel on two plains: the religious and political. It remains on this first reli-
gious meaning of the cross, yet its function changes. This symbol of reconcil-
iation and sacrifice now becomes a symbol of struggle and even war due to 
the cross (Kozub-Karkut & Głuszek-Szafraniec, 2016). On the political level, 
it maintains a relationship with the institutional Church. In such a relation-
ship, however, it accepts the character of a symbol of oppression and religious 
domination.
Representatives of banal religion, in relation to religion classes, boil their 
arguments down to the depreciation of religious feelings and replacing them 
with economic arguments. According to this view, the tactic of referring to banal 
representations of religion weakens the religious dimension of catechesis. When 
we compare this condition with other studies on the topic of banal religion 
(Nybro Petersen, 2013), it turns out that this is a concept that is clearly flexible 
and dependent on the context of the analyzed case.
The question arises about the changes in the perception of of these banal 
representations of religion. The reception survey we presented earlier contradicts 
this possibility. In the case of Poland’s strongly immersed Catholic context, the 
expansion of trivial forms of religion does not determine changes in the percep-
tion of religious symbols. The example of our cross-analysis unequivocally shows 
that regardless of the meanings of the media coverage on the cross, its primary 
religious significance remains stable.
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Political issues get mediatized
Politics and mediatization arise from a reflection that goes in a different direction 
than the one connected with religion. First of all, we followed Jesper Strömbäck 
and Frank Esser, who claimed that mediatizing politics is a process of reactive 
and proactive adaptation of political actors to media logic. They want to meet the 
need for media visibility (Strömbäck & Esser, 2014b). In the light of this analysis, 
political actors took the main initiative in adapting to media logic. The grounded 
theory we provided did not point to the receptivity of political actors to media 
logic. On the contrary, they initiated a change based on a projection of benefits 
that could bring them media visibility.
An important element of the process which the authors referred to was mixing 
the process of adapting the logic of the media with political logic and differenti-
ating them from the world of politics. Our analysis did not expose the last of these 
features. In exchange, the interweaving of the logic of the media and political logic 
acquired a clear meaning. In the material described, however, the first one took 
primacy. Political actors, to a great extent, followed the rules of media logic. In 
rare cases, they referred to the primacy of political criteria. This is illustrated by 
the already mentioned example of the agency of President Kwaśniewski.
Strömbäck and Esser’s (2014b) distinction in the framework of political 
logic on polity, policy, and politics did not fully function in this study. Policies 
treated in terms of principles regulating the political process did not reflect 
the mechanisms of mediatization presented here. The policy based on defining 
problems, forming them, and introducing them into the institutional framework 
appeared in the petrifying positions of left-wing parties in favor of a secular state. 
The mechanism here basically consisted in confronting political parties with the 
context of the endorsed Church. This tactic boiled down to exposing the Church’s 
omnipotence. In the case of politics, however, it was about clearly focusing on 
the leaders of political parties and gaining support for the demands they made. 
This was especially visible at the end of the campaign, when PO leaders used 
anti-clerical discourse to win leftist votes.
Distinguishing the mediatization of politics from the previously presented 
mediatization of religion concerns the presence of other elements of media logic. 
In the case of political issues, media logic is primarily a dictate of the four basic 
mechanisms for shaping contents and formats: (1) leadership, (2) controversy, 
(3) confrontation, (4) professionalization.
The repeatedly invoked figure of Aleksander Kwaśniewski reflects the need 
for a political leader who has a clear image. In the case of the former president, 
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this was about competence and a dialogical rather than an offensive attitude. 
The next element boiled down to a series of controversial postulates regarding 
the concordat. It also illustrates the mechanism of confrontation. As can be seen 
in the contents of the sixth chapter, SLD’s leader Grzegorz Napieralski placed 
himself in opposition to the fusion of religion and the nation. This gave him a 
short-lived effect in the form of visibility in the media. In the case of profession-
alization, we are primarily concerned with the development of the institution of 
the party’s advocate, which accepts the role of a frontman or scapegoat in crisis 
situations.
Insight into the mediation of the secular state
At the end of this book, let’s gather the existing insights in the field of the secular 
state and Church-state relations in response to the rest of the research questions 
asked. The book’s contents show a balance between the initial results of the medi-
ation analysis of the issues (chapter five) and their subsequent mediatization 
(chapter six). Thus, when facing question Q3 about the shape of the media repre-
sentation of the secular state and Church-state relations, we are heading towards 
the coverage of the political or religious actors and traces of religious visibility in 
the media. The actors in question are essentially individuals and institutions. As 
demonstrated by the subsequent qualitative analysis, there is a form of central-
ized personalization here (Patterson, 1994), confirmed in other studies on the 
contents of the media in Poland (M. Mazur, 2014). Its basis is the mechanism by 
which individual political actors give in to party leaders and their spokespersons. 
The same applies to most religious institutions.
When answering question Q4, we are able to confirm the existence of an insti-
tutional form of mediatization in relation to the secular state and the relations 
between the Church and the state. This process takes place primarily on the level 
of political and religious actors who in their group’s typical way adopt media 
logic. Three issues need to be emphasized here. The actors themselves design 
the media’s potential behaviors. Their accommodation is therefore an intuitive 
process. It involves learning and clearly occurs in connection with other types of 
logic, such as political logic.
Second, as we can see, over time, the media coverage of the secular state 
narrows the perspective of our view of the problem to the model of pure sep-
aration. One can see the clear success of accommodating leftist parties to the 
formats and principles of the media. Third, this process is not sufficient in the 
face of significant non-media factors shaping the recipients. We are moving 
here towards a negative answer to question Q5, about how the reception of the 
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discussed mediatization takes place in society. It turns out that the mutual cou-
pling between political and religious actors on the one hand and the media on 
the other remains far from the viewpoints of viewers and readers. Specifically, 
the respondents’ opinions lack reflections on the process of mediatization in a 
secular state.
At the beginning of the book, we juxtaposed opposing quotes from the media 
involved in the coverage of religious issues and the media presenting the cov-
erage of the secular sacred to the reader. This double-voice led the reader to 
reflect on the phenomena of secularization and desecularization. We recalled 
Casanova’s supposition that the process of secularization may have not directly 
resulted from modernization but from a historical choice. We would like to per-
ceive Poland in such categories. As a country whose modernization does not 
entail radical secularization, we simply choose political and religious actors to 
balance the fusion of the nation and religion that are continually divided by 
society.
Secularization in its various types can, therefore, calmly proceed at the indi-
vidual level until society itself fails to overcome the consensus on the fusion of 
religion and the nation. In the distant future, the reversal of the mechanism men-
tioned by Christopher Marsh (2011) will have to be considered. According to 
its dynamics, at the moment of the departure of society from the fusion of the 
nation and religion, there should occur the spontaneous process of seculariza-
tion, which in the present case would boil down to a marked acceleration of the 
privatization of religion (Borowik, 2010).
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Fig. A.1:  Coding list of categories for the content analysis
Political actors:
Adam Strzembosz; Aleksander Bentkowski; Aleksander Kwaśniewski; Aleksander 
Małachowski; Aleksandra Jakubowska; Alicja Grześkowiak; Andrzej Balicki; Andrzej 
Olechowski; Andrzej Stelmachowski; Anna Komorowska; Anna Sobecka; Antoni 
Macierewicz; Armand Ryfiński; Artur Dębski; Beata Mazurek; Bogdan Borusewicz; 
Bogdan Klich; Bolesław Piecha; Bronisław Geremek; Bronisław Komorowski; Dariusz 
Rosati; Donald Tusk; Ewa Kopacz; Grzegorz Schetyna; Hanna Gronkiewicz-Waltz; 
Hanna Suchocka; Izabela Sierakowska; Jacek Kuroń; Jacek Rostowski; Jacek Sasin; 
Jadwiga Wiśniewska; Jan Jankiewicz; Jan Krzysztof Bielecki; Jan Olszewski; Janusz 
Kurtyka; Janusz Palikot; Janusz Piechociński; Jarosław Gowin; Jarosław Kaczyński; Jerzy 
Buzek; Jerzy Jaskiernia; Jerzy Szmajdziński; Jerzy Wenderlich; Joanna Senyszyn; Jolanta 
Szczypińska; Jolanta Szymanek-Deresz; Józef Oleksy; Józef Zych; Krzysztof Janik; Krzysztof 
Skubiszewski; Lech Kaczyński; Lech Wałęsa; Longin Pastusiak; Marek Borowski; Marek 
Kuchciński; Marek Siwiec; Maria Kaczyńska; Marian Krzaklewski; Mariusz Błaszczak; 
Michał Boni; Michał Kamiński; Paweł Graś; Paweł Zalewski; Piotr Ikonowicz; Przemysław 
Gosiewski; Radosław Sikorski; Roman Giertych; Roman Jagieliński; Ryszard Bugaj; 
Ryszard Czarnecki; Ryszard Kaczorowski; Ryszard Kalisz; Stanisław Żelichowski; Stefan 
Niesiołowski; Tadeusz Iwiński; Tadeusz Mazowiecki; Tomasz Kalita; Waldemar Pawlak; 
Władysław Bartoszewski; Włodzimierz Cimoszewicz; Wojciech Olejniczak; Zbigniew 
Bujak; Zbigniew Siemiątkowski; Zbigniew Wassermann; Zofia Kuratowska.
Religious actors:
Archbishop Konrad Krajewski; Archbishop Wiktor Skworc; Archbishop Celestino 
Migliore; Archbishop Józef Kowalczyk; Archbishop Józef Michalik; Archbishop Jóżef 
Życiński; Archbishop Sawa; Archbishop Sławoj Leszek Głódź; Archbishop Stanisław 
Gądecki; Archbishop Tadeusz Gocłowski; Bishop Jan Chrapek; Bishop Tadeusz Pieronek; 
Cardinal Angelo Sodano; Cardinal Franciszek Macharski; Cardinal Józef Glemp; Cardinal 
Kazimierz Nycz; Dalai Lama; Father Tadeusz Rydzyk; Patriarch Bartholomew I; Patriarch 
Kirill; Pope Benedict XVI; Pope Francis; Pope John Paul II; Reverend Remigiusz Sobański; 
Reverend Józef Kloch.
Other social actors:
Adam Michnik; Ewa Łętowska.
Religious denominations:
Adventists; Catholic Church; Churches (in general, in Poland); Lutheran Church; 
Orthodox Church.
Groups of believers:
Greek Catholics; Non-believers; Orthodox; Roman Catholics.




Apostolic Nunciature; John Paul II Catholic University of Lublin; Military Ordinariate of 
the Polish Army; Polish Bishops’ Conference; Pontifical Academy of Theology in Cracow; 
Radio Maryja; The Cracow Curia; The Holy See/Vatican; The Katowice Curia.
State and political institutions:
Constitutional Tribunal; Government; Joint Committee of the Church and the State; The 
Sejm and deputies; The Senate and senators.
Public visibility of religion:
Akcja Wyborcza “Solidarność” (AWS) – Solidarity Electoral Action; Bartholomew I in the 
Sejm; Bezpartyjny Blok Wspierania Reform (BBWR) – Nonpartisan Bloc for Support of 
Reforms; Bishops on social issues; Chaplains in the army and hospitals; Dalai Lama visits 
the president and prime minister; John Paul II in the parliament; Konfederacja Polski 
Niepodległej (KPN) – Confederation of Independent Poland; Lewica i Demokraci (LiD) – 
Left and Democrats; Liga Polskich Rodzin (LPR) – League of Polish Families; Lustration 
of Archbishop Wielgus; NSZZ “Solidarność” – Solidarity Trade Union; Patriarch Kirill at 
Belweder Palace; Platforma Obywatelska (PO) – Citizen’s Platform; Political parties; Polska 
Jest Najważniejsza (PJN) – Poland is most important; Polska Parta Socjalistyczna (PPS) – 
Poland’s Socialist Party; Polskie Stronnictwo Ludowe (PSL) – Poland’s Peasants Party; 
Porozumienie Centrum (PC) – Citizen’s Central Agreement; Prawo i Sprawiedliwość 
(PiS) – Law and Justice; Priests in the public sphere; Reconciliation between the Polish and 
Russian Churches; Ruch Palikota – Palikot’s Movement; Samoobrona RP – Self-Defense 
of the Republic of Poland; Smolensk crash; Socjaldemokracja Polska (SDPL) – Social 
Democracy of Poland; Socjaldemokracja Rzeczypospolitej Polskiej (SDRP) – Social 
Democracy of the Republic of Poland; Sojusz Lewicy Demokratycznej (SLD) – Democratic 
Left Alliance; Sexual molestation case for Archbishop Paetz; Teachers of religion and 
religion in school; Unia Polityki Realnej (UPR) –Real Politics Union; Unia Pracy (UP) – 
Labour Union; Unia Wolności (UW) – Freedom Union; Church celebrations with the 
participation of politicians (not in authority); Church celebrations with the participation 
of the authorities; State celebrations with the participation of representatives of Churches; 
Joint Church and state celebrations; Zjednoczenie Chrześcijańsko-Narodowe (ZChN) – 
Christian National Union.
Symbols:
Altar; Polish emblem; The cross; The preamble to the constitution; Wawel Royal Castle in 
Cracow.
Church-State Relationships:
Church and government consultations; Church criticizes representatives of the 
government and the ruling party; Church negotiations with the state; Church-state 
compromise; Concordat; Constitution; Interpretation of common Church-state 
arrangements; Laws and policies on religion; Meetings with the president; Opposition 
criticizes the Church; Opposition criticizes the government on matters of religion; 
Parliamentary interpellation on matters of religion; Provisions issued to the Church; 
Representatives of the state and the ruling party criticize the Church.
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Fig. A.1: Continued
Types of Church-state relations:
Autonomy of Church and state; Church’s neutrality towards the state; Secular state; 
Secularism (generally); Separation of Church and state; State ideological neutrality; State 
impartiality.
Controversies:
Abortion; Catholic Church finances; Church financed by the state; Equality of religions; 
In-vitro fertilization; Land transferred to the Church; Support for free Tibet.
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Fig. A.2:  Coding list of the initial coding in grounded theory
No Code
1 Attacking the Church
2 Stressing the Catholic traditions of the nation
3 Church involvement in the issue of sexual education lessons
4 The Church’s involvement in the administrative reform of the country
5 Engaging the faithful in the work on the constitution
6 Appealing to local governments
7 Articulating the Church’s readiness to fight the authorities
8 The Church’s articulation of readiness to end the fight against the authorities
9 Authorizing the government to be ready to agree with the Church
10 The Church attacking the state
11 Defending the secularity of the state
12 Celebrating the concordat
13 National mourning celebration at Jasna Góra
14 Celebrating national mourning in the Vatican
15 Withdrawing the concordat
16 Withdrawing religion from schools
17 Striving to remove the Church from public life
18 Decisions of authorities on religion (except for participation in religious rituals)
19 Defining secularization
20 Declarations of political parties against the ratification of the concordat
21 Declarations of political parties on religious invocation
22 Declarations of political parties for the signed concordat
23 Declarations of individual politicians against the ratification of the concordat
24 Declarations by individual politicians regarding the ratification of the concordat
25 The Pope declaring support for integration with the EU
26 The disapproval of the clergy’s commitment to politics
27 Demand for the enthronement of Christ as the King of Poland
28 Demand for respect for the autonomy of the Church
29 Discrimination of atheists
30 Discrimination of the Church
31 Discussing the state of work on the concordat
32 Discussing power with non-Catholic exiles
33 Distancing society from the Church in public life
34 Actions of minority Churches
35 Anti-clerical action
36 The activity of apostates




38 Pope’s action in the process of signing the concordat
39 The president’s action regarding the return of Church property
40 Government action on the ratification of the concordat
41 Government action on the return of Church property
42 Exhibiting the cross
43 Church financing from the budget
44 Trading with the Church
45 The Church intruding in politics and legal matters
46 Radio Maryja intruding into the political sphere
47 Interrogation of authorities regarding Church property
48 Instrumentalizing the cross
49 Intervening in the matter of Radio Maryja
50 The intervention of the authorities in the Wielgus case
51 Commenting on the results of the elections by the Church
52 Confronting the case of Archbishop Wielgus
53 Co-operation costs
54 Criticizing the government for signing the concordat
55 Questioning religious symbols in public places
56 Combining abortion and the concordat
57 Praying
58 Prayer before the Smolensk cross
59 Insisting the Vatican ratify the concordat
60 Stigmatizing the Church
61 Violating the principles of freedom of conscience and religion
62 Imposing religious duties by the state
63 Calling Poland a religious state
64 Non-Catholic Churches negotiating their position
65 The Catholic Church negotiating its position
66 Negating the impartiality of the state’s worldview
67 Not provoking the Church
68 Not seeking support for the constitution draft in the Episcopate
69 Fearing Poland’s atheization
70 Fearing the domination of one religion and worldview
71 Fearing the growth of the Church’s position
72 Postponing the ratification of the concordat
73 Rejecting the idea of a religious state
74 Rejecting the concordat as a way to marginalize Catholics




75 Determining the position of religion in school
76 Identifying the essence of the concordat
77 Defining the essence of contracts with Churches (excluding the concordat)
78 The term Polish model concordat
79 The ratification of the concordat by the Commissioner for Human Rights
80 Emphasizing the role of John Paul II
81 Emphasizing support of the radical right by individual bishops
82 Emphasizing the state’s great sins against the Church
83 Signing the concordat
84 Signing the concordat means social stability
85 Signing laws with other religions
86 Support for cooperation by John Paul II
87 Social support for the concordat
88 Social support for the Church
89 The Catholic Church supporting a party
90 The Sejm supporting the ratification of the concordat
91 Postulating the secular state
92 Postulating taxation of priests
93 The Church postulating the prohibition of abortion
94 Postulating non-Catholic statutes as a concordat by non-Catholic denominations
95 Postulating the separation of Church and state
96 Postulating the separation of state and religion
97 Postulating a secular state
98 Postulating Three Kings as a national holiday
99 Linking the concordat with state interests
100 Presenting Christian assumptions in the constitution
101 Problematizing religious vigils
102 Proceeding with the concordat
103 Proposing autonomy and independence
104 Proposing the liquidation of the Church fund
105 Proposing the liquidation of the concordat
106 Proposing the ideological neutrality of the state
107 Proposing the removal of the cross from the Sejm
108 The proposal of the impartiality of the state in world-view matters
109 Protesting against the cross
110 Social protests against the Church




112 Papal speeches in the parliament
113 Bartholomew I speaking in the parliament
114 Bartholomew I speaking in the Sejm
115 The Dalai Lama speaking in the parliament
116 Transfer of the Smolensk cross
117 Compliance with the concordat
118 Anticipating the date of signing the concordat
119 The adoption of the concordat means the independence of the Church from the 
moods of the state
120 Accepting a concordat means limiting state policy
121 Assigning the role of religion
122 Restoring the Church-state bond
123 Granting the Church privileges
124 Ratification of the concordat as an introduction to a religious denomination
125 Ratification of the concordat by John Paul II
126 Ratification of the concordat by the president
127 Renegotiation of the concordat
128 Respecting the independence and autonomy of the state and the Church
129 Resignation from religion classes
130 Understanding cooperation
131 Understanding the secular state
132 Benedict XVI’s condolence to the family of Prof. Geremek
133 Conflict on the nature of education in schools
134 Conflicts on the place of ethics in schools
135 Bartholomew I meets the parliament
136 Bartholomew I meets the president
137 Kirill meets the president
138 The meeting between the Dalai Lama and politicians
139 The Dalai Lama’s meeting in the parliament
140 The Dalai Lama’s meeting with the president
141 The meeting of John Paul II with the parliament
142 The meeting of representatives of the Church and the authorities
143 The meeting of representatives of the opposition and the Church
144 Opposing the concordat
145 Church opposition to the provisions of the Constitution on the secularity  
of the state
146 Church opposition to same-sex unions




147 Opposition of politicians to same-sex unions
148 Opposition to the separation of Church and state
149 Opposing the secularity of schools
150 Opposing reliefs for Churches
151 Tensions between the Church and state
152 Battling against Catholicism
153 Treating the (Polish) Church as a national symbol
154 Treating Catholics as second-class citizens
155 Treating the concordat as a bargaining chip with the Church
156 Treating the cross as a political problem, not a religious one
157 Treating representatives of the Church as politicians
158 Churches appealing for the return of their property
159 Participation of ministers in secular events
160 A politician participating in a religious event
161 The president participating in the mass
162 Government representative going to the Vatican
163 The Pope gives an audience to a representative of Poland’s authorities
164 The Pope gives an audience to a representative of the Polish government
165 Disclosure of data
166 Stabilizing the Church’s position with a concordat
167 Determining the level of the Church-state relationship
168 The president’s position on the Dalai Lama’s visit
169 Removing crosses
170 Maintaining good relations with the Catholic Church
171 Establishing a committee for editing the concordat
172 The authentication of changes in Poland according to the concordat
173 The coalition is addicted to criticizing the concordat
174 Reconciliation of constitutional provisions regarding the Churches
175 Recognizing the concordat as a reference point for other religions
176 Using the term “Real Poles”
177 Fighting for the cross
178 Fighting with the cross
179 Entry into force of the concordat
180 Introducing legal protection for atheists
181 Indicating the inequality of religions
182 Indicating the equality of denominations




184 Pointing to the equality of denominations
185 Pointing to doubts about the concordat
186 Showing that the state is also for non-believers
187 Cooperation between the Church and Solidarity
188 Suspending abortion laws for fear of the Church
189 Explaining the slow pace of work on the concordat
190 Explaining that the left are not atheists
191 Explaining the Church’s tax obligations
192 Showing allergies to Catholicism
193 Using solutions from the concordat for other denominations
194 Listing topics from the secular state
195 Speaking against politicians (by bishops or people of the Church)
196 Developing the understanding of secularity
197 Developing the understanding of neutrality
198 Developing an understanding of secularity
199 The Tribunal’s statement on Church matters
200 Drawing a common path for the state and the Church
201 Bringing the bishop to court
202 The Vatican’s acceptance of the concordat
203 Catholic Church involvement in work on the constitution
204 Catholic Church involvement in work on changes in the constitution
205 Involvement of the Catholic Church in work on social support for the police
206 Involvement of the Catholic Church about in-vitro regulations
207 The Church speaking out on education
208 Asking questions about the place of the Church in a pluralistic society
209 Instigating religious events in the public sphere
210 Announcing the examination of the constitutionality of the concordat
211 Accusing the authorities of conspiracy with a clergyman
212 Boycotting work on the bill for the ratification of the concordat
213 Insulting the cross
214 Drawing attention to the secularity of a building used for religious purposes
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Fig. A.3:  Survey questionnaire on the social reception studies
Dear Sir/Madam,
The Institute of Political Science and Journalism of the University of Silesia is carrying out a 
research project led by Dr. Damian Guzek entitled Media towards the idea of a secular state, 
financed by the National Science Center (grant no.: 2014/15/N/HS5/00646). The project 
addresses the problem of the media representing the idea of a secular state. The following 
questionnaire is part of this project and aims to identify the level of correspondence 
between the respondents’ knowledge and media coverage on the idea of a secular state.
 You have been selected from among the residents of Poland to take part in this survey. 
I am asking for honest and comprehensive answers to the interviewer’s questions, since 
only such statements are valuable. The survey is anonymous and the answers will be used 
to compile collective statistical data.
Thank you for your participation in the research.
1.  Does political power in Poland conduct a dialogue with religious denominations other 








3.  Please indicate (any number of answers) which of the following religious leaders visited 
the Polish parliament:
• Pope John Paul II
• Bartholomew I (Patriarch of Constantinople and spiritual head of world Orthodoxy)
• Kirill (Patriarch of Moscow and All Russia)
• The Dalai Lama
• None
• I do not know
4.  Do you think Poland is a country in which religious freedom is respected, meaning the 





• Hard to say
5.  Do you think Poland is a country in which the constitutional principle of state 







• Hard to say
6.  Please indicate whether you agree or disagree with the statement that in Poland after 





• Hard to say
7.  Please indicate whether you agree or disagree with the statement that in Poland after 





• Hard to say
8.  Please indicate whether you agree or disagree with the statement that in Poland after 





• Hard to say
9. How do you think the cross should be treated in Poland? (any number of answers)
• As a religious symbol
• As a symbol that testifies to the Catholic tradition of the nation
• As a symbol of opposition to the PRL system
• As a symbol of the Smolensk tragedy
• Hard to say
10.  How do you think the participation of state representatives in religious events should 
be treated? (any number of answers)
• As an expression of cooperation between the state and Churches
• As an element emphasizing shared values and traditions
• As proof of breaking the principle of state secularism
• As proof of the influence of religion on state institutions
• Hard to say
(continued on next page )
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11.  Please indicate which of the following statements you consider to be an expression of 
implementing the postulate of a secular state? (any number of answers)
• The withdrawal of religion from schools
• Liberalizing the abortion law
• Liquidating the Church fund
• Removal of religious symbols from public places
• Breaking the concordat
• None
• Hard to say
12.  Please indicate whether you agree or disagree with the statement that in Poland after 





• Hard to say
13.  Please indicate whether you agree or disagree with the statement that in Poland after 





• Hard to say
This part is dedicated to how you use media.
14.  Please indicate the sources (any number of answers) from which you receive 
information about the secular state:





• Church – sermons and parish announcements
• TV
• Other
• None of the above → go to number 16.
15.  Please indicate the main source from which you receive information about the secular 
state:







• Church – sermons and parish announcements
• TV
• Other (which ones?)
• Difficult to say
16.  Please indicate the main source from which you get information out about the 
postulate of breaking the concordat:





• Church – sermons and parish announcements
• TV
• Other
• Difficult to say
17.  Please indicate which opinion about the concordat you hear most often?
• The concordat restores the Church-state bond
• The concordat introduces the denominational state
• The concordat protects the Church against excessive state influence
• The concordat protects the state from excessive Church influence
• None of the above → go to number 19
18.  Please indicate the main source you based your opinion on:





• Church – sermons and parish announcements
• TV
• Other
19.  Which thesis about the secularity of the Polish state do you hear most often?
• It is necessary to defend state secularity
• There is no fear of maintaining state secularism
• The secular state is fictional
• None of the above → go to number 21
(continued on next page )
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20. Please indicate the main source of this thesis:





• Church – sermons and parish announcements
• TV
• Other
This part is devoted to attitudes towards the presence of religion and the Church in 
public space
21.  In Poland, there is a discussion about the place of religion in public life. Are you 
against the cross being put in public buildings, for example schools or offices?
• I am against
• I am not against
• Difficult to say
22.  Please state if you are against religion lessons in schools or not?
• I am against
• I am not against
• Difficult to say
23.  Please state if you are or are not against the Church speaking about moral issues and 
customs?
• I am against
• I am not against
• Difficult to say
24.  Please state whether or not you are against the Church voicing its position on the laws 
passed by the Sejm?
• I am against
• I am not against
• Difficult to say
25.  Please state whether you are or are not against priests telling people how to vote in 
elections?
• I am against
• I am not against
• Difficult to say
26. Please state if you are for or against priests blessing public places and buildings?
• I am against
• I am not against
• Difficult to say
Appendix 271
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27.  Please state whether you are for or against priests or bishops being present at state 
ceremonies and celebrations?
• I am against
• I am not against
• Difficult to say
28.  Please state whether you are for or against state representatives being present at 
religious ceremonies and celebrations?
• I am against
• I am not against
• Difficult to say
29. Please state whether you are for or against the religious style of taking military oaths?
• I am against
• I am not against
• Difficult to say
30. Please state if you are for or against priests appearing on TVP?
• I am against
• I am not against
• Difficult to say
This part concerns demographic and social variables and metrics
31. Please specify your gender:
• Female
• Male






• 65 and over
33. Please indicate your place of residence:
• Village
• City up to 19,999 residents
• 20,000 – 99,999
• 100,000 – 499,999
• 500,000 and over
34. Please indicate your level of education:
• Elementary/Jr. high school
• Basic vocational





35. Please indicate the social and professional group that best describes you:
• Management staff, a specialist with higher education
• Average personnel, technicians












36. Please state your place of employment:
• State or public institution
• State or private company
• Non-agricultural private sector
• Private farm
• Other
37. Please indicate the income per person:
• Up to 649 PLN
• From 650 to 999 PLN
• From 1000 to 1399 PLN
• From 1400 to 1999 PLN
• Over 2000 PLN
• No answer













40. Please indicate your confession (belonging to a Church or religious association):
• Roman Catholic Church (Catholic Church – Latin rite)
• Orthodox Church
• Evangelical Church of Augsburg
• Greek Catholic Church (Catholic Church – Byzantine-Ukrainian rite)




• I do not belong to any religion
• No answer
41. Please indicate how often you participate in religious practices:
• A few times a week
• Once a week
• 1–2 times a month
• Several times a year
• I do not participate in Church at all
• No answer









• Difficult to say
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